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# **Understanding integration policy-making in Japan using a field analytical approach**

**Case studies of Osaka and Yokohama**

Hardeep Singh Aiden

A dissertation submitted to the University of Bristol in accordance with the requirements for award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Social Policy in the Faculty of Social Sciences and Law.

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## **Abstract**

Looking towards Japan, there is a growing number of studies concerned with migration and migrant integration, especially in urban contexts. However, within the Japanese context, and indeed more widely, more investigation is needed into the actors and institutions involved in the integration policy-making process. In particular, the roles played by government and non-government actors and their relative influence on integration policies have been underexplored.

Hence, this study has sought to investigate how the configuration of actors and institutions in Japan has helped shape the policies affecting migrants in Japanese cities. In order to do so, it presents findings from qualitative research carried out in the two Japanese cities with the highest numbers of foreign residents, namely Osaka and Yokohama. The research has sought to investigate the key actors involved in the development of integration policies, the institutional structures that have developed to take formal responsibility for these policies, and the competing narratives and discourses bound up with integration policy-making processes.

Rather than viewing the relationships between institutions and actors as ‘multilevel’, with its emphasis on vertical hierarchy, this study argues that it may be more fruitful to view these interconnections as multi-spatial and multi-scalar. This project has also been carried out with the aim of examining integration-related issues from a relational perspective, by using a Bourdieu-inspired field analytical framework that draws on concepts from governance and citizenship-based research on integration.

Using a relational approach, this study contributes to our understanding of how the balance of control over integration policy-making has changed since the 1990s, highlighting the practices and processes at work within and across the institutions that are shaping integration-related policies and policy-making processes in Japan. Although integration policies are now appearing at the national scale as a result of the reconfiguration of actors involved in the production of these policies, this study also considers how actors are negotiating structure and agency in the development of integration policies at the local scale.



## **Dedication and acknowledgments**

I would like to extend my gratitude to the many people, in many countries, who so generously contributed to the work presented in this thesis.

First and foremost, I wish to thank all the participants who gave up their time to support this project. Without their participation, this thesis could not have been written.

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Carrying out fieldwork in another country is not an easy endeavour. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Mizuuchi Toshio and his colleagues at Osaka City University for their support while I was in Japan. I also wish to acknowledge Marcelo Cargano, Flavia Fulco and Jocelyn Celero for going far beyond the call of duty in their research, interpreting and translation assistance for this project, and Kei Namba for her unfailing transcription support.

I am indebted to my family—my mum, dad, brother and sister—for their unswerving support over the last eight years, which has meant the world to me. I dedicate this thesis to them.



## **Author's declaration**

I declare that the work in this dissertation was carried out in accordance with the requirements of the University's Regulations and Code of Practice for Research Degree Programmes and that it has not been submitted for any other academic award. Except where indicated by specific reference in the text, the work is the candidate's own work. Work done in collaboration with, or with the assistance of, others, is indicated as such. Any views expressed in the dissertation are those of the author.

Signed:

Date: 9 November 2018





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## Glossary

**Citizen (*shimin*)** The word *shimin* in Japan has two meanings: one is citizen in the legal sense and the other is city resident (akin to the French term *citadin*).

**Citizenship (*shiminken, shitizunshippu*)** Either the legal rights and duties of individuals attached to nationality under domestic law (also called national citizenship in this text), or the practices and virtues of individuals and organisations oriented towards the common good or to membership and activities of individuals in civil society associations.

**Denizenship** A set of rights for long-term resident foreign nationals that includes at least the following: long-term residence permits, access to employment, enhanced protection from deportation/expulsion (compared to short-term residents) and provisions for family reunification in the country of residence. In Japan, denizenship is associated with the rights of ‘special permanent residents’.

**Ethnonationality** Membership of a nation sharing a common history, culture, language or descent (which does not necessarily coincide with the totality of persons holding the ‘nationality’ of a country in the legal sense) or membership of an ethnonational minority living within a state, which may be culturally linked to an external kin-state.

**Foreign resident (*gaikokujin jūmin*)** Used more frequently in policy discourse than the Japanese term *imin* (‘immigrant’), foreign residents are defined as first-generation immigrants and individuals from subsequent generations who do not hold Japanese citizenship.

**Immigrant (*imin*)** Although the Japanese term *imin* is rarely used in political discourse, here immigrants are taken to mean first-generation migrants, i.e. those who were born outside of Japan and migrated to Japan at some point in their lives. This definition excludes migrants born to Japanese expatriates, or ethnonationals living temporarily abroad, such as *kikokushijō* (‘returnee children’).

**Japanese (*nihonjin*)** In this study, Japanese people are understood to be those who identify their ethnonationality with Japan. This description overlaps with, but is not equivalent to, those who possess Japanese nationality.

**Korean (*korian/kankokujin/chōsenjin*)** An individual with ethnonationality pertaining to the Korean peninsula, Japanised as *korian*. The term *kankokujin* connotes South Koreans, while the term *chōsenjin* connotes North Koreans.

**National (*kokumin*)** A person holding nationality of a particular state. The Japanese term *kokumin* has been the subject of frequent debate—as it has also been interpreted as referring to people living in Japan regardless of legal nationality—and is often used to refer to Japanese ethnonationals.

**Nationality (*kokuseki*)** The legal relationship between a person and a state as recognised in international law (cf. ethnonationality).

**Naturalisation (*kika*)** Any mode of acquisition after birth of a nationality not previously held by the target person that requires an application by this person or his/her legal agent, as well as an act of granting nationality by a public authority.

**Nikkeijin** A Japanese term referring to people of ‘Japanese origin’, which includes Japanese nationals who emigrated to other parts of the world (particularly South America in the first half of the nineteenth century) and their descendants.

**Non-profit organisation (*hieiri soshiki*)** Any organisation in Japan legally recognised as a specified entity under the provisions of the 1998 NPO Law.

**Oldcomer (*ōrudokamā*)** A Japanese neologism, based on the word ‘newcomer’, used to describe more established immigrants in Japan, especially *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese.

***Seikatusha*** The meaning of *seikatusha* ranges from ‘consumer’ to ‘person who actively organises their own life’ (Seifert 2007).

**Special permanent resident (*tokubetsu eijūsha*)** A legal status available to *Zainichi* people in Japan, who have not naturalised, which guarantees them greater rights than other permanent residents.

***Tabunka kyōsei*** A policy approach concerning the integration of immigrants in Japan, usually translated as ‘multicultural coexistence’ or ‘intercultural living’.

***Zainichi*** A Japanese term used to describe people living in Japan, originally from the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and parts of China, who were once regarded as Japanese

subjects and are now regarded as ‘foreigners’ living in Japan. The term is also applied to their descendants.



## List of abbreviations

The names of Japanese organisations have been abbreviated using the organisation's Japanese name, unless the organisation has a formal English abbreviation.

**ASEAN** Association of Southeast Asian Nations

**CEFP** Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy (*Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi*)

**CLAIR** Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (*Jichitai Kokusaika Kyōkai*)

**CRR** Council for Regulatory Reform (originally known as the *Sōgō Kisei Kaikaku Kaigi*, later shortened to the *Kisei Kaikaku Kaigi*)

**DPJ** Democratic Party of Japan (*Minshutō*)

**FG#** Focus group number #

**GSTK** *Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi* (council of cities with a concentrated foreign population)

**Ijūren** *Ijūsha to Rentai-suru Nettowāku* (Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan)

**IMISCOE** International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion research network

**Keidanren** *Nippon Keizai Dantai Rengōkai* (Japan Business Federation)

**KIF** Kanagawa International Foundation (*Kanagawa Kokusai Kōryū Zaidan*)

**LDP** Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (*Jimintō*)

**MEXT** Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (*Monbukagakushō*)

**MHLW** Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (*Kōseirōdōshō*)

**MIC** Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (*Sōmushō*)

**MOJ** Ministry of Justice (*Hōmushō*)

**NGO** Non-governmental organisation

**NPO** Non-profit organisation (see Glossary)

**OECD** Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

**OFIX** Osaka Foundation of International Exchange (*Ōsaka-fu Kokusai Kōryū Zaidan*)

**OPMFR** Office for the Promotion of Measures for Foreign Residents (*Teijū Gaikokujin Shisaku Suishin Shitsu*)

**TKSK** *Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai* (MIC study group concerned with the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei*)

**YOKE** Yokohama Association for International Communications & Exchanges (*Yokohama-shi Kokusai Kōryū Kyōkai*)

## Notes on spelling and translation

This text follows the Japanese convention of writing the surname first and then the given name, for Japanese names, but vice versa for other names. So, for instance, the Japanese Prime Minister's name is written as Abe Shinzō, rather than Shinzō Abe.

All Japanese words have been italicised (apart from place names) and macrons are used to indicate long vowels in certain words, except where those words are already familiar to English speakers. For example, the Japanese word for 'coexistence' is written as '*kyōsei*', while the capital of Japan has been written as 'Tokyo' rather than '*Tōkyō*'.

All translations in this text are the author's own. Where a translation was produced by an interpreter or translator, these have been marked with a dagger (†) for the sake of economy. To illustrate:

This quotation was translated by a third party, and subsequently edited by the author to remove inconsistencies and to modify any turns of phrase that would seem unclear to a native English speaker without changing the intended meaning. (Interview X, Tokyo†)

Many words in this text have been transliterated rather than translated to highlight the fact there is no adequate English translation. For example, the term *tabunka kyōsei* may be translated as 'multicultural coexistence' or 'intercultural living', but neither of these approximations is entirely satisfactory.

All mistakes and omissions in this text are the author's own.



Although one starts any effort at thick description, beyond the obvious and superficial, from a state of general bewilderment as to what the devil is going on—trying to find one's feet—one does not start (or ought not) intellectually empty-handed. Theoretical ideas are not created wholly anew in each study; as I have said, they are adopted from other, related studies, and, refined in the process, applied to new interpretive problems. If they cease being useful with respect to such problems, they tend to stop being used and are more or less abandoned. If they continue being useful, throwing up new understandings, they are further elaborated and go on being used.

Clifford Geertz (1973, 27)

# 1 Introduction: integration policies and policy-making in Japan

## 1.1 Background

Against the backdrop of declining fertility rates and population aging, the stock of foreign-born people as a proportion of the population has gradually increased in most economically developed countries (OECD 2017, 295–97). While the benefits of immigration to host societies seem to receive much less attention than the challenges, it is fair to say that the issues surrounding the admission and incorporation of migrants into host societies are posing multiple challenges for policymakers and other integration policy stakeholders.

Immigration is not a linear or universal process; it is, predominantly, an urban or metropolitan trend with immigrants clustering in cities and suburban areas. While immigration is a major concern on national policy agendas, the impacts are local. A focus on cities as sites of migrant integration brings attention to the spatial and socioeconomic contexts of migration and highlights the implications of immigration for local politics. Local officials are on the front line, but may lack adequate support or acknowledgment from central government regarding the pressures they face.

In the case of Japan, the foreign resident population has grown fairly steadily since the late 1980s to the point where registered foreigners now account for almost 2.4 million people within the country, or 1.9% of the population (see Figure 1.1). Upon closer examination, the figures reveal that a third of all registered foreigners live in the 23 special wards of Tokyo<sup>1</sup> and five other major cities: Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kobe and Kyoto (see Table 1.1). Understanding what these cities are doing to address the issues affecting local foreign residents, and how, is essential if we are to better understand the migration process in Japan.


Over the last decade or so, there has been a growing trend to look at these issues in terms of the policy-making process itself, exemplified by the work of several

---

<sup>1</sup> Administratively speaking, the 23 special wards of Tokyo (akin to the boroughs of London) have not constituted a single entity since 1943 when the city of Tokyo (*Tōkyō-shi*) was merged with the prefecture of Tokyo (*Tōkyō-fu*) to form the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (*Tōkyō-to*).

IMISCOE researchers.<sup>2</sup> In what Giovanna Zincone and Tiziana Caponio describe as a ‘sort of fourth generation research topic’ of migration research (Zincone and Caponio 2006, 6), scholars are seeking to understand the political processes through which immigration and immigrant integration policies come into existence and how their implementation is steered. In particular, these researchers have been exploring the governance of migration. Since 2014, researchers at the University of Sheffield have also been exploring issues relating to migration governance as part of the *Prospects for International Migration Governance* (MIGPROSP) project.

**Figure 1.1 Number of registered foreign nationals in Japan, 1980–2016 (stock)**



Sources: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015); *Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei (kyū-tōroku gaikokujin tōkei) tōkei-hyō*, Ministry of Justice ([http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei\\_ichiran\\_touroku.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html))

As Borkert and Bosswick suggest, the ‘making of migration policies is a multidimensional and complex process’, involving and affecting ‘different spheres of society (local, regional, national, international) as well as it is influenced by the interaction between a multitude of social-political actors’ (Borkert and Bosswick 2011, 95). These processes are often said to be characterised by phases of ‘policy formulation, operationalisation and instrumentalisation and actual policy implementation’ (Borkert and Penninx 2011, 10–11) and understanding these processes in the case of migration policy-making can give us valuable insights into the variances between policy intentions and outcomes.

<sup>2</sup> IMISCOE (International Migration, Integration and Social Cohesion in Europe) is a European network of scholars in the area of migration and integration.

**Table 1.1 Number of foreign residents in the 23 special wards of Tokyo and the five largest designated cities, as at June 2017**

City	Prefecture	Number of foreign residents	As percentage of all foreign residents in Japan (%)
23 special wards	Tokyo	439,821	17.8
Osaka	Osaka	130,378	5.3
Yokohama	Kanagawa	92,117	3.7
Nagoya	Aichi	77,668	3.1
Kobe	Gunma	46,831	1.9
Kyoto	Kyoto	43,230	1.7
<b>Total</b>		<b>830,045</b>	<b>33.5</b>

Note: The 23 special wards of Tokyo comprise the area that was, until 1943, the city of Tokyo

Source: *Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei* ('foreign resident statistics'). Available at <http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001196143>

However, there are several issues regarding the research that has been carried out to date. To begin with, the research that has been conducted in this domain has focused primarily on European countries while other countries and contexts remain to be investigated. This is particularly evident in the scant number of articles concerning Japan, or East Asia, in some of the key journals in the field.<sup>3</sup>

In addition, the relationships between the institutions under investigation have been explored as 'vertical' and hierarchical, and researchers have tended to approach these relationships through 'top-down' or 'bottom-up' approaches. Rather than viewing the relationships between institutions and actors as 'multilevel', with its emphasis on vertical order, this study approaches these interconnections as multi-spatial and multi-scalar.

The number of studies concerned with immigrant integration in Japan, especially in urban contexts, is growing (for example, Douglass and Roberts 2000; Tsuda 2006a; Kawamura, Kondō, and Nakamoto 2009; Chung 2010). However, within the Japanese context and more widely, what is needed is more investigation into the actors and institutions involved in migration policy-making processes, to understand the roles they play and their relationships with one another. Hence this project offers a timely, non-European perspective on an innovative branch of migration scholarship.

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<sup>3</sup> For instance, searching for articles on Japan (i.e. articles where Japan is the key focus or one of the key sites) in journals such as *Migration Studies* or the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* yields many fewer results than countries such as Germany, France, the UK or the US.

## 1.2 Japanese migration research: key developments

There is a growing corpus of academic scholarship focusing on migration in East Asia and the Asia Pacific (including Haines, Lee, and Chan 2014; Chan, Fung, and Szymańska-Matusiewicz 2015). While researchers have engaged in multiple strands of research in order to understand the Japanese integration regime, three in particular are worth highlighting for their originality, for their connection to wider issues within Japanese policy studies, and for their relevance to this study.

### 1.2.1 The human rights approach: activism and global norms

The human rights based approach was a natural consequence of grassroots activism to win greater rights for Japan's minorities, in particular the *Buraku* and *Zainichi* Korean communities.

As Neary (2002) explains, the human rights cause was first taken up and promoted by the Buraku Liberation League (*Buraku Kaihō Dōmei*), created in 1955, to the point where human rights became synonymous with *Buraku* discrimination in some areas. *Buraku* communities are descended from an underclass of butchers, tanners and executioners, who were legally and socially excluded from mainstream society in the premodern era due to their association with 'death'. Their struggle for greater equality and recognition for the issues they were facing helped shine a light on postwar Japan's commitment to human rights and gradually led to measures to improve their socioeconomic status (Neary 2002, 35–42). It also provided a source of inspiration for activism by *Zainichi* Koreans (Chung 2010).

Political mobilisation by *Zainichi* Koreans was less successful in the fifties and sixties, but from the late 1970s onward their efforts were rewarded with greater civil and social rights, and to a lesser extent political rights. Tsutsui and Shin (2008) suggest that this is all the more remarkable given that *Zainichi* Koreans were unable to exert pressure on elected officials or influence national politics through other direct means. Instead they argue that global human rights instruments, combined with local mobilisation efforts, helped produce policy changes..

Research by predominantly Japanese scholars helped shine a light on the discrimination facing foreigners in Japan. A classic work in this vein is Kōmai Hiroshi's *Migrant Workers in Japan* (Komai 1993). Kōmai is well known as an

activist, who, among other things, has called for amnesty for ‘illegal immigrants’ in Japan as a matter of human rights (Kashiwazaki 2000, 466). Works by Kōmai and other activists/scholars in the 1980s and 1990s produced detailed accounts of the problems facing migrants through a right-based framework.

Activist groups, especially academics and civil society organisations, impatient with the national government’s neglect of non-entry control aspects of international migration see local governments as a viable alternative site for action (for example Komai 2004). In Japan, migrant-supporting organisations have worked with local government officials to target the national bureaucracy and the Supreme Court to influence policy outcomes on immigration (Shipper 2008). Local government officials, dedicated to fostering a distinct collective identity for their community, make good partners in such endeavours.

Other scholars, such as Amy Gurowitz, have focused on developments at the transnational scale, beginning with Japan’s ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1979, as a way of understanding domestic policy changes. Addressing claims that advocates of international human rights standards have not adequately demonstrated their importance in domestic policy-making, Gurowitz (1999) argues that international norms have helped bring about significant changes to discriminatory policies in Japan. While Japan might have adopted international norms as part of its role as an international player, ‘Japanese lawyers, activists, and government officials have attributed the various improvements in policy toward Korean-Japanese (as well as toward Burakumin and Ainu) in large part to ratification of these agreements’ (Gurowitz 1999, 429).

The work of Gurowitz and others highlights the role of the Japanese state in absorbing international ideas and in working with other nation-states to agree domestic and regional policies. This is not to say that transnational actors have no part to play in Japanese integration policy-making, but that much of what we consider to be transnational activities are conducted between states and subnational actors, rather than via supranational agencies. Nonetheless, few researchers have explored integration policy-making in relation to the concurrent activities of transnational and domestic actors.

In Japan, although the proportion of foreign residents among the total population is small in comparison to other industrialised countries, several hundred support groups exist to offer a variety of services to foreign workers and to advocate for their rights and welfare. Piper and Ball (2001) estimated there to be over 200 such groups at the turn of the century, but the current number is likely to be much higher. Among these, women's groups in particular often promote and appeal for strong transnational linkages against human trafficking and the violation of human rights. Most have established local 'networks' within their own country, and some have begun to establish transnational links, particularly with an Asia-Pacific focus (Piper and Ball 2001).

### **1.2.2 The citizenship approach**

Drawing on citizenship-based approaches developed in the European context in the 1980s and 1990s (for a critical overview, see Favell 2001), migration studies scholars focusing on the Japanese context have used similar approaches to investigate integration policies in Japan (for example, Chung 2010).

Looking towards the transnational scale, the global human rights norms and instruments discussed in the previous section have also been characterised in terms of 'postnational' forms of citizenship (Soysal 1994; Sassen 2002). Based on universal ideas of personhood, it has been suggested that postnational rights and claim-making may challenge citizenship at the nation-state level (Soysal 1994). Looking at the phenomenon of so-called guest workers in postwar Europe, Yasemin Soysal argued that 'the recent guestworker experience reflects a time when national citizenship is losing ground to a more universal model of citizenship anchored in deterritorialized notions of persons' rights' (Soysal 1994, 3). As well as the global human rights culture, Soysal also argued that the development of transnational political structures has acted to 'constrain the host states from dispensing with their migrants at will' (Soysal 1994, 144), which could be described as a form of 'soft governance' (Geddes and Scholten 2016, 170–71).

By contrast, several scholars have been critical of postnational citizenship. Joppke (2010), for instance, argues that postnational citizenship leaves second-generation immigrants, and their descendants, in a vulnerable position, as they continue to lack the political rights that are conferred by national citizenship. In addition, states have

also used national citizenship ‘as a tool for integration, with distinctly disciplinary and coercive connotations’ (Joppke 2010, 22), which is evident in the increasing use of language proficiency as a prerequisite for settlement, naturalisation or even immigration (S. W. Goodman 2010). Thus national citizenship continues to play an important role in integration policy-making and this shows no signs of abating (Joppke 2010).

While transnational institutions may be able to encourage change, it has been pointed out that they do not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state (Tsuda 2006b, 10). Moreover, if we look beyond the European Union, although we should not discount the importance of the intangible influence of transnational institutions, the tangible impact of transnational political structures on domestic policy-making is arguably much weaker.

Other scholars have approached the issue of migrant integration by looking at citizenship at a subnational scale. There are several reasons for looking at subnational institutions, including local governments, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and, potentially, trade unions or businesses. In the absence of an overarching national strategy to address the issues faced by immigrants, many observers have commented on the role played by local government in supporting the integration of migrants into Japanese society (Komai 2001, 118–37; Komai 2004; Tsuda 2006a). While state-migrant relations are important, foreign residents in Japan do not have access to the formal rights conferred by national citizenship. However, some researchers have treated the relationship between local government and minority groups as a new type of citizenship. Local governments are said to be acting to fill the void, left by the national government, by treating foreign residents in their areas of jurisdiction as ‘local citizens’ (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Tsuda 2006a).

Although foreign residents are not guaranteed the same access to social services as ‘ordinary’ citizens under national policy, many local authorities and NGOs are tackling discriminatory practices at a ‘local’ level (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000, 245). Under this schema, migrants are entitled to rights conferred by local governments as residents within particular areas under the aegis of those governments. Even with ‘local citizenship’, however, other practical issues such as Japanese language illiteracy or unfamiliarity with local procedures may pose a problem for migrants



wishing to exercise those rights. It may therefore be expected that policy approaches towards migrants would aim to resolve such problems. Local governments and civil society organisations are in a good position to transform the (in)formal rights of that foreign residents possess as local citizens into substantive rights.

Although the focus of citizenship-based migration studies has conventionally been on the state–migrant nexus, and the rights and obligations attached to this relationship, Japanese migration studies have pushed the boundaries of this research in line with research on local citizenship and local governance in other parts of the world (for example, see the contributions in the volume by Tsuda 2006b; including Agrela and Dietz 2006). However, mapping out the roles and responsibilities of local institutions and foreign residents, with reference to the urban and national context, is the first step in determining whether local citizenship has any mileage as a scholarly concept.

### **1.2.3 The governance approach**

While the ‘conventional’ focus of citizenship is the relationship between individuals and ‘the state’ (as exemplified by Marshall 1950), governance focuses our attention on the constellation of actors involved in the policy-making process. In particular, governance approaches concentrate on actors’ roles, inter-relationships and various strategies of policy-making (Rhodes 1997; Daly 2003; Swyngedouw 2005), including the participation and agency of migrants themselves. As Chhotray and Stoker point out, governance approaches may also address ‘the role of government in governance and the degree to which governance undermines or supports democratic accountability in public decision-making’ (Chhotray and Stoker 2009, 18). Moreover, the decisions made by these actors are enacted in different spaces and at different scales—the transnational, national, regional, and local. The roles of space and scale, and their interconnectedness, can also be explored through a governance lens (Martin, McCann, and Purcell 2003; Kennett 2017).

The discussion so far has shown that an increasing number of Japanese migration scholars have examined the roles of actors apart from the national government since the 1990s. Several studies have looked at the roles of, and relationships between, actors and policy instruments from the transnational sphere (Gurowitz 1999; Flowers 2016), local government sphere (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Tegtmeyer Pak 2006;

Kashiwazaki 2003), and ‘civil society’ (Shipper 2008; Chung 2010), particularly from legal and policy perspectives (Kashiwazaki 2000).

Governance takes account of the autonomous nature of local governments and NGOs as policy innovators. Tegtmeier Pak (2006) notes that local government has a history of proactive policy-making going back to the 1960s and 1970s and that policies concerning foreign residents fit into this trend. This policy-making role has arguably been strengthened since the 1990s with decentralisation (*chihō bunken*) featuring firmly on the political agenda. Shipper (2008, 128–29) contends that local governments have acknowledged the work performed by NGOs and have developed innovative policy initiatives with the expertise of these foreigner support groups. This position is backed up by Takezawa’s (2008) research into the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, where volunteers from the affected areas and beyond subsequently set up NGOs providing various services to foreigners, including non-registered foreigners. Such services may fill vital gaps in the absence of national schemes.

Despite the growth of research into the roles of, and relationships between, various actors involved in the integration process, a more comprehensive overview has been lacking. Typical of this work is the edited volume by the doyen of Japanese migration research, Kōmai Hiroshi (2004). The authors in that volume offer a detailed description of local government policies and NGO initiatives in three municipalities—the cities of Hamamatsu and Kawasaki and the town of Ōizumi—as well as a discussion of local community and trade union activities. However, as with many other studies from this period, the discussion is confined to the normative and never moves into the theoretical space. In addition, I would argue that research in this area would benefit from a closer analysis of the relationship between national and local government (Aiden 2011).

### **1.3 Research approach**

The extent to which the national government, local governments and civil society actors are involved in determining the balance of equality between migrants and Japanese ethnonationals through the Japanese welfare regime is a compelling research agenda with implications beyond the Japanese context. It is therefore timely to examine the Japanese case in more detail, using a framework capable of capturing

the dynamic relationships between the actors and institutions involved in migration policy-making processes.

This study has adopted a relational approach for understanding integration policies and policy-making in Japan, which I believe has the potential to shed new light on these phenomena, while incorporating elements of governance and citizenship-based frameworks.

### **1.3.1 Introducing a relational approach to investigate integration policies and policy-making**

The aim of this study has been to investigate integration policies and policy-making processes related to the settlement and integration of foreign residents in Japan, using concepts drawn from governance and citizenship-based studies. The ‘conventional’ focus of citizenship is the relationship between individuals and the state.

Governance, meanwhile, focuses our attention on the configuration of actors (including the national government, local governments and civil society actors) involved in the policy-making process, and their roles, interrelationships and various strategies of policy-making, including the participation and agency of migrants themselves. Moreover, the decisions made by these actors are made in different spaces—the transnational, the national, the regional and the local—where different aspects of governance and citizenship are enacted and contested.

While scholars have often used concepts from citizenship and governance concurrently, I propose going a step further. In this study, I have focused on the relational dimensions of governance and citizenship-based frameworks—the aspects of these frameworks that focus on the relationships between the actors involved in the production of integration policies in the Japanese context. In fact, part of the purpose of this project has been to understand how integration policy-making processes may be studied using a relational approach. By this I mean an approach that focuses on the relationships between certain policy-making actors and institutions, not just on the entities themselves.

I argue that field analysis provides a germane way of combining citizenship and governance-based approaches by viewing them through a single relational framework. Field analysis was developed by Pierre Bourdieu as part of his relational

approach to sociology (for an overview, see Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). According to Bourdieu, modern society is characterised by the existence of multiple independent arenas, which he described as ‘fields’ or simply as ‘spaces’, that although empirically interrelated and mutually determinative, nonetheless obey their own internal laws and principles to some extent (Emirbayer and Williams 2005). Thinking systematically in terms of fields involves viewing all aspects of society relationally: beginning with national society itself (which Bourdieu described as the social space as a whole) down to microcosmic fields, such as individual families, and everything in between.

While some of Bourdieu’s concepts have been used in migration studies before—in particular, ‘cultural capital’ and ‘habitus’ à la Bourdieu—they are seldom used as part of field analysis in the way that Bourdieu intended. Using the concepts of capital or habitus without situating them within a field does not make conceptual sense from a Bourdieuan perspective. This study therefore uses an analytical framework based on a ‘fuller’ understanding of field theory, rather than a selective appropriation of Bourdieu’s analytical toolkit.

The purpose of this study is not to suggest that a relational approach is necessarily better than other approaches, but to demonstrate the utility of a relational approach through an empirical investigation of the research questions outlined below.

### **1.3.2 Research questions**

Using a relational approach, this study has sought to address the following question: how does the configuration of actors and institutions in Japan help shape the policies affecting migrants in Japanese cities? More specifically:

- Who are the key actors involved in the development of integration policies and why?
- What institutional structures have developed to take formal responsibility for these policies?
- How have integration policies and policy-making processes been influenced by critical events or ‘junctions’?

- How are the subjects of integration policies constructed within policy-making processes? What does this reveal about the nature of these policies and the relationships between the actors and institutions involved?

Given that the majority of foreign residents in Japan are located in urban environments, these processes have been explored in the two cities with the highest numbers of (registered) foreign residents, namely the cities of Osaka and Yokohama.

### 1.3.3 The study sites: Osaka and Yokohama

The communities of Osaka and Yokohama provide pertinent sites for exploring the production and experiencing of integration policies within the Japanese context. Figure 1.2 shows the number of ‘registered foreign residents’ (*gaikokujin tōrokusha*) in Japan’s largest cities, where ‘foreignness’ is defined by ‘nationality’.<sup>4</sup>

While Tokyo is home to a much larger number of foreign residents than Osaka, Tokyo’s administrative arrangements are such that it cannot be classified as a single city. Hence the city of Osaka has the highest number of (registered) foreign residents of any ‘designated city’ (municipalities with a population of greater than 500,000 and designated as cities by government ordinance) in Japan. Between them, the top ten designated cities accounted for almost a quarter of all foreign residents in Japan in 2016. Consequently, Osaka represents an important case in which to understand how Japanese cities conceptualise and approach the issues related to the integration process.


While Osaka is host to about 126,000 foreign residents, the majority of Osaka’s foreign resident population is made up of residents of Korean origin, many of whom are *Zainichi* (Koreans who settled in Japan as imperial subjects, along with their descendants). Bearing this in mind, a slightly different picture emerges if we focus on those migrant groups of non-Korean origin (see Figure 1.3). Yokohama has the highest number of non-Korean foreign residents, followed by Osaka, Nagoya,

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<sup>4</sup> Here, the Japanese term *kokuseki* has been translated as ‘nationality’. For the majority of Japanese ethnonationals this is a non-issue: one’s ‘nation-ness’ and ‘state-ness’ are identical (McCrone and Kiely 2000). However, it is important to maintain the analytical distinction between nationality and citizenship in the light of an increasing immigrant population and growing articulations of intra-Japanese difference (e.g. Okinawan-ness) as forms of political and cultural resistance. The relationship between citizenship, ethnicity and identity in the Japanese context is explored more fully by other scholars, such as Tai (2004) in the case of *Zainichi* Koreans.


Kawasaki (located near Yokohama) and Kobe (located near Osaka). Consequently, Yokohama represents a second important case study site.

**Figure 1.2 Cities with highest numbers of registered foreign residents by nationality, as at December 2016**



Source: *Shikuchōson-betsu kokuseki/chiiki-betsu zairyū gaikokujin* ('foreign residents by municipality and by nationality/region'). Available at <http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001177523>

**Figure 1.3 Cities with highest numbers of registered foreign residents by nationality (excluding residents of Korean origin) as at December 2016**




Source: *Shikuchōson-betsu kokuseki/chiiki-betsu zairyū gaikokujin* ('foreign residents by municipality and by nationality/region'). Available at <http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001177523>

The map below (Figure 1.4) shows the location of the key study sites, as well as the locations of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (the site of central government in Japan) and Hamamatsu City: a city heavily involved in integration policy-making through

its role as part of the *Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi* (or GSTK, discussed in more detail later in the text).

**Figure 1.4 Map showing the locations of the study sites within Japan**



Osaka and Yokohama are located in two of the most heavily populated and economically productive metropolitan areas in the world. The city of Osaka lies in Osaka prefecture, itself located in the wider Kansai region. Kansai comprises seven prefectures: Osaka, Mie, Nara, Wakayama, Kyoto, Hyōgo and Shiga. Owing to its proximity to Kobe and Kyoto, Osaka is sometimes grouped with these cities in a region called the Keihanshin metropolitan area—home to roughly 20 million people.

Like Kansai, the Kantō region encompasses seven prefectures: Gunma, Tochigi, Ibaraki, Saitama, Chiba, Tokyo and Kanagawa, which is home to the city of Yokohama as well as the city of Kawasaki. With an estimated one third of the total Japanese population living within its administrative borders, Kantō is the most heavily populated region in Japan.

## **1.4 Chapter outline**

Chapter two sets out the historical context of immigration and immigrant policies in Japan, with due attention to the political, social and economic circumstances under which these policies arose, and the contemporaneous patterns of migration. Specific attention is given to the configuration of these factors as they coalesced in the urban spaces of Osaka and Yokohama during the course of the twentieth century. The discussion then turns to the way in which integration policies have been framed and the ways in which migrants and migrants' rights have been constructed within these policies.

Expanding on the themes presented in the next chapter, chapters three and four sketch out a relational framework for conceptualising and analysing the issues, actors and institutions involved in integration policy-making within the Japanese context. The conceptual framework sketched out in the third chapter draws on concepts developed in governance and citizenship studies, while the fourth chapter demonstrates how integration policies and policy-making may be viewed through the relational perspective of field analysis—an analytical approach developed by Pierre Bourdieu.

The theory and practice are integrated in the fifth chapter through a discussion of the qualitative research methods used to explore the research questions, namely documentary review, interviews with integration policy stakeholders and focus groups carried out with foreign residents with a connection to Yokohama or Osaka.

The findings from the study sites are presented in chapter six—which focuses on the data gathered through the policy stakeholder interviews—and chapter seven, which draws primarily on the focus group data. Taken together, the qualitative research findings highlight the relations between the actors and institutions involved in the



production of integration policies at a national and local scale, and how these policies are experienced by migrants and other foreign residents in Japan.

The findings are discussed critically in the penultimate chapter. By engaging with the data from the study sites, this chapter attempts to refine our understanding of the issues at stake in the development of integration policies in Japan using a field analytical approach. The strengths and limitations of this study, and implications for wider migration research, are discussed in the concluding chapter.

## **2 Migration policies and policy research in Japan**

### **2.1 Introduction**

We cannot discuss Japan's integration policies without reference to the way in which Japan's immigration regime is managed. While *immigration* policies are concerned with the admission, entrance and exit of people who used to live outside the territory in question, *immigrant* or *integration* policies relate to immigrants and their position in the new society of settlement (Borkert and Penninx 2011, 14–15). However, it is worth emphasising that the parameters of immigrant policies may well be affected by the outcomes of immigration policies and the latter may, in turn, be revised in the light of the former.

Thus, while the focus of this study is on integration policies and policy-making in Japan, it is also necessary to look at how migrants are stratified before they even step foot on Japanese territory. As Kraler observes, 'contemporary migration management largely operates through allocating differential rights to different categories of migrants and thus through legally discriminating against (certain categories of) foreign nationals' (Kraler 2010, 13). Viewed in this way, it could be argued that the Japanese immigration system demarcates immigrants in terms of statuses and associated packages of rights, which may shape their subsequent settlement experiences.

Hence, this chapter presents an overview of the immigration regime and the integration policies that have been developed in Japan, with a particular focus on the development of integration policies in the two study sites—Osaka and Yokohama. This is followed by a review of the literature on the policy paradigms that have characterised Japanese integration policies, with a view to unpicking some of the ways in which issues have been framed and migrants have been constructed within these paradigms.

### **2.2 The problem of/with integration**

The issue of 'integrating' migrants into host societies poses multiple challenges for all concerned. The term itself is highly contested despite its popularity over other terms such as inclusion, incorporation and cohesion (Favell 2001). Indeed, Schierup

and others have used the term ‘incorporation’ in preference to integration which they regard as politically loaded by dint of its connection to particular national policy regimes (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 40).

But what exactly is (social) integration?<sup>5</sup> Loosely defined, integration involves a process through which migrants adapt to a host society, but this definition raises several issues. Geddes, for example, makes the following three observations regarding integration:

First, we usually recognise integration only in its absence as social exclusion or disintegration rather than being able to specify what is meant by an integrated society. [...] Second, the integration of immigrants is often linked to discussion of immigrants as though these militate against inclusion or are vehicles for creation of a more progressive multicultural society. [...] Third, citizens tend to look to the state to guarantee the expectation of integration, i.e., not that this will necessarily be attained given that it’s difficult to say what it would mean, but that governments are at least expected to show that they care. (Geddes 2003, 23–24)

As Geddes rightly observes, the absence of integration in the form of ‘disintegration’ is more easily understood than integration per se. The ‘polar opposite [of integration] is so obviously bad as to almost force us to accept integration as a necessity’ (Favell 2001, 353).

In a less direct way of defining integration, we can also identify a range of policies that could broadly be termed integration or immigrant policies. While *immigration* policies are concerned with border controls and admission, *integration* policies focus on the consequences of immigration and issues associated with (permanent) settlement. Such issues may include the need for legal and social protection, naturalisation and citizenship rights, housing provision, multicultural education policies and host-society language courses. (For a comprehensive list, see Favell 2001).

This is problematic for several reasons. First, the collection of policies, provisions and interventions that might constitute a broad integration policy does not tell us what the expected outcome is. At the very least they may stave off ‘disintegration’, but other than that it is not obvious what the results will be. Second, cross-national

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<sup>5</sup> Japanese scholarship makes frequent reference to immigrant policies as ‘social integration policies’ (*shakai tōgō seisaku*), as opposed to just ‘integration policies’, but neither term is widely used in non-academic discourses.

studies on integration invariably assume that immigrants are integrating into one homogeneous society within one nation-state. Third, there is a tendency in the wider literature on migrant integration to associate the set of policies and initiatives that *could* be termed integration policies with the national government. Yet any number of actors may be the originators and implementers of these policies, as Favell notes.

What should be asked first is how and why this disparate range of state policies, laws, local initiatives and societal dispositions—which could be implemented by many agencies at many levels—comes to be thought of as a single nation-state’s overall strategy or policy of *integration*. Who or what is integrating whom and with what? (Favell 2001, 351)

In polities, such as Japan, where local governments also have the ability to develop local-level policies or programmes, it would seem reasonable to consider these instruments as part of local processes of integration. It is inadequate to discuss ‘local’ integration in terms of national policies toward foreign residents or immigrants, without due regard for what is happening at the local scale. As Ireland notes, ‘in order to gain a complete understanding of the political aspects of immigration, one has to examine local-level developments’ (Ireland 1994, 19). On the other hand, there is also a need to be critical towards recent research into local government initiatives that ignores the role of the state and its effect on other actors (Aiden 2011).

## **2.3 Migration policies and policy-making in Japan**

### **2.3.1 Immigration to Japan: an overview**

Despite being frequently described as a recent country of immigration (Tsuda 2006a), Japan has had a long history of migration. In times before the nation-state was born, it was particularly cities and local authorities that had fulfilled the need to ‘regulate’ some aspects of admission and residence, for example by providing people a ‘pass’ through the territory and permission to exert a profession (Borkert and Penninx 2011, 8). Even during Japan’s period of ‘seclusion’ (*sakoku*) between the early 1600s and the mid-1800s, considerable trading activity occurred between Japan and other parts of Asia via Japan’s coastal cities, and these trade networks subsequently formed the basis of important migration routes (Hamashita 2009). This is evident in the historical activities of cities such as Yokohama and Nagasaki, where thriving Chinatowns saw little interference from the Tokugawa shogunate (c. 1600–1868). After Japan reopened its doors to regular global trade in the 1850s and 1860s,

Chinese and Western merchants began to form foreign settlements in Japan's major port cities at the end of the nineteenth century (Yamawaki 2000). While the direct influence of local governments on Japanese immigration policy seems to have waned, indirect forms of influence also receive scant attention from scholars of contemporary migration, which may be an oversight.

With Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, 'internal' migration flows between the Korean Peninsula and Japan were soon established, and hundreds of thousands of Korean 'subjects' were later conscripted into labour service during the Second World War (Ryang 2000). Over half a million Koreans and smaller numbers of Taiwanese and mainland Chinese people remained in Japan after the war and came to be described as *Zainichi*, literally meaning 'in Japan'.

Against this backdrop, the first major piece of postwar immigration legislation was passed in 1951. The Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (*shutsunyūkoku kanri oyobi nanmin nintei hō*) was designed 'to provide for equitable control over the entry into or departure from Japan of all persons and to consolidate the procedures for recognition of refugee status'. With the Allied occupation of Japan drawing to an end, *Zainichi* Koreans and Chinese were formally declared to be 'aliens' or 'foreigners' (*gaikokujin*) from April 1952 onwards (Chung 2010). However, following the normalisation of diplomatic ties between Japan and South Korea that culminated in the 1965 Treaty, *Zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese were granted the right to 'special permanent resident' (*tokubetsu eijūsha*) status—now viewed as a form of 'denizenship' (see below).

Japan experienced fairly low levels of immigration throughout the 1960s and 1970s, but Sellek (2001, 15–54) identifies three major stages of migration of foreign workers to Japan in the postwar era. The first began in the late 1970s, marked by an influx of predominantly female migrants concentrated in the sex and entertainment industries and, to a lesser extent, the admission of refugees from the Indochinese Peninsula. The second stage was marked by a shift towards an increasing number of male migrant workers into low-wage jobs from the mid-1980s onward, which, like the first stage, was primarily irregular migration.

The most recent stage, beginning with the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control Act, has been characterised by Japan's deep economic recession. The Act was

revised to rationalise the status-of-residence system by introducing 27 up-to-date residence permit categories. As Takao notes:

Foreigners residing in Japan may engage in the scope of activity that is specified by their status of residence. Period of stay is determined by the status of foreigners. All foreigners residing in Japan are obliged to register as foreign residents within 90 days of entering Japan. They must complete Foreign Resident Registration at their local ward or municipal office and receive a foreign resident registration card. This is the key procedure for foreigners to be eligible for social services. (Takao 2003, 528)


At the same time, the Act also reinforced measures against ‘illegal foreign workers’ or ‘visa overstayers’ (*fuho taizaisha*), making the situations of many foreign workers precarious. As Sellek observes, ‘immigration policy in Japan has been adopted so that the so-called “unskilled foreign workers” are forbidden from entering the country’ (Sellek 2001, 91). In reality, however, foreign workers continued to work as ‘unskilled’ labour through various types of status of residence, especially as ‘foreign trainees’ (*gaikokujin kenshusei*) and as euphemistic ‘entertainers’, while receiving no formal recognition as workers by the authorities.

These developments have gradually changed the composition of foreign residents in Japan in terms of the (ethno)nationalities of those residents (see Figure 2.1). Of those that benefitted from the ‘side door’ policies introduced by the revision, the *Nikkeijin* (foreign-born descendants of Japanese emigrants) were perhaps the biggest winners. Shortly before the amended Immigration Control Act came into effect on 1 June 1990, the Ministry of Justice issued a circular specifying new criteria for obtaining the long-term resident (*teijūsha*) visa which had been newly introduced in the revised Act (Sellek 2001; Kondō 2009; Akashi 2010). Hence, a legal migration channel was opened up for third generation *Nikkeijin*, as well as their spouses and dependants, through an administrative mechanism; as opposed to a legislative one, which would have been subject to greater scrutiny. Since their admission was not treated as economic migration, those entering with the visa could take up any occupational activities, thus becoming de facto migrant workers.

Competing explanations have been put forward for this expansionary move. One explanation is that the special provision was intended to rebalance the legal status of the descendants of earlier Japanese emigrants—not just those in South America but those living elsewhere too—with the status of third and fourth generation *Zainichi*

Koreans and Taiwanese in Japan (Kondō 2009; Akashi 2010). Another is that the admission of *Nikkeijin* was expanded as part of a labour market strategy to secure unskilled workers without threatening Japan's ethnonational homogeneity. The fact that most South American *Nikkeijin* who arrived after the 1990 amendment subsequently found employment as unskilled labour seems to lend weight to this assessment (Akashi 2010).


**Figure 2.1 Number of foreign residents in Japan by nationality, 1980–2016**



Sources: *Kokuseki, nenrei (5-nen kaikyū) betsu gaikokujin-suu* ('number of foreigners by nationality, 5-year age bands'), Statistics Bureau of Japan. Available at <https://www.stat.go.jp/data/chouki/02.html>  
*Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei (kyū-tōroku gaikokujin tōkei) tōkei-hyō* ('statistics on foreign residents'), Ministry of Justice. Available at [http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei\\_ichiran\\_touroku.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html)

In reality, both accounts may be correct to a certain degree, but Anglophone scholarship has largely privileged the latter explanation (for a thoughtful discussion, see Akashi 2010). Yamanaka, for instance, describes the admission of *Nikkeijin* as a 'political compromise' enabling employers to meet their labour needs while attempting to 'maintain racial, ethnic and social homogeneity in the face of progressive transnationalization' (Yamanaka 1996, 78). Viewed in this light, the Government's rationale that the new provision would enable *Nikkeijin* to visit their ancestral homeland seems to be a thin cover for the actual policy logic (Tsuda 1999; Chung 2010). However, conceding this publicly would certainly have paved the way for international criticism of 'racism in labour-migration policies' (Surak 2008, 566).

**Figure 2.2 Number of foreign residents in Japan by residence status, 2006–2016**



Note: Fourteen key categories are presented here (including SHIS, which stands for specialist in humanities/international services) but there are several categories which are not shown

Source: *Zairyū gaikokujin tōkei (kyū-tōroku gaikokujin tōkei) tōkei-hyō* ('statistics on foreign residents'), Ministry of Justice. Available at [http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei\\_ichiran\\_touroku.html](http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html)

The growth in *Nikkeijin* migration over the next two decades began to reverse following the global financial crisis and the temporary introduction of a repatriation programme which barred re-entry for three years. Figure 2.2 shows that there were almost 270,000 people in Japan on long-term resident visas in 2006. Among the visa holders, approximately 153,000 were Brazilian nationals and 21,000 were Peruvian nationals, with Chinese nationals and Philippine nationals making up a further 60,000. By 2012, the number of Brazilian nationals with long-term resident visas had declined to 53,000. At the same time, the number of Brazilian nationals registered as



the spouse (or other family member) of a Japanese national decreased from over 74,000 in 2006 to just under 20,000 in 2016.

Over the decade to 2016, there was an 84% increase in the number of permanent residents in Japan. As Figure 2.2 shows, the number of permanent residents increased from approximately 394,000 in 2006 to 727,000 in 2016. This growth was predominantly due to an increase in the number of nationals from other Asian countries registering as permanent residents. Between 2006 and 2016, the number of Chinese nationals registered as permanent residents doubled from about 117,000 to 238,000, the number of Philippine nationals registered as permanent residents also doubled from approximately 60,000 to 124,000, and the number of Korean nationals registered as permanent residents increased from 48,000 to 68,000. Similarly, the number of Brazilian nationals registered as permanent residents increased from approximately 79,000 to about 115,000.

In contrast to ‘unskilled migrants’, ‘highly-skilled migrants’ (*kōdō jinzai*) and international students have gained under more recent changes to the immigration system. These groups are now able to take advantage of a much easier route to settlement in comparison to other migrant groups, as a result of their perceived ability to contribute more, economically speaking, to Japanese society. The number of non-Japanese nationals with student visas doubled from 132,000 in 2006 to 277,000 in 2016, while the number of non-Japanese nationals registered as engineers or specialists in humanities/international services (SHIS) increased from 92,000 to 161,000 over the same period.

We can classify non-Japanese ethnonationals into broad categories, which I describe as foreign residents and migrants. Excluding refugees and asylum seekers and so-called ‘illegal migrants’, we are left with migrants who emigrated to Japan from various countries and foreign residents who were born in Japan but lack Japanese nationality—a key group being *Zainichi* Koreans from the second generation onwards.

As mentioned above, many *Zainichi* Koreans are treated as denizens through their status as special permanent residents. However, it is also clear from Figure 2.2 that the number of special permanent residents has decreased considerably. There were 443,000 special permanent residents in 2006, of which 99% were Korean nationals,

compared with 339,000 in 2016. This is partly due to mortality, but also due to increasing naturalisation rates, particularly among younger *Zainichi* Korean cohorts who identify as ‘Korean Japanese’ rather than ‘Korean’ only (Tai 2004; Hester 2010). While many *Zainichi* Koreans maintain their non-Japanese nationality as a form of resistance against assimilation, the ‘Korean Japanese’ identity expresses a definition of ethnicity as separate from nationality. However, the difficulty of obtaining accurate statistics on the number of naturalised Koreans or Chinese in Japan is indicative of the view that ethnicity and nationality are inextricably linked, at least as far as the Japanese authorities are concerned.

Looking beyond Japan’s territorial borders, the establishment of the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in the 1980s provided two new forums for the potential discussion of labour migration issues. Although the impact of these bodies on Japanese policy-making is debateable, the results of transnational activities are certainly discernible. Negotiations for, and the conclusions of, bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with the rapidly developing ASEAN countries<sup>6</sup> signalled the Japanese Government’s intention to open the front door (as opposed to the side door; cf. Sellek 2001) to labour migrants.

The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) have, in recent years, called for the government to depart from its restrictive immigration policy and for the expansion of labour migration. Since 2003, the negotiations for agreements with ASEAN countries (and also India) has been promoted by both ministries and supported and encouraged by the Prime Minister’s Office (Kuboyama 2008). Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia and India have pressed the Japanese government for the liberalisation and deregulation of the movement of people, and this has certainly had an impact. Specifically, the Japanese Government passed legislation that extended the technical intern training programme to care work and revised Japanese immigration law in late 2016 by establishing a new visa category for nurses and care workers (*kaigo*).

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<sup>6</sup> The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has ten member countries including Thailand, the Philippines and Vietnam. The term is used here in a similar fashion to the term ‘OECD countries’, namely to denote a particular group of countries.

### 2.3.2 Integration policy-making processes at the national scale

Postwar Japan was famously described as a ‘developmental state’ by Chalmers Johnson (1982) in recognition of the role of central government in driving the country’s development strategies and economic growth. This approach was institutionalised during the Meiji era (1868-1912) and its trajectory remained largely unchecked until the economic bubble burst in the late 1980s, plunging Japan into its severest recession since the Pacific War. Since then, decentralisation, deregulation and administrative reforms have gained momentum.

The work of Deborah Milly is one of the few comprehensive studies of governance and immigrant policies in Japan. Milly’s (2014) comparative study of Japan looks at a range of policy areas—including welfare, housing, education, healthcare and family support—and how central and local government and non-governmental actors interact to shape and influence these policies.

Milly’s study adopts a multilevel governance framework for understanding the development of immigrant policies in Japan ‘in terms of prior institutions, prior political strength of humanitarian civil society groups, the proximate sources of devolution, and subsequent immigrant policy changes’ (Milly 2014, 19). While this approach has been frequently used in European studies (for instance, Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011), multilevel governance approaches may also be viewed as problematic (as discussed in the next chapter).

Milly analyses how local governments devised new policies by coordinating among themselves, especially through the *Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi* (GSTK), which Milly translates as the ‘Conference of Cities with Large Foreign Populations’. She also considers how they have gained influence via the *Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai* (TKSK), a central government committee which she translates as the ‘Council to Promote Multicultural Society’.

The GSTK was established as a ‘political force’ (Komine 2014, 207) by mayors from 13 municipalities that had been particularly affected by the increase in *Nikkeijin* migrants following the 1990 amendment to the Immigration Control Act. As the largest city in the group, Hamamatsu City hosted the first conference of the GSTK and released a declaration which called for *chiiki kyōsei* or ‘local integration’

(Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2001). Immediately after its launch, the mayors representing the municipal members of the GSTK took the declaration to key central ministries and continued to lobby central government for national action on education, social security and a new system for maintaining information on foreign residents (Komine 2014, 207–8).

Non-governmental actors also had pre-existing proposals or quickly developed proposals to bring to central government. This included *Ijūren* (which did not in fact become a specified NPO until 2015), which presented a comprehensive proposal for policy reforms to government officials in 2002. Around the same time, a group of academics—Yamawaki Keizō, Kondō Atsushi and Kashiwazaki Chikako—published their vision of Japan as a multi-ethnic state in order to stimulate public debate on the issues concerned (Yamawaki, Kondō, and Kashiwazaki 2001). Their proposals included the creation of a ‘basic law’ (*kihon-hō*) for foreigners and a separate agency to oversee the rights of foreign residents. By 2004, *Keidanren* (the influential Japan Business Federation) had also developed a policy position, which echoed that of the GSTK. At that time, the organisation was led by the Chairman of the Toyota Motor Corporation, Okuda Hiroshi—chair of a company that has employed hundreds of *Nikkeijin* immigrants at its site in Aichi prefecture since the 1990s (Milly 2014, 73).

Crucially, in 2005 the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) established the aforementioned TKSK, a study group concerned with the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei*. In 2006, the MIC circulated the report produced by the TKSK and its plan for the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei* in local communities (*chiiki ni okeru tabunka kyōsei suishin puran*) to local governments throughout Japan (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The TKSK report is notable as the first central government output to address integration in a comprehensive fashion (Aiden 2011).

The TKSK is just one example of the plethora of advisory committees that have, at various times, been involved in policy-making at the national scale. As Harari explains:

In modern democracies, governments appoint public advisory bodies (variously called commissions, councils, committees, hereafter PABs) whose membership is

partly or wholly composed of persons from outside government. Ideally, these bodies should, by facilitating the participation of special interest groups, scholars, etc., in public policy making, help government to make responsive, innovative, and practical policies. (Harari 1997, 18)

Enacted under the auspices of the US occupation authorities, Article 8 of the National Government Organisation Act (*kokka gyōsei soshiki-hō*) stipulated that the formation and certain features of advisory bodies would be statutory. These statutory advisory bodies are generally referred to as *shingikai*. In due course, however, non-statutory bodies—referred to as *kondankai* or *shiteki shimon kikan* (‘private advisory bodies’), even though they are appointed by public figures for public purposes—have mushroomed alongside the *shingikai*.

Membership of a given *shingikai* does not convey the full extent of *participation* in the operations of that *shingikai*. There are cases where individuals are appointed as ‘advisers’ (*komon, sankō*), but do not appear in the membership lists. Moreover, *shingikai* vary considerably in size from a handful of individuals to over 100 members. The larger *shingikai* tend to operate through subcommittees or study groups, whose membership is not always limited to *shingikai* members.

Unfortunately, as in the case of the non-statutory advisory bodies, neither the existence nor the full membership of such subcommittees and study groups is regularly published.

Formally, *shingikai* members are appointed by the prime minister, by other cabinet ministers or by heads of government agencies, but in practice appointment decisions are almost invariably made by high-ranking bureaucrats, often in consultation with the groups concerned. Government organisations (ministries, agencies) vary in the number of *shingikai* they form and for which they provide administrative and sometimes research staff support.

While the TSKS report was an important stepping stone, the plan gained political traction when the influential *Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi* (‘Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy’, hereafter the CEFP) took its ideas on board. At the time, the CEFP was an influential ‘supra-ministerial’ agency directly accountable to Prime Minister Koizumi (Yamawaki 2007). Its adoption of the ideas developed by the TSKS led to the creation of a ‘liaison conference’ (*renraku kaigi*) on issues related to foreign workers. The liaison conference produced the first cross-ministerial integration

policy in December 2006—a comprehensive policy concerning foreigners as *seikatsusha* or ‘members of society’ (Gaikokujin Rōdōsha Mondai Kankei Shōchō Renraku Kaigi 2006).

In 2007, the ‘Council for Regulatory Reform’ (CRR), located within the Cabinet Office, urged the government to implement the social integration measures desired by the GSTK. Unlike the GSTK proposal, however, the CRR three-year plan explicitly linked these measures to visa renewal, including rules on checking the applicant’s taxation history, social security registration, employment conditions, Japanese language proficiency and, where appropriate, children’s school enrolment. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) incorporated some of the suggestions made by the CRR in its March 2008 guidelines and again in its March 2009 guidelines, but not in their entirety (for a fuller discussion, see Kondō 2009).

In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Cabinet Office hastily created the Office for the Promotion of Measures for Foreign Residents (*Teijū Gaikokujin Shisaku Suishin Shitsu*). The OPMFR took charge of a repatriation scheme targeting *Nikkeijin* migrants, many of whom had become unemployed following the crisis. Aside from the repatriation scheme, which was heavily criticised by domestic and international commentators, the OPMFR also announced emergency measures covering education, re-employment, housing, crime and disaster management, and multilingual administrative services (Teijū Gaikokujin Shisaku Suishin Kaigi 2009). Combined with previous developments, these measures have led to the emergence of what may be regarded as Japan’s first integration policies at the national scale.

After decades of taking a back seat in terms of integration policies, the Japanese state—or, more precisely, central government—has taken a more prominent role in this regard since the early 2000s (Komine 2014; Milly 2014). One of the key questions that remains unsatisfactorily answered, however, is why central government has become more involved in the development of policies.

Adopting institutionalist accounts, both Komine (2014) and Milly (2014) suggest that political pressure from local government and various governmental agencies led to the gradual introduction of various integration policies at the national scale. What is unclear, however, is why these institutions were able to effect change after a

considerable period of relative stability in terms of central government non-involvement.

### **2.3.3 Migration-related challenges at the local scale**

While the Japanese government has transformed the immigration system in recent years, there has never been a clear overarching approach to tackle the integration of migrants and other foreign residents already living in Japan. Local governments have attempted to fill this gap over several decades with a series of pragmatic local policy measures. To some extent these policies were designed to prevent conflict between Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonationals and how to incorporate the latter into the Japanese social welfare systems, with consequences for the meaning of community membership.

According to Milly (2014), local policies could only develop in areas where devolution had occurred and funding was possible, such as informational materials for foreign residents, Japanese-language classes for foreign adults and consultative mechanisms to promote inclusiveness. Providing foreign residents with access to national healthcare and the social insurance system, however, has been more difficult, and local officials together with civil society actors have tried to assist to some degree. Local governments have had more tools at hand to address housing issues, through publicly managed housing projects, for example. They have also played a role in the provision of education at the local level, which takes account of the particular needs of migrant children.

Innovation at the local level in these social policy areas is driven by either local government officials and/or civil society groups, both impacting on national policy changes. Milly illustrates the processes of these local initiatives and innovations with examples from several cities and prefectures, which gives an idea of the diversity of actors and approaches existing in response to different local conditions.

At the same time, local governments also carry out functions delegated to them by central government. Under the Alien Registration Act (*gaikokujin tōroku-hō*), for example, local governments collected basic personal information, such as names and home addresses, from foreign residents on behalf of the Ministry of Justice whose primary concern was, and still is, immigration control. This information was then

used by local governments to provide social services and collect taxes. However, the system was not designed for the purpose of local governance and created inefficiency (Komine 2014). For instance, a municipal government could not legally close down the file of a foreign resident who was known to have moved out of the municipality until the individual had registered with another local government. Without accurate information on foreign residents, some local governments struggled to undertake routine administrative tasks. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that many *Nikkeijin* were employed as casual workers (or ‘despatch workers’) and frequently changed jobs and locations of residence.

Although many of the migration-related challenges that local governments face may be similar, it is important to stress that the contexts in which local governments operate are shaped by a unique combination of social, political, economic and historical factors. Hence, it is essential to consider some of these factors as they relate to the study sites—Yokohama and Osaka.

Osaka is one of the key commercial centres of Japan, with a long history as a strategic trading port in the Kansai region. Osaka’s ‘identity’ is often conceived in opposition to that of Tokyo and there are marked sociocultural differences between the two conurbations. This is particularly apparent in the distinctiveness of the Osaka dialect (*ōsaka-ben*) vis-à-vis ‘standard Japanese’ (*hyōjungo*), which was based on the Tokyo dialect. It has even been suggested that this opposition has been appropriated by *Zainichi* Koreans in Osaka as a symbolic form of resistance to the Japanese state, in the guise of ‘ethnolinguistic solidarity’ between the Korean language and Osaka dialect (Maher and Kawanishi 1995).

Osaka can be regarded as somewhat progressive in terms of addressing the needs of foreign residents. During the 1920s and 1930s the city carried out a series of labour surveys, which sought to investigate general labour conditions and living standards (Mizuuchi 2003, 18–19). The reports also addressed the high percentage of poor quality housing and the high proportion of foreign residents in the inner city areas—trends which have persisted into the postwar period (Mizuuchi 2003). More recently, the Osaka City education board was the first to create its own policy for the education of foreign children in government schools (Okano 2008, 108), and it is one



of the few cities that allows foreign residents to hold public sector positions despite central government opposition.

Cities are also sites where central government agencies act at the local scale. This includes the Commission for the Protection of Human Rights (*Jinken Yōgo Inkai*) which is part of the MOJ. The commission delegates its powers to regional Legal Affairs Bureaux to provide human rights advice to residents, including children, women and foreign residents. Osaka also has a Human Rights Counselling Office for Foreigners, located within the Osaka Legal Affairs Bureau.

While cities can act as creative hubs for policy innovation, they can also act as arenas where struggles at a national or transnational scale play out. This was the case in 1995, when the Supreme Court upheld an Osaka High Court ruling that the Constitutional definition of ‘Japanese citizens’ and ‘residents’ only applies to Japanese nationals, thereby denying foreign residents the right to vote in local and national elections. The ruling was issued following a 1990 lawsuit in which nine *Zainichi* Koreans filed a complaint against the Osaka Election Committee for not registering them in the electoral roll based on Article 24 of the Public Offices Election Act (*kōshoku senkyo-hō*). An obiter dictum included in the ruling did concede the basic constitutionality of granting local voting rights to non-Japanese nationals, but such a change may only be brought about by legislation.

While Osaka is home to a high proportion of the *Zainichi* Koreans living in Japan, who have helped shape the city’s history as well as its policies towards foreign residents, Yokohama is often regarded as one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Japan. Yokohama played a significant role in modern Japanese history following the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry’s famous black ships just south of its shores in 1853–54. Not only did this mark the gradual end of two centuries of national seclusion (*sakoku*), but also the emergence of a new urban space through which modernity and ‘otherness’ would seep into Japan. Thereafter, Yokohama grew rapidly to become one of Japan’s largest ports and migrant workers played a significant role in this development, especially in the immediate postwar period.

Osaka is well-known for having the largest Koreatown in Japan, while Yokohama is known for having a vibrant Chinatown—the largest in Japan and an important site for Japanese-oriented tourism (Yamashita 2003). Chinese immigrants in Yokohama,

as Han (2014) argues, were happy to identify as ‘citizens’ (*shimin*) of Yokohama, with the dual aims of challenging Japan’s official refusal to recognise them as Japanese nationals, while eschewing exploitation by the imperial state to promote favourable Sino-Japanese relations during the Second World War.

Industrial decline since the 1980s has seen many of those erstwhile employed around the docks pushed into unemployment, but the growth of other sectors has attracted a new generation of migrant labour with skills in areas such as IT and engineering. These structural and economic changes and their impact on the socioeconomic trajectories of migrant workers are reflected in the spatial distribution of foreign residents in Yokohama (Yamamoto 2000). The location of a US navy base in the south of Kanagawa has also contributed to a relatively high number of Americans living in Yokohama: almost 2,500 compared with about 1,500 US nationals in the city of Osaka.

## **2.4 Integration policy paradigms and policy frames**

### **2.4.1 Changing policy paradigms, changing constructions of migrants**

The ideational turn in policy studies has ensured that the importance of ideas is not lost in understandings of policy development and policy change, to the point where there is now an extensive body of literature in this space (for a list of key works, see Béland 2009, 704). In this frequently-cited definition, Peter Hall describes what he means by the term ‘policy paradigm’:

[...] policy makers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded through the very terminology through which policymakers communicate about their work, and is influential because so much is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a whole. I am going to call this interpretive framework a policy paradigm. (Hall 1993, 279)

Hall (1993, 293) distinguished between three modes of policy change. First and second order change are associated with incremental policy-making—in other words, change within the parameters of a particular policy paradigm. While first order change involves relatively small changes in the levels or settings at which policy instruments are used to achieve particular goals, new policy instruments may be

employed in second order change. By contrast, ‘Third order change [...] is likely to reflect a very different process, marked by radical changes in the overall terms of policy discourse associated with a “paradigm shift”’ (Hall 1993, 279). It is also characterised by a shift in policy goals, as well as an alteration in the type of policy instruments used and their settings. Daigneault describes the three orders of change as being ‘lexically ordered’, implying that ‘each mode builds upon and extends the characteristics of the preceding mode’ (Daigneault 2014, 455).

While policy paradigms have not always been carefully defined in the studies employing the concept (for a fuller discussion, see Daigneault 2014), an appreciation of the importance of different norms and worldviews can give us a better handle of how and why policies come into being. In particular, Daigneault (2014) points to the need to distinguish between policy paradigms proper and the ideational components of policies. In addition, ideas take effect through the ways in which political actors and institutional forces interact with them (Béland 2009, 707–8). They take shape through the variety of rhetorical and action frames that ‘underlie the persuasive use of story and argument in policy debate’ and ‘inform policy practice’ (Schön and Rein 1994, 32).

With respect to the Japanese context, it may be argued that the body of discourse collectively referred to as *nihonjinron* helped define the paradigm in which immigration policies were developed at the national scale, while reinforcing opposition to the development of national integration policies.

Discussions on migration often focus on the ‘other’, but it is important to remember that migration challenges notions of ‘self’ too. The *nihonjinron* literature came to prominence in the 1970s and 1980s, seeking to explain the presumed cultural uniqueness of Japan and the Japanese, at a time when Japan’s economic success was fast commanding worldwide attention. Since then, the methodological, empirical and epistemological flaws of *nihonjinron* discourse have been exposed by several critics, leaving it ‘thoroughly castrated’ (Ryang 2004, 8) according to some scholars.

However, it would be wrong to discount its current importance:

As an overarching worldview of Japan, *nihonjinron* has no rival. No other worldview of the Japanese society, culture, and nation has a wide enough acceptance to compete successfully with *nihonjinron*. Thus *nihonjinron* prevails by default. (Befu 2001, 118)

Mouer and Sugimoto believe that support for the ideology represented by *nihonjinron* by different institutions acted as an invisible but effective ‘psychological barrier’ against migration, especially during the 1970s (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, 403). Despite the fact that the *nihonjinron* discourse of ethnic homogeneity (*tan’itsu minzoku*) is inconsistent with Japan’s ethnocultural diversity (Weiner 1997; Lie 2001), policymakers consistently appealed to *nihonjinron* narratives to explain or justify their policy decisions. Prime Minister Nakasone celebrated Japan’s ethnic homogeneity in the 1980s as a factor in its economic success, and the national identity defined by the *nihonjinron* literature served to ‘legitimate’ such claims (Befu 2001, 100–101). In particular, Nakasone attributed the Japanese postwar miracle to the harmony that derives from a homogenous society. In so doing, he was contrasting Japanese homogeneity and harmony to alleged heterogeneity and divisiveness in the US, implying that America’s economic problems during the eighties, as well as Japan’s economic successes during that time, stemmed precisely from the ethnocultural differences between the countries. As Yoshino points out, these aspects of *nihonjinron* are based on a racialised sense of self:

A Japanese expresses the ‘immutable’ or ‘natural’ aspect of Japanese identity through the imagined concept of ‘Japanese blood’. Since a scientifically founded ‘racial’ classification of the Japanese and non-Japanese is meaningless, ‘Japanese blood’ is, first and foremost, a case of social construction of difference. (Yoshino 1992, 24)

Several scholars have observed that support for the ideal of ethnonational homogeneity has led to a paradoxical situation, where Japan defines itself as a zero-immigration country in spite of reality (Morris-Suzuki 1998; Burgess 2014). In much the same way as the German state described its postwar migrant workers as *Gastarbeiter* (‘guest workers’), the Japanese state has consistently avoided the use of the term *imin* (‘immigrant’) in public discourse. As Burgess explains:

The no-immigration principle is an institutionalization of the homogeneous-people discourse. The principle basically states that Japan does not accept migrants. Indeed, the M-word (*imin* in Japanese) is markedly absent in legal, media and popular discourse, where it is replaced by euphemisms such as “entrants” and “foreign workers.” On the policy side, this means that it is necessary to do as much as possible to prevent foreigners in general from staying long or settling down. Tessa Morris-Suzuki argues that this principle has remained relatively unchanged since the first Nationality Law of 1899, which aimed to a) prevent an influx of unskilled labor, and b) restrict access to Japanese nationality. (Burgess 2014)

Against this backdrop, the discourse of ‘internationalisation’ (*kokusaika*) took centre stage in the 1980s and has dominated discussions on foreign residents for the last three decades. Internationalisation came to prominence as an encapsulation of the spirit and ambitions of the country at a time when its economic growth was attracting worldwide attention, yet it has not been without its critics. Mouer and Sugimoto identified two goal-incongruous usages of the word internationalisation: the first implying ‘the smooth promotion of Japan’s national interests, an application associated primarily with the establishment’; the second, concerning idealistic worldviews ‘either referring vaguely to international brotherhood and goodwill among nations or outlining the way in which some form of world government might be encouraged’ (Mouer and Sugimoto 1986, 381–83). Other commentators have observed that internationalisation has ushered in a new era in Japanese politics. Gurowitz, for instance, believes that ‘Debates over internationalization [...] have changed the context in which immigrants are discussed (from a perspective of domestic isolation to a more global and regional context)’ (Gurowitz 1999, 443).

Officials in local governments have challenged the national rhetoric of homogeneity (*tan’itsu minzoku*) with a rhetoric of ‘local internationalisation’ (*uchinaru kokusaika*) and more recently *tabunka kyōsei*.

From the mid-1990s, a potential alternative to internationalisation appeared in the guise of *tabunka kyōsei* (variously translated as ‘multicultural coexistence’, ‘multicultural symbiosis’ or ‘intercultural living’) and seems to be gaining popularity in both national and local government discourse. According to Takezawa, *tabunka kyōsei* emerged in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake (known as the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japanese) in 1995—a disaster he describes as ‘a significant turning point in terms of the relationships between the Japanese and the ethnic minorities in the city’ (Takezawa 2008, 32–33).

*Tabunka kyōsei* has been fostered by civil society organisations and local governments with an understanding that temporary migrants have become permanent residents and that foreign residents should be able to participate in Japanese society. If Japanese nationality is a precursor to citizenship, then citizens’ rights are also tied to this notion. However, denying a range of rights to foreign residents at a time when

immigration looks set to increase is surely unsustainable. As Morris-Suzuki points out:

In the present global system [...] it is necessary to understand the rights of individuals, in terms of their status not only as ‘citizens’ or ‘nationals’ (*kokumin*) but also as ‘residents’ or ‘denizens’ (*jūmin*): people whose long-term residence in a particular community gives them a right to share in the social and political life of that community, whatever their official nationality. (Morris-Suzuki 1998, 191–92)

In this respect, *tabunka kyōsei* is often presented as a far cry from the discourse of cultural and ethnic homogeneity featured in *nihonjinron* literature. However, the fact remains that these residents are not citizens and do not have the same rights as citizens. This has implications for how these immigrants are perceived by Japanese citizens and the rights that they possess.

Japan is often described as a centralised state but, as Jacobs (2000) points out, the role of prefectures and larger cities has been greatly undervalued. While foreign residents have been denied the rights associated with state citizenship on the basis of their nationality (Komai 1993; Tegtmeier Pak 2000), some cities have sidestepped the issue of nationality by treating foreign residents as ‘local citizens’.

According to Tegtmeier Pak (2000), some local governments have gone even further, committing themselves to treating foreigners as ‘local citizens’ (which is her translation of the term *gaikokujin shimin*). Under this approach, local government officials found political space for addressing immigrant issues by redefining the ‘amorphous’ national government project for local internationalisation. The specific catalysts for this process differ from city to city, but overall, the redefinition of local internationalisation to include integration plans and programmes allows local officials to expand the scope and importance of their programmes.

#### **2.4.2 Migrants’ rights as non-citizens, denizens or local citizens**

Many of the rights now available to migrants in Japan have resulted from the path-breaking activities spearheaded by *Zainichi* Koreans keen to tackle the social and legal discrimination they faced as ‘foreigners’ living in Japan. As Chung (2010) observes, much of the welfare and social protection now available to foreign residents—such as a secure residential status, access to social security, protection from certain forms of discrimination and employment freedom—were gradually

achieved through years of struggle. Many of these struggles were channelled through civil society organisations and coethnic networks, which engaged in both lobbying activities and service provision—a model subsequently adopted by countless other migrant-supporting organisations.

In addition, many of the ideas and slogans associated with *Zainichi* activism, such as *tomo ni ikiru* ('living together'), *sen shin shimin shakai* ('advanced citizen society') and *gaikokujin shimin* ('foreign citizen' or 'foreign city resident') have now entered mainstream discourses on integration. In particular, the idea of 'living together' seems to have been appropriated under the guise of *kyōsei* or 'coexistence'. Likewise, policymakers seem to have replaced the idea of the *sen shin shimin shakai* with the *kyōsei shakai* ('coexistence society').

However, the adoption of these ideas warrants greater scrutiny. In particular, it is not clear where the package of rights and opportunities afforded to migrants in Japan lies on the spectrum between assimilationism, at one extreme, and pluralism or multiculturalism at the other. While there are elements of multiculturalism in *tabunka kyōsei*, I propose that several concepts that would be associated with multiculturalism have not been incorporated into the Japanese term.

To begin with, it is worth reiterating the views of critics who believe that 'a potent source of confusion is the use of terms such as pluralism and multiculturalism to refer simultaneously to a state of affairs and a political programme' (Barry 2000, 22). It is therefore important to distinguish between multiculturalism as a state of affairs and multiculturalism as a political programme. The former is an undeniable feature of Japan, if we take account of national minorities, immigrants and lifestyle groups. For instance, Japan is multinational in the sense that there are indigenous groups such as the Ainu and Okinawan communities, which may even be regarded as nations in their own right; but it is also home to multiple immigrant groups with plural ethnic identities, as well as various lifestyle groups (Weiner 1997).

Multiculturalism as an official policy programme traces its roots to political developments in Canada and Australia in the 1970s. These ideas were soon taken up by liberal thinkers, culminating in the development of 'liberal multiculturalism'. For Loobuyck, this is intended to signify 'a policy within the scope of liberal philosophy that seeks maximum accommodation of differences in religious, cultural or ethnic

origin in a stable and morally defensible way, in private as well as in public spheres' (Loobuyck 2005, 110). Multiculturalism is often regarded as a positive alternative to policies of assimilation, based on a politics of recognition of the citizenship rights and cultural identities of ethnic minority groups.

For Castles, assimilation means 'encouraging immigrants to learn the national language and to take on the social and cultural practices of the receiving community' (Castles 2003, 10). However, Japanese policies of assimilation in the post-war era served to restrict the expression of non-Japanese cultural identities; not just those of immigrants such as the *Zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese who became 'invisible minorities' (Tai 2009), but also those of indigenous groups such as the Ainu and Okinawans (Kōhei 1996). Until recently, *Zainichi* communities were required to register as aliens and to have their fingerprints recorded as part of their non-citizenship and those wishing to naturalise were compelled to adopt Japanese-style names, further contributing to the disappearance of their ethnic markers (Asakawa 2003; Tai 2009).

One issue to note here is the duration of residence. Many migrants might have come to Japan as temporary migrants, but have ended up staying for several years. In the case of more established immigrant groups, such as the special permanent residents, residence has been for several decades or whole lifetimes. What is not always explicitly discussed, however, is whether migrants should be treated differently for being 'permanent residents' and whether the rights of temporary migrants may differ in relation to the length of their stay. Indeed, some scholars have suggested that individuals' rights to social claims on the state are determined by their residence status rather than their national citizenship (Therborn 1995, 85–99). Thus we need to distinguish between the rights accorded to citizens and non-citizens, and the gradation of formal and substantive rights available to different groups of foreign residents (Morris 2002).

Japanese citizenship is based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*: citizenship is awarded to those who have blood ties to Japan so that individuals born on Japanese soil are not necessarily entitled to Japanese citizenship. Before the 1985 revision of the nationality law, this situation was further complicated by the need for the father to possess Japanese nationality (Murphy-Shigematsu 2000, 204–5). Thus,



generations of individuals born in Japan—particularly resident Koreans and Taiwanese who are considered to be foreign nationals and are unable to acquire dual citizenship—have been able to apply for Japanese citizenship only through the naturalisation process.

Although many of Japan's immigrants do not possess citizenship, in some respects they are treated as pseudo-citizens. Hammar (1990) first used the term 'denizen' to describe migrant workers who immigrated to parts of Europe, remaining in their destination countries for much longer than intended—or permanently—without acquiring citizenship. Later it came to be applied to people 'who are foreign citizens with a legal and permanent resident status' (Hammar 1990, 15). 'Special permanent residents', who make up a large proportion of *Zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese, therefore qualify as denizens under this definition.

Policy approaches towards denizens can be expected to differ to those aligned to citizens, but where do denizens sit with respect to other non-citizens such as *Nikkeijin* or marriage migrants? Mackie, following Ghassan Hage, argues that 'citizenship is not a simple matter of a binary distinction between citizens and non-citizens, but rather a constellation of features which determine one's position on a spectrum of citizenship' (Mackie 2002, 201). She demonstrates that while lack of citizenship rights may lead to absence from the voting franchise, 'marked features' that are perceived to distinguish foreign residents from Japanese citizens may also influence the assumptions underpinning various policies.

The differences between archetypal 'Japanese citizens' and the non-Japanese ethnonationals who are of particular interest to this study may be perceived rather than real, but that does not diminish their effect in framing the discussions on immigration and integration. As Table 2.1 indicates, Japanese nationality is not regarded as an attribute of non-Japanese ethnonationals. For example, as mentioned in the previous section, an increasing number of *Zainichi* Koreans are exploring their identity as 'Korean Japanese' by acquiring Japanese nationality but maintaining an ethnicity that draws on their Korean ethnocultural roots. However, Japanese discourse at large does not seem to accept the idea of 'ethnic minorities' as Japanese nationals.

**Table 2.1 Attributes associated with, or perceived to be associated with, Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonationals**

Attribute	Archetypal citizen	<i>Zainichi</i> Koreans	Brazilian <i>Nikkeijin</i>	Filipino migrants	Highly skilled migrants
Nationality (citizenship)	+	–	–	–	–
Japanese fluency	+	+	+/-	–	+/-
Japanese ‘blood’	+	–	+	–	–
Japanese ‘appearance’	+	+	+/-	–	–
Current level of cultural literacy	+	+	+/-	+/-	+/-

Note: + denotes the presence (or perceived presence) of the attribute in question, – denotes its absence (or perceived absence) and +/- denotes high variability in the (perceived) presence of the attribute  
Source: Adapted from Mackie (2002, 204)

Fluency in the Japanese language—to wit, proficiency in the Japanese language to the extent that an observer is given the impression that the observed individual is an archetypal Japanese citizen—varies among different groups of foreign residents.

After migrating to Japan, many Brazilian *Nikkeijin* were perceived to have Japanese language fluency owing to their Japanese ‘appearance’ (Tsuda 2008). In the case of highly skilled migrants, there may be disconnect between the perception of fluency and the reality. Many highly skilled migrants might have studied Japanese as international students in Japan or as a result of having taken Japanese language classes. However, without having the appearance of archetypal citizens, highly skilled migrants are unlikely to be considered ‘native level’ speakers.

Whereas highly skilled migrants are often expected to be male, there are more female Filipino migrants in Japan than male Filipino migrants. Filipino migrants are likely to lack, or be perceived as lacking, many of the attributes associated with archetypal Japanese citizens and gender is likely to influence these perceptions. However, this does not preclude the possibility that Filipino migrants have the cultural literacy or ‘cultural capital’ (see chapter four) needed to enable them to negotiate various social situations.

## 2.5 Summary

Despite the fact that Japan has a long history of immigration, migrant numbers have remained relatively low in comparison to other economically developed countries.

The 1990 revision of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act rationalised the status of residence system and was accompanied by ‘side door’ policies, which allowed *Nikkeijin* to emigrate to Japan in greater numbers with no restrictions on their ability to work. Since then there has been a gradual increase in the stock of foreign residents living in Japan, but Japan’s immigration regime continues to be restrictive towards all but the ‘highly skilled’. This clearly has implications for the long-term composition of Japan’s migrant population and, by extension, the way in which its integration regime is likely to be managed.

In contrast to Japan’s immigration regime, Japan’s integration regime remained undeveloped at the national scale for much of the postwar period. The reluctance of the Japanese government to develop integration policies can at least partly be attributed to an insistence on preserving a myth of Japanese ethnonational homogeneity and the characterisation of Japan as a country of zero immigration (Burgess 2014).

Instead it has fallen to local governments, such as Osaka City and Yokohama City, to develop their own policies to support migrants and other foreign residents living within their areas of jurisdiction. Many of these policies were designed to address issues such as education and housing, and were shaped by the local contexts in which they were produced (Milly 2014). Despite an official rhetoric that refuses to recognise immigrants, local governments appear to have treated non-Japanese ethnonationals as denizens or ‘local citizens’ and afforded them civil and social rights in this capacity (Tegtmeyer Pak 2006).

For this study, what is crucial is to understand to what extent these characterisations still hold. That is to say, we need to explore whether the portrayal of national government as disinterested in integration policies and local governments as integration pioneers still holds. It is also important to understand the ideas which permeate the integration policies developed by governmental actors and how these have been influenced by non-governmental actors.

Hence, in the next chapter, I discuss the actors involved in the integration policy-making process in more detail, focusing on the relations that characterise the governance of integration policy-making processes and migrants’ relationships with ‘the state’ and other institutions.

### **3 Understanding integration policy-making in Japan: a relational approach**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Within migration studies, the specific analysis of migration policy-making has been described as an emerging field of research (Penninx, Berger, and Kraal 2006; Zincone, Penninx, and Borkert 2011). In what Zincone and Caponio (2006) describe as the ‘fourth generation’ of migration research, investigations pose the question of how immigration and integration policies are created, operationalised and implemented. This research does not focus on the content of these policies per se, but on the political processes through which such policies come into existence and how their implementation is steered.

A growing body of research in this field is being produced by scholars from IMISCOE, particularly by the Standing Committee on the *The Multilevel Governance of Immigrant and Immigration Policies*, which has sought to theorise the relationships between local, regional, national and supranational policies from a multilevel governance perspective. More recently, the group has been focusing on the strategies used by cities to deal with the challenges of increasing diversity, by looking at their links with other governmental and non-governmental actors and the approaches that emerge from these relations.

A separate but related research agenda is being developed by the MIGPROSP project on the prospects for international migration governance. Based primarily at the University of Sheffield, the research team has been exploring how actors within governance systems understand international migration and what these understandings mean for the future governance of international migration at national, subnational and transnational scales.

Looking towards Japan, the number of studies concerned with migration and migrant integration in urban contexts is growing (for example, Tegtmeier Pak 2000; Tsuda 2006b; Shipper 2008; Yamawaki 2007; Chung 2010). Yet, within the Japanese context and more widely, more investigation is required into the actors involved in the integration process within and across cities, to understand the roles played by the

state and non-state actors and their relative positions within these policy-making spaces.

Taken together, the concepts of citizenship and governance provide a pertinent framework with which to understand and explore the institutional and agential dimensions of migration policy-making. Governance focuses our attention on the networks of actors involved in the integration process, their roles and inter-relationships and various strategies of policy-making, including the participation and agency of the migrants themselves. In addition, ideas from citizenship enable us to explore the dynamics between institutions and migrants, and the expression of these complex connections in the way that policies towards migrants are negotiated.

Some scholars refer to citizenship and governance as multidimensional or multi-layered processes (Swyngedouw 2005; Dean 2013). This is an important development, as it reminds us that citizenship and governance are highly complex processes. Here, I conceptualise these processes as having multiple, interconnected dimensions, the analysis of which necessitate a clear articulation of which dimensions are being explored. Accordingly, this study focuses on the *relational* dimension of governance and citizenship: namely the relations between the actors and institutions involved in the integration policy-making process.

## **3.2 The relational dimensions of governance**

### **3.2.1 Governance in a Japanese context**

The concept of governance has received increasing attention within social policy and related disciplines since the 1990s (Rhodes 1996; Rhodes 1997; Pierre and Peters 2000; Swyngedouw 2005; Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Now widely used, governance emerged in the 1990s from ‘virtual obscurity’ (Daly 2003, 115) to take an important place in the social sciences. Analyses of governance focus on the formal and informal actors involved in making and implementing decisions, and the formal and informal structures that shape these decisions.

While *government* refers to a particular agent of collective power in society, or to a particular mode of societal control (hierarchy), *governance* is connected to the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented. Recognising that governance is ‘notoriously slippery’ to conceptualise (Pierre and

Peters 2000, 7), and building on the definition offered by Chhotray and Stoker (2009, 3), I suggest that governance is about the process of collective decision-making in settings where there is a plurality of actors or organisations whose relations are controlled through both formal and informal institutions and mechanisms.

First and foremost, therefore, governance focuses our attention on the collective decisions required to produce integration policies and the way in which those decisions are made by the actors involved. Moreover, it reminds us that central government is not the only actor involved in integration policy-making decisions, but that the nation-state has been challenged by the complexity of social problems, the strength of organised interests, and the growing internationalisation of interdependencies (Benz and Papadopoulos 2006). Hence, it allows us to transcend the somewhat artificial divide between society and politics by including institutions in both spheres that govern and regulate society, either alone or in combination. As Sørensen (2006) argues, the ‘dividing line between state and society is blurred because of the fact that governance is often produced by networks involving both public and private actors’.

Thus, the governance of integration policies can be thought of as a multi-actor process with interlocking, evolving roles and relationships involving foreign residents and influencing the integration of foreign residents within Japanese society.

With reference to Europe, Zincone and Caponio (2006) note that research on migrant integration and governance has developed unevenly both in terms of the timing of its genesis and of the kinds of themes that have become the focus of researchers’ interest. However, this kind of study already represents quite a relevant research field in ‘new’ immigration countries, such as Italy (Zincone and Caponio 2005) and Spain (Agrela and Dietz 2006; Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2011). Although Japan is often grouped with other new immigration countries (Tsuda 2006a)—despite a long history of immigration as noted in the previous chapter—it remains under-researched in a field dominated by studies of European and Anglophone countries and contexts. Can we, therefore, apply a governance framework to Japan bearing in mind that it may not ‘fit’ the Japanese context, or do we disregard the model as Western-centric? As Merleau-Ponty so eloquently stated, ‘how can we understand the other without

sacrificing him to our logic or without sacrificing [our logic] to him?’ (Merleau-Ponty 1965, 146).

We cannot know what is being sacrificed, or negotiated, without appreciating how governance is already understood and applied within the Japanese context. The English term ‘governance’ was originally incorporated into the Japanese language in the form of ‘corporate governance’ (*kōporēto gabanansu*) and there is a host of academic and grey literature in this area. More recently, the term ‘multilevel governance’ (*marutireberu gabanansu*) has also been discussed by Japanese scholars in relation to the European Union. Within academic circles, the term ‘*gabanansu*’ has also been used in connection with government structures, since the 1990s.

Not only has the term been ‘Japanised’, but it has also catalysed new discussions on pre-existing Japanese terms. Looking towards the political sphere, Prime Minister Obuchi’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century coined the term ‘collaborative governance’ (*kyōchi*) in 2000 to conceptualise a ‘new’ approach for dealing with contemporary global and social risks:

This new governance is not adequately expressed by the Japanese word traditionally used, *tōchi*. While we do not repudiate everything about the old governance, we suggest calling the new governance *kyōchi*, a word that emphasises cooperation (*kyō*) rather than governing, rule, or control (*tō*). (Prime Minister’s Commission on Japan’s Goals in the 21st Century 2000, 16).

It is worth noting that the report was published after a decade or more of Japanese economic stagnation and within this context the term was connected with other neoliberal ideas introduced at the time. The commission coined the term *kyōchi* in an attempt to encourage the public to change its mind-set on the relationship between individuals and society. The inclusion of the new term caused some controversy among commissioners, who considered it to have no place in the Japanese language (Kawashima and Suzuki 2000). Controversies notwithstanding, the report’s call for individuals to take greater responsibility for governance issues demonstrated a normative understanding of governance as involving greater responsabilisation. While *kyōchi* never really caught on, the neoliberal ideas underpinning this normative form of governance seem to have remained popular with the Koizumi administration and beyond (Hook 2010).

### **3.2.2 From multi-level to multi-scalar governance**

Speaking in the mid-2000s, Zincone and Caponio described the emerging research on the processes of policy-making for immigration and immigrant integration as a ‘sort of fourth generation research topic’ (Zincone and Caponio 2006, 2), which tackles the problem of understanding how migration policies are decided upon and carried out. Like other IMISCOE scholars, they approach this field from the perspective of ‘multilevel governance’, a concept that rose to prominence in the 1990s, especially through studies of the European Union (Marks 1993; Marks, Hooghe, and Blank 1996).

With respect to Japan, Deborah Milly (2014) has used a multilevel governance perspective to explore the development of immigration and integration policies at a national and subnational scale. Her work seeks to show how new forms of governance, involving governmental and non-governmental actors, are characterised by processes that affect both national and local approaches to immigrant integration. In particular, Milly adopts multilevel governance to refer to ‘the trend of dispersing power away from central states and the increasing role of collaborative networks in governance, regardless of the role of supranational organizations’ (Milly 2014, 4). It is clear that Milly is particularly interested in multilevel governance as characterised by intentional devolution and the growth of cross-sector networks—networks that span the public, private and non-profit sectors. This resonates with Dingwerth’s (2004) definition of governance as the horizontal associational networks of private (market), civil society (usually NGOs) and state actors.

Despite its popularity, however, the concept of multilevel governance is also problematic. Several scholars have commented on the need to refine multilevel governance, both conceptually and taxonomically (see, for instance, Alcantara, Broschek, and Nelles 2016; Jessop 2016). Studies based on multilevel governance have also been criticised for concentrating on the complex web of relationships that characterise specific areas of policy-making, rather than developing explanatory accounts of policy-making processes (Jessop 2016, 19).

At the heart of multilevel governance is the idea of different levels of governance. As Jessop notes, however, it is not clear whether the ‘level’ in multilevel governance ‘refers to territorial jurisdictions, core-periphery relations among places, the scalar



division of labour (with its potentially tangled hierarchies), the nodal character of networks' (Jessop 2016, 19) or some other construct. Furthermore, the multiple levels in multilevel governance also imply the existence of a priori hierarchical relationships (Stubbs 2005). Within the European context in which the concept of multilevel governance was originally developed, Gary Marks defined it as 'a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several territorial tiers', in which 'supranational, national, regional, and local governments are enmeshed in territorially overarching policy networks' (Marks 1993, 402–3). Thus, although the EU plays host to a number of actors and institutions with markedly different levels of power and resources, this formulation of multilevel governance implies that power and resources are vertically distributed. Dingwerth's (2004) characterisation of these relationships as 'horizontal' is an improvement, in this sense.

Several scholars have commented on the need to explore policy-making as a multidimensional process in which various actors have a role (for example, Dror 1983), but 'multidimensional' need not necessarily be equated with 'multilevel'. Rather than 'levels', some observers refer to different 'scales'. For example, Brenner's suggestion that 'scales evolve relationally within tangled hierarchies and dispersed interscalar networks' so that 'scalar hierarchies constitute mosaics not pyramids' (Brenner 2001, 605–6) appears to be an improvement on the treatment of hierarchy within the multilevel governance literature. Jones and others have built on Brenner's idea of interscalar networks through the concept of 'multi-scalar networks' which 'link local and trans-local processes, producing and consolidating social constructions of place' (Jones, Jones, and Woods 2004, 104).

Despite the emergence of new forms of governance, we should not be too hasty in dismissing or discounting the continuing importance of the state. In fact, many of the 'networked organisations' that are part of the governance process are 'both set up by, and directly or indirectly controlled by, the state and, regardless of their origins, necessarily articulate with the state' (Swyngedouw 2005, 2002). Regardless of the spaces (transnational, national, regional or local) that we may be considering, institutions and actors are unlikely to act outside of parameters set by the state or without reference to the state.

Since the 1990s, neoliberal policies have seen powers ‘up-scaled’ to transnational actors and ‘down-scaled’ to local government and civil society in many OECD countries. However, even with the rescaling of power, the role of the state is still crucial. While power is seemingly devolved away from the state, the state may still maintain a degree of control through its relationships with local government or through ‘governmentality’: the strategies or ‘technologies’ of governance (Lemke 2002; Foucault 2010).

Without ignoring the role of central government, a multi-scalar governance framework pushes us to look ‘beyond the state’ (Swyngedouw 2005), enabling us to view organisational structures and relationships in addition to the state–migrant nexus. What is of interest is not the actors, *per se*, but the ‘matrix of governance’ (Lieberthal 1995) or, better, the ‘choreographies of governance’ (Swyngedouw 2005) and the arrangement of responsibilities and control among the actors involved. Considering configurations of governance focuses our attention on the forms of power (such as control and influence) and linkages (such as networks), which make up the mechanisms that drive governance. While actors operating in larger territories may have greater access to resources or spatially more expansive networks than those operating in smaller territories, this should not necessarily be equated with greater influence over integration policy-making processes. Rather than making assumptions about the links between scale and influence, this study exploits the explanatory potential of governance frameworks to understand how integration policies are influenced.

### **3.2.3 Central–local government relations**

Most governance scholars emphasise the continuing importance of the nation-state within governance arrangements. However, if we are exploring integration as a primarily urban phenomenon, which affects some cities more than others, then it is also important to unpick the relations between central and local government in Japan.

There are three main tiers of government in Japan: national or central, prefectural and municipal (cities, towns and villages), with larger cities such as Osaka and Yokohama having a further tier in the form of local ward offices. Previous theories of central–local government relations in Japan have drawn on key works by Tsuji Kiyoaki and Muramatsu Michio to understand the relationships between these bodies.

In an influential work on the topic, Tsuji (1969) drew on ideas presented by John Stuart Mills in his lesser known essays on *Representative Government* to develop a theory of central government as possessing a functional form of control over local government, as illustrated by the following excerpt.

The principal business of the central authority should be to give instruction, of the local authority to apply it. Power may be localised, but knowledge, to be most useful, must be centralised; there must be somewhere a focus at which all its scattered rays are collected, that the broken and coloured lights which exist elsewhere may find there what is necessary to complete and purify them. (Mill 1977, 544)

Tsuji believed that central–local government relations should be maintained by functional (legislative, administrative and financial) control from the centre, using the British system as an exemplar. This system is evident in organisations such as CLAIR (Council of Local Authorities for International Relations), which is administered by staff seconded from both central and local government, helping encourage local implementation to national standards. According to Tsuji’s model, local governments operate as executive branches of central government, but his approach does not adequately account for issues such as local opposition to central government policies. With respect to integration policies, the previous chapter highlighted the fact that a number of local governments in Japan have developed integration policies at the local scale—affording social rights to foreign residents living under their jurisdiction despite the lack of integration policies at the national scale. While these activities do not necessarily undermine Tsuji’s ideas, they do not seem to support the model either.

Muramatsu (1997; 2001), on the other hand, has proposed a model of interdependency, where local governments exhibit some level of autonomy within the legislative constraints described by Tsuji. This constrained independence is evident in, for example, local government acceptance of subsidised projects such as the ‘rainbow bridge’ (*niji no kakehashi*) project. While the rainbow bridge project was designed to enable state schools to support migrant children with Japanese language needs, local governments had some control over how these funds were used during the implementation phase. Muramatsu (1997) attributes changes to central–local government relations to ‘bottom-up’ competition between local governments, with prefectural governors playing an important role in encouraging local autonomy.

With regards to integration, Tegtmeier Pak (2006) notes that local governments in Japan have a history of innovative policy-making going back to the 1960s and 1970s and that policies concerning foreign residents fit into this trend. This policy-making role has arguably been strengthened since the 1990s with decentralisation (*chihō bunken*) featuring firmly on the political agenda. The path to administrative decentralisation and local government reform was initiated in the early 1990s, when Japanese Diet cooperation with local government led to the enactment of a law for the promotion of decentralisation (*chihō bunken suishin-hō*) and the creation of an associated committee (*chihō bunken suishin iinkai*) in 1995. Recommendations by the Decentralisation Promotion Committee to change central–local government relations from hierarchical to cooperative set the direction of subsequent decentralisation reform (Yagi 2004, 11). The Diet later put forward an omnibus bill for decentralisation which was enacted in 1999 and implemented the following year (*chihō bunken ikkatsu-hō*).

While decentralisation has undoubtedly affected central–local government relations in Japan, it is not clear what impact this has had on integration policies at either the national or the local scale. Scholars such as Reed (1986) have suggested that central government may influence local government policies through constraints, guidance and advice, but ultimately allow local governments to make their own decisions. The influence exerted by central government may, therefore, lead to some level of similarity between local government policies.

However, decision-making at the local level requires the support and cooperation of central government. For instance, Aldrich suggests that unless the goals of local governments ‘mesh’ with central government objectives, implementing these goals may be heavily constrained by ‘financial, administrative and legal ties to the centre’ (Aldrich 1999, 70). A simple reading of this argument could be taken to be that central government can shape the development of integration policies at the local scale through its ties with local governments. However, the argument rests on the potential for conflict with central government objectives in terms of integration, or related policy areas, if indeed such objectives exist in the first place.

On the other hand, some commentators argue that the state has been weakened by the fiscal crises that have swept across more economically developed parts of the world

at various points during the past few decades, most recently in 2007–08. These crises have impacted differently on different levels of government and on the relationship between these levels (Peters and Pierre 2001). A case in point is Japan where the state previously used financial resources as carrots, or sticks, to steer local governments. Given that public spending in Japan has reduced over time (Brady and Lee 2014), the state's capacity to use financial incentives is also likely to have reduced. However, we also need to consider whether central government would use its financial ties to influence local government integration measures, given the government's reluctance to recognise immigrants in the first place.

Political and administrative actors at different levels of government perceive reality—and hence the policy problems associated with it—differently, as they are confronted with variation in the contextual factors, actors and aspects of the policy problem at hand (Poppelaars and Scholten 2008). The fact that policy does not always trickle down to the local level is not always the result of an implementation gap or administrative misfit. More fundamentally, different levels of government can induce different ways of problem framing. In Japan, since local government officials are directly responsible for registering foreigners and dealing with the majority of complaints from Japanese residents about migrants in a particular place, they have a different perspective to national officials who are only tracking the demographic changes from a distance (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000).

As Milly notes, 'subnational governments do not just implement national policies, they create independent measures, may stretch national policy rules, and advocate national policy changes to standards for immigrant inclusion' (Milly 2014, 22). Hence, we may expect integration policies to be developed and framed differently at the local scale than at a national scale—and this study has been undertaken to detect such variations.

### **3.2.4 Local governance, networks and participation**

By viewing 'local governance' (or governance at the local scale) as a process which establishes the definition and consequences of community membership, one is emphasising local government's qualities as a government and reflecting the arguments often made by local elected politicians for greater respect and greater autonomy from higher levels of government (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998). On the

other hand, there is also a need to be critical towards recent research into local government initiatives that ignores the role of central government and its effect on other actors (Aiden 2011). Neither central government nor local governments operate in a bubble and citizenship issues require interventions at both tiers (García 2006, 753). While local governments have been active in determining local policies and plans, it is necessary to take a broader view of policies adopted by local governments within a larger context that includes central government.


Governance takes account of the autonomous nature of local governments and civil society organisations as policy innovators. For instance, Shipper contends that local governments have acknowledged the work performed by NGOs and have developed innovative policy initiatives with the expertise of these foreigner support groups (Shipper 2008, 128–29). This position is backed up by Takezawa's (2008) research into the Kobe earthquake (known as the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan), where volunteers from the affected areas and beyond subsequently provided various forms of support to foreigners, including non-registered foreigners. Ostensibly temporary services such as those provided in the aftermath of the earthquake can become permanent sources of support, helping to fill vital gaps in the absence of national schemes.

Following the period of proactive local governance in the 1960s and 1970s, the pursuit of independent policy-making at the local level has been normalised. Activist groups—especially academics—impatient with the national government's neglect of non-entry control aspects of international migration see local governments as a viable alternative site for action.

There are a range of governmental and non-governmental actors that may be involved in the governance of integration policies involving and affecting immigrants and other foreign residents in Japan. Aside from the governmental actors mentioned above, there are various potential actors which may be loosely termed 'civil society actors', including NGOs, trade unions, migrant or coethnic associations, social movements, academic experts, and the media.

Figure 3.1 highlights the different types of actors involved in integration policy-making at the local scale that are considered to be pertinent to this study.

**Figure 3.1 Key actors involved in integration policy-making at the local scale**



While we have already discussed local governments as key actors in the field, a number of organisations exist within civil society with the aim of supporting specific causes or groups of people. At the same time, a number of organisations exist to support migrants, including informal and formal networks of ethnic associations. For the purposes of this study, non-governmental organisations that support migrants are of particular interest.


Lying at the boundary between local governments and migrant-supporting organisations are international exchange associations or foundations (*kokusai kōryū kyōkai/zaidan*). These were developed in the 1980s as part of Japan's internationalisation agenda to foster cultural exchange, including cultural exchange between Japanese cities and cities in other countries through the sister city movement (Ertl 2008). This movement later expanded to include what became known as *uchinaru kokusaika*, or 'inward internationalisation'. While the internationalisation movement was criticised for essentially ignoring Japan's domestic ethnocultural diversity, *uchinaru kokusaika* drew attention to this oversight. Hence, the remit of international exchange associations slowly expanded to include support services (generally advice and information services, and language classes) aimed at migrants living in local communities.

While civil society organisations (including NGOs, advocacy groups and non-state foundations and associations) have been active in Japan for decades, it was not until

1998 that civil society organisations were able to register as non-profit organisations under the ‘Law to Promote Specified Non-Profit Activities’ (*tokutei hieiri katsudō sokushin-hō*). With the enactment of the NPO Law, as it commonly called, thousands of civil society organisations registered to become specified non-profit organisations (see Figure 3.2).

A specified NPO (hereafter, just NPO) is under the jurisdiction of either the prefecture or city where its main office is located (but only if the city is a designated city). Once an organisation has completed the necessary procedures and turned in the necessary documents to the jurisdiction office, the jurisdiction office ‘authenticates’ that organisation as a NPO as long as it fulfils its legal requirements. NPOs that have cleared the standard conditions and received authorisation from the director of the National Tax Administration Agency become authorised/certified NPOs. According to the Cabinet Office, there were 51,518 *nintei* (‘authenticated’) NPOs and 1,021 *ninshō* (‘authorised’) NPOs in Japan in 2016. The key difference between the two categories is that donors to *ninshō* NPOs are able to benefit from income tax deductions, unlike donors to *nintei* NPOs, but this privilege comes with stronger government oversight.

**Figure 3.2 Number of specified NPOs in Japan, 1998–2016**



Source: NPO Homepage, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. Available at <https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/>

For Milly, ‘the combination of dispersed policy responsibilities and increased roles for citizens suggests that changes in local governance may affect the character of



policy advocacy at local and national levels by changing citizens' understanding of and investment in foreign residents' (Milly 2014, 6). Local government or NPOs may choose to advocate or lobby central government for policy change, or they may be able to influence central government indirectly by participating in local governance, albeit that their role in local governance may not have been intended to be used for advocacy purposes (Milly 2014, 23).

Immigrant-advocacy NGOs in Japan have worked with local government officials to target influential actors, especially the national bureaucracy and the Supreme Court, to influence policy outcomes on immigration (Shipper 2008). Local government officials, dedicated to fostering a distinct collective identity for their community, make good partners in such endeavours.

Moreover, many migrant-supporting NPOs and NGOs are part of regional or national alliances. Of particular relevance is the Kansai NPO Alliance—a network of NPOs in the Kansai region which covers the prefectures of Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, Nara, Shiga, and Wakayama. At a national scale, many migrant-supporting organisations are members of *Ijūren*—also known as the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan—which is a Tokyo-based organisation that advocates on behalf of migrant-supporting organisations in Japan.

For scholars such as Rhodes (1996), governance involves cooperation and coordination through formal and informal networks of actors. He goes on to argue that these networks are driven by 'the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes' and that they are subject to a complex dynamic and are not directly accountable to the state but that the state may be able to steer networks 'indirectly and imperfectly' (Rhodes 1996, 660).

In addition to these networks, Rhodes (1997) also believes that policy networks matter. Policy networks, involving committees, civil servants, professions, interest groups, provide the crucial framework for including some interests, while excluding others. All governments confront a variety of interests, and so aggregating those interests is a functional necessity. As discussed in chapter two, committees have played an important role in developing migrant policies in Japan, as in the case of the TSKS and the development of its report on the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei* in local communities (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006).

Speaking about strategies for managing policy networks, Klijn and others have highlighted the importance of managing relations within an existing network, as well as strategies to change the structure of a network or the actors participating in it (Klijn, Koppenjan, and Termeer 1995). However, the network concept and how best it should be analysed, remains somewhat problematic and unclear. As Marsh and Smith (2000) argue in terms of policy outcomes, it is unclear how much explanation is down to the existence of a particular network, and what it is about that network that delivers certain outcomes.

### **3.2.5 Transnational actors and institutions**

The discussion so far has been limited to actors and institutions that are physically located within Japan and which operate primarily at a national, regional or local scale. However, there is also a need to consider the actors and institutions operating chiefly at a transnational scale, which may be involved in the governance of integration policies in Japan.

Looking towards the transnational space, many scholars still see limited significance of ‘postnational’ or international organs outside of the EU context (for example, Joppke 1999). While transnational institutions may be able to encourage change, they do not necessarily challenge the sovereignty of the state, whereas the rights and services conferred by local governments and NGOs are actually enforced (Tsuda 2006b, 10). Moreover, if we look beyond the European Union, there are no global institutions that have the ‘teeth’ to enforce postnational or supranational forms of citizenship.

Addressing claims that advocates of international human rights standards have not adequately demonstrated their importance in domestic policy-making, Gurowitz (1999) argues that international norms have helped bring about significant changes to discriminatory policies in Japan. While Japan may have adopted international norms as part of its role as an international player, many quarters ‘have attributed the various improvements in policy toward Korean-Japanese (as well as toward Buraku and Ainu) in large part to ratification of these agreements’ (Gurowitz 1999, 429).

Both Gurowitz’s work and the previous example highlight the role of the Japanese state in absorbing international ideas and in working with other nation-states to agree

domestic and regional policies. This is not to say that transnational actors have no part to play in Japanese governance arrangements, but that much of what we consider to be transnational activities are conducted between states and subnational actors, rather than via supranational agencies.

As Milly (2014, 15–16) notes, although East Asia and other regions lack transnational institutions analogous to the EU, other international and transnational mechanisms have been used to influence the treatment of migrants and other foreign residents in Japan. As discussed previously, international norms have been used to bring about domestic changes in Japan (Gurowitz 1999) and some transnational institutions have effectively brought about policy change through extra-parliamentary tactics (Chung 2010). For example, pressure applied through the US Department of State's ranking of individual countries' human trafficking conditions in the 2000s, combined with ongoing pressures from domestic actors, led to changes in the legal status of foreign trainees (Milly 2014).

In Japan, although the proportion of foreign residents among the total population is small in comparison to other industrialised countries, hundreds of support groups exist to offer a variety of services to foreign workers and advocate for their rights and welfare (Piper and Ball 2001). Among these, women's groups in particular often promote and appeal for strong transnational linkages against human trafficking and the violation of human rights. Most have established local 'networks' within their own country and some have begun to establish transnational links, particularly with an Asia-Pacific focus (Piper and Ball 2001). There are also a few NGOs which do lobbying work at an international organisational level, including *Ijūren* (the Solidarity with Migrants Network Japan).

### **3.3 The relational dimensions of citizenship**


While governance focuses our attention on the actors involved in integration policy-making decisions, migrants are often only discussed to the extent that they are involved in participatory forms of governance. However, as the subjects of integration policies, and given their stake in the outcomes of those policies, more focus is needed on migrants themselves. Hence, in this section I draw on the citizenship literature to look at the relationships between migrants and central government, and between migrants and local government, in more detail.

### 3.3.1 Citizenship and the state–migrant nexus

Since the 1980s, closely allied to discussions of migrant integration has been the concept of citizenship (Schmitter Heisler 1992). Migration studies have tended to adopt a particular view of citizenship as being liberal-democratic and ‘national’ (Soysal 1994; Sassen 2002). In other words, citizens are regarded as ‘loyal’ to territorially-bounded nation-states, as represented somewhat stylistically in Figure 3.3a. Bauböck comments that the link between citizenship and the nation-state was reified by the American and French Revolutions (Bauböck 2003, 140), but this connection was not always the status quo. In the Greek conception of citizenship, citizens participated in the government of the polis, with Athens being the prime example. Works by Jean Bodin and Johannes Althusius in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked a shift in understanding, in which the citizen was regarded as falling under the sovereign influence of a larger territorial state (Bauböck 2003, 140). This system is often referred to as the Westphalian model, but whether or not the Treaties of Westphalia actually provided the blueprint for this system is highly debateable (Osiander 2001).

Within this schema, issues such as possible ‘leaks’ in territorial boundaries (Ferrera 2005, 13), the existence of political communities other than the nation-state and the loyalty of individuals to more than one such community have, to a large extent, been downplayed (Bauböck 2003). These assumptions are present in Marshall’s casting of social citizenship as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community’ (Marshall 1950, 28), characterised by its triumvirate of civil, political and social rights.

**Figure 3.3 (a) The state–migrant nexus (left) and (b) an expanded view of the state–migrant nexus (right)**



Rather than treat social citizenship as a hierarchy of civil, political and social rights, Dean (2013) reconceptualises social citizenship in terms of ‘sociality’ (the competing meanings that attach to social interdependency) and ‘negotiation’ (the dynamics of the claims process through which needs may be acknowledged or recognised). As a ‘post-Marshallian’ concept, social citizenship involves multiple sites of interdependency and multiple sites of dialogue for the negotiation of social rights. Thus, while integration policies and policy-making are often analysed in terms of the actions of the Japanese state (Figure 3.3a), a less ‘rigid’ view of citizenship permits non-national spaces of negotiation to be taken into account involving local government actors as well as central government actors (Figure 3.3b).

In the past these sites of negotiation may have been limited to physical spaces such as forums, but ‘we now live in a world where the capacity to communicate across time and space not only dissolves the significance of territorial boundaries, but also makes virtual communities with shared needs and interdependencies possible’ (Dean 2013, 12). While I would argue that the significance of territorial boundaries has not been completely ‘dissolved’, Ellison and Hardey (2013) believe that new forms of communication made possible by Web 2.0 based technology (especially social media platforms, whose reach and accessibility are augmented by Wi-Fi penetration) have enabled open-ended conversations and forms of virtual participation that can and do lead to new forms of ‘solid’ engagement and protest.

Within the expanded state–migrant nexus, desirable behaviour is not necessarily enforced by the state, but a web of incentives and disincentives may be spun around society to extract voluntary obedience and to ‘mould conduct’ (Rose 2000: 323). Seen from a political or Foucauldian perspective, new welfare governance implies a form of working upon ‘the ways in which individuals regulate their *own* behaviour to ensure this is consonant with the interests of the state’ (C. Pierson 2004, 75). Hence, any exploration of migrant-related policies and policy-making processes would be incomplete without an attempt to understand the implications of particular policies on the rights, responsibilities and expectations placed upon immigrants and other foreign residents.

### 3.3.2 Citizenship as a multidimensional construct

Dean's idea of claims and counterclaims, or the politics of need, is also present in Tilly's view of citizenship as 'a continuing series of transactions between persons and agents of a given state in which each has enforceable rights and obligations uniquely by virtue of the person's membership in an exclusive category' (Tilly 1996, 230). Yet, Tilly's formulation is problematic insofar as it assumes that these transactions necessarily take place between individuals and the state. Dean's analysis proceeds through a complicated layering of heuristics, too detailed to explore here, but its significance lies in its multidimensional conceptualisation of social citizenship that 'loosens its bonds with the nation state, so that citizenship is defined over a spectrum that extends from the global, through to the local' (Lister 2003, 196).

The increasing impact of globalisation and the emergence of non-governmental actors are giving rise to new understandings of citizenship that question the link between nationality and citizenship (Sassen 2002). Beginning with Soysal's (1994) seminal work on *Gastarbeiter* ('guest workers') and 'postnational citizenship', the debate has been extended to encompass both transnational and 'local' (subnational) institutions, and membership based not only on nationality but also on personhood.

While the territorial and exclusionary nature of Japanese citizenship is certainly important, this study does not view citizenship simply in relation to the Japanese nation state. Nor is this study concerned with social citizenship or postnational citizenship, per se. Rather, this study is concerned with citizenship as a multi-institutional and multi-actor process with multiple sites for the negotiation of needs and rights between migrants, the national government, local governments and other actors.

There are several reasons for looking at subnational institutions, including local governments, NGOs and, potentially, businesses/employers. To begin with, although migrants and other foreign residents are not guaranteed the same access to social services as ordinary citizens under national policy, many local authorities and NGOs are tackling discriminatory practices at a 'local' level, treating foreigners as 'local citizens' (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Tegtmeyer Pak 2006; Yamanaka and Akiba 2014).

According to Andrew and Goldsmith, ‘local citizenship conveys the potential for local government structures to represent and/or reinforce the interrelationship of individual and collective identities’ and ‘captures the idea of the city and the locality as the appropriate levels for an arena of debate’ (Andrew and Goldsmith 1998, 110–11). As local citizens,<sup>7</sup> foreign residents are afforded the same rights as ordinary citizens in terms of access to services (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000). Local governments are thus forging a form of immigrant policy that accepts foreigners in an inclusive way. According to García:

‘Urban and regional forms of citizenship’ develop when: policy instruments are introduced locally and regionally in order to maintain and/or create social entitlements as a result of citizens’ demands or as a result of local institutions’ innovative practices; and when the mechanisms for political integration provide an open sphere for participation and contestation not only for established citizens, but also for denizens. These are forms of citizenship because they ‘result in diverse forms of appropriation of national laws as citizens’ rights’. (García 2006, 754)

As ‘local citizens’, migrants’ nationality may not prevent them from accessing services that are available to them as residents, but other practical issues such as Japanese language illiteracy or unfamiliarity with local procedures could pose a problem. It may therefore be expected that policy approaches towards foreign residents would aim to resolve such problems. Local governments and civil society organisations are in a good position to transform the informal/formal rights that foreign residents possess into substantive rights.

As well as social rights, local governments have also been active in trying to secure more political rights for migrants as local citizens in terms of local suffrage.

The upward trend of pro-local suffrage among voters coincides neatly with growth in local government calls to grant foreigners’ voting rights—and in related newspaper articles. In 1993, for the first time in Japan, 16 local governments passed resolutions calling for foreigners to be allowed to vote in local elections, and in the next year, another 172 local governments passed similar resolutions. By 2001, 1,439 local governments had passed such resolutions, representing 73% of Japan’s total population. The number of articles devoted to foreigners’ local suffrage in two major national newspapers, the Asahi

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<sup>7</sup> Tegtmeyer Pak’s (2000) translation of *gaikokujin jūmin* as ‘local citizen’ should be qualified, as ‘foreign resident’ offers a more objective approximation to the original. Defining foreign residents as local citizens strengthens Pak’s argument, but it could also be viewed as a misleading interchange of terms.

Shimbun and the Nikkei Shimbun, dramatically increased from only nine articles in 1987-93 to 104 articles in 1994-2000. Takao (2003, 534)

Hitherto we have focused on the rights that citizens, or residents, may be entitled to within the democratic state of Japan, or within Japanese cities, but we cannot look at this relationship under the naïve assumption of ‘something for nothing’. In affording rights to foreign residents, Japanese institutions are also signalling the expectations that they are placing upon foreign residents in terms of obligations (cf. Milly 2014). Marshall proposed that ‘the normal method of establishing social rights is by the exercise of political power, for social rights imply an absolute right to a certain standard of civilization which is conditional only on the discharge of the general duties of citizenship’ (Marshall 1950, 43).

For Philp (1999) these ‘duties of citizenship’ can be categorised as two forms of demands: procedural and participatory. Whereas procedural duties involve behaving in a way commensurate with the acceptance of the procedures of the political process that one may wish to influence, participatory duties concern the activities which link citizens to their political representatives within a common political culture (Philp 1999, 25).

While Philp’s categorisation is useful, it is only through empirical investigation that the real implications of these demands can be deciphered. The contextually-specific conditions that are enmeshed in these duties (or obligations) are crucial for understanding the material and symbolic effects of these demands on the involvement of foreign residents in the policy-making process.

Another issue to consider in relation to local citizenship is the extent to which it is a substantive form of citizenship. Tsuda (2006c, 278–83) contends that substantive (local) citizenship is predicated not only on the implementation and enforcement of a particular set of rights, but also on the ‘active civic participation’ of migrants as members of their ‘residential communities’. This involves recognition of their civic belonging and commitment to actively claim and exercise the rights to which they are entitled.

Tsuda argues that migrants do not actively engage in civic participation for three key reasons: the instrumental economic motives of migrants, a sojourner mentality and ethnic segregation. According to Tsuda, the majority of migrants in Japan are



interested in amassing as much money as possible for the duration of their time in Japan. This means that many migrants' lives revolve around work, leaving much less time for civic activities. At the same time, migrants may frequently relocate in order to take advantage of new employment opportunities, or as a result of losing employment, which is not conducive to developing a sense of belonging. This may be compounded by the cultural and linguistic barriers that migrants face, inhibiting their sense of civic community and engagement as 'local citizens'.

### **3.4 Towards a relational framework**


The model in Figure 3.4 below summarises some of the key ideas from the discussion so far. Unlike previous research which focuses on the state–migrant nexus (including Cornelius, Tsuda, and Valdez 2003), and more recent research which scrutinises relationships between local government and migrants (including Tsuda 2006a), this model identifies several actors whose roles and interrelationships could be fruitfully investigated to understand how policies affecting foreign residents are made and governed. These roles and relationships are shaped by the particular sociocultural, political, economic and historic factors that coalesce to form the 'Japanese context'.

While the 'conventional' focus of citizenship is the relationship between individuals and the state, governance focuses our attention on the wider assemblies of governmental and non-governmental actors involved in the policy-making process, and their roles, inter-relationships and various strategies of policy-making, including the participation and agency of immigrants/foreign residents themselves. Moreover, the decisions made by these actors are enacted in different spaces—the transnational, the national, the regional and the local scales of cities and municipalities—and the roles of these spaces and their interconnectedness are therefore an integral part of this conceptual framework.

A key feature of the model is that foreign residents are positioned at the centre and relationships with other actors stem from here. While 'bottom-up' approaches are an improvement on 'top-down' perspectives—insofar as they identify key institutional relationships with reference to foreign residents first and foremost, and then between institutions—both approaches imply that these relationships are vertically structured. Instead, the model here presents the relationships between the various actors as

dynamic and non-hierarchical. Of course, the distribution of power and resources among various actors and across relationships may vary considerably, but this distribution is a matter for empirical investigation.

**Figure 3.4 Key relationships in the governance of integration**



The model focuses on the actors that are ‘physically’ located in Japan, as well as those actors who may be physically located elsewhere, but whose transnational activities may have an impact on Japanese policy-making. The Japanese context would be inappropriate for contextualising *all* the activities of transnational actors. In the case of bilateral and multilateral agreements, we would need to reproduce the model for all the countries involved and identify linkages between these countries and the contextual layers in which they operate. Such a framework may be useful for comparative research, but falls outside of the scope of the present study.

The influence of transnational activities on the political, sociocultural and economic conditions in Japan should also be noted, in terms of their impact on, and involvement of, the other actors in the model. Japan’s historical and geographical position in East Asia or the Asia Pacific, and as a member of international

organisations, also influences its domestic policies. Betts (2011) suggests that what makes governance ‘global’ is not the ‘level’ at which it is identified—whether bilateral, regional, transnational, or supranational—but rather the fact that it is constraining or constitutive of the behaviour of states and transnational actors. However, this definition is rather narrow, suggesting that global governance must have an effect on actors’ behaviours for it to be recognised and implying that this influence is top-down.

Nor should we assume that the Japanese state must operate at the national scale. States are simultaneously involved in transnational and multilateral processes that ultimately have implications for national and local policies. At the same time, ministries such as the MOJ have local branch offices, especially in larger cities. These branch offices bypass the local government structure and enable the state to deal directly with local residents.

Given the multi-scalar and multi-spatial nature of governance, even ‘local’ actors may engage in activities that could be considered to have a transnational flavour, such as the ‘sister city’ programme. Moreover, the governance structures that apply within one prefecture or municipality may vary from one prefecture to the next. For example, Osaka City Government performs many of the duties that prefectural governments would conduct in other localities. In addition, the city of Osaka is subdivided into 24 wards, each with its own ward office and varying numbers of foreign residents with different demographic makeups.

The relationship between the state and ‘civil society’ in Japan is also noteworthy. The blurring of the state/civil society boundary in Japan is of more than theoretical interest. In most policies we can see how the institutions of the Japanese state work with non-governmental actors in ways that would be considered unusual, perhaps impossible, in many Western states (Neary 2003).

### **3.5 Summary**

This chapter has drawn together key concepts from governance and citizenship-based approaches to migration studies in order to create a combined framework for exploring integration policies and policy-making processes within a Japanese context.

The previous chapter demonstrated that the development of integration policies (and indeed immigration policies) within Japan may be viewed as a multi-actor process. The purpose of this chapter was to expand upon this by showing that citizenship and the governance of integration policies may also be viewed as multidimensional processes, involving multiple actors and multiple scales. Moreover, focusing our attention on the relations between the actors and institutions involved in the production of integration policies allows insights from governance and citizenship based approaches to be combined in one framework, while offering a relational perspective on the issues at stake.

It is important to bear in mind that the concept of governance was not developed in a Japanese context, but has subsequently entered Japanese academic and political discourses. In particular, the term *kyōchi*, while short-lived, indicated a form of governance centred on collaboration with civil society actors in the delivery of public services. The role of migrant-supporting organisations, particularly specified NPOs, is of particular concern to this study.

Much of the literature exploring migration policies through a governance lens has done so through the lens of multilevel governance—a conceptual framework developed primarily through studies of the European Union. While multilevel governance has been particularly useful in urging scholars to look at the role of *transnational* institutions in policy-making alongside national governments, this study is particularly interested in the role of *subnational* or local governments in the development of integration policies. For the purposes of this study, power and scale are regarded as more useful stratifying concepts than territorial ‘levels’ alone.

However, it is easy to lose sight of the centrality of migrants in the integration policy-making process. While migrants are often constructed as passive policy subjects, there is also a need to consider migrants as key actors in the governance of integration policies—for example, as individuals who may make claims on the state as residents or local citizens within particular cities. Alongside the civil and social rights that migrants may be entitled to—either at a national or local scale—we also need to be aware of the expectations and obligations that are placed on migrants.

Given that this is still an emerging research area, the governance–citizenship framework developed in this chapter must be tested and validated in the field. The

next chapter outlines an analytical framework for understanding how integration policies are being developed in Japan, and experienced by migrants, based on a Bourdieu-inspired field analysis.

## 4 Analysing integration policy-making: a field analytical approach

### 4.1 Introduction

Although governance can be viewed as a collaborative process rather than an adversarial one (Ansell and Gash 2007), there is a need for scholars to view all forms of governance with a critical eye—to scrutinise, for instance, whether collective decision-making is truly collective or whether policy-making practices are as democratic as they profess to be. Yet, we also need to understand *why* particular forms of governance occur, why certain actors are involved in decision-making processes, or not involved as the case may be, and why particular policies are pursued or implemented.

In their review of contemporary debates in policy studies, Ayres and Marsh (2013) note that the theorisation of policy-making within policy studies has been dominated by approaches developed within American branches of political science. In particular, analysis of policy-making as a sequence or cycle of interrelated activities or stages has tended to dominate discussions of policy-making ‘processes’, with its focus on problem identification, agenda setting, deliberation and development of potential actions, implementation of agreed actions and evaluation. According to John (2003), the 1990s were dominated by three explanatory approaches to the theorisation of policy-making, based on the concepts of policy streams (Kingdon 1995), punctuated equilibria (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Although very different, all three approaches share similarities in their appreciation of the importance of ideas, as well as (rational) actors, institutions, groups and networks, and exogenous factors (John 2003).

Public policy analysis is, however, now rich in concepts and methods devised to understand the social contexts in which policies are produced, or constructed (e.g. Gusfield 1994), and which problematise the concept of policy itself (Shore and Wright 1997). One such approach articulated by Dubois (2014b) involves the application of field analysis. A Bourdieu-inspired field analysis of integration policy-making encourages the researcher to view the governance and state-migrant

relationships at the heart of policy-making more critically, while also providing a distinct explanatory logic for policy change.

This chapter begins by identifying and discussing examples of how field analysis has been used in migration studies to date. It then goes on to describe how the production of integration policies may be viewed from a field perspective, before discussing what this study is contributing to the literature. I argue that it offers a fresh perspective on existing concepts—one which highlights the dynamics of the power relations between actors and institutions involved in the struggle for developing integration policies, while challenging the behavioural assumptions underpinning certain governance approaches.

## **4.2 Field analysis in migration studies**

As mentioned in chapter one, a field is essentially a space of relations—not simply between actors, but between the characteristic resources, practices and other attributes of those actors. Thinking systematically in terms of fields involves viewing all aspects of society in terms of fields.

There have been some attempts to develop field-based or relational approaches in migration/integration studies already. Of particular note are the works of the Dutch scholars Peter Scholten and Justus Uitermark. While both these approaches apply Bourdieu's 'tools' for very specific purposes, both have merits worth discussing in their own right.

Scholten's (2011) work draws on the relational approach developed by Bourdieu and his structuralist-constructivist perspective, combined with Rein and Schön's (1996) work on problem framing and frame reflection, to explore the dialogue between migration (and migration research) and migration policy-making in a Dutch context. However, it should be stressed that the ideas and insights developed by this work have implications and applications beyond the Dutch context.

According to Scholten, framing a problem requires 'naming specific facets from problem situations and an inherently normative way of framing them into cognitive stories about what is going on, who is involved, why it is going on and what could or should be done to provide a solution' (Scholten 2011, 33). His work builds on Schön and Rein's (1994) approach to problem framing, which recognises the influence of

the structural setting in which framing takes place. According to Scholten, they ‘refer to frames as being connected to particular institutional forums that induce actors to name and frame a problem situation in a specific way’ (Scholten 2011, 33). And sometimes the structures of those forums induce actors to reflect on those frames or possible alternatives.

Scholten criticises Rein and Schön’s approach for its ‘loose’ conceptualisation and operationalisation of institutional forums and thence goes a step further by viewing science and policy as fields of structured relations. The problem Scholten addresses is the very specific nature of the relations between policymakers and researchers (the ‘research–policy nexus’) and how changes in this nexus are connected to changes in the way that immigrant integration is framed in policy and research. The analytical insights drawn from the field perspective, and in particular the intersection of different fields, helps explain changes in the relationships between those fields in the Netherlands at different periods of time and their connection to the framing of immigrant integration.

For Uitermark (2012), while European countries have exhibited increasing convergence in terms of integration policies, integration politics (i.e. the struggles through which differences and inequalities are constructed between individuals and groups that share the same nationality, namely the Dutch one) has become more contentious (Uitermark 2012, 22).

According to Uitermark, integration politics are contested in the ‘civil sphere’—those institutions and communicative channels where actors negotiate the conditions and nature of civil belonging (Alexander 2006). He draws on the work of Bourdieu to develop a political sociology of integration politics, by recasting Alexander’s civil sphere as a field. In fact, Uitermark (incorrectly) identifies the civil sphere as the Bourdieuan ‘public sphere situated at the intersection of the political field and the bureaucratic state’ (Wacquant 2013, 276). Civil politics is a discursive struggle, where discourse is defined as a ‘coherent ensemble of framing and feeling rules through which meaning and emotion are ascribed to material and social realities’ (Uitermark 2012, 29).

Uitermark is seemingly more critical of Bourdieu than Scholten, and sees Bourdieu’s understanding of the concept of ‘symbolic power’ (the power to recognise or



legitimise forms of capital) as one that not only absolutizes discourse, but also absolutizes power. This, for Uitermark, is demonstrated in Bourdieu's 'principled unwillingness to examine [actors'] interactions' which 'reduces his capacity to understand the dynamics of collective action' (Uitermark 2012, 29). Uitermark therefore complements his field analysis with network analysis and discourse analysis to better grasp the dynamics and ambivalence of power relations and hence understand changing immigrant integration approaches in the Netherlands (specifically, Amsterdam and Rotterdam).

While Bourdieu's work should not be accepted uncritically, Uitermark's criticism of Bourdieu's work ignores key elements in Bourdieu's extensive body of work, especially the notion of habitus which he scarcely touches upon. Although less prominent, there are elements in Bourdieu's oeuvre which indicate an interest in change and strategies for change (discussed later in this chapter) albeit through a field-analytical perspective rather than an interactionist one. Introducing network or discourse analysis into the mix could therefore be regarded as excessive.

Furthermore, Bourdieu rarely, if ever, spoke in a sustained and systematic way about the civil sphere. Rather, he spoke of coalitions or movements in which 'the dominated' among the dominant actors would align themselves with actors from outside the field of power in attempts to gain greater shares of resources and influence (Emirbayer 2010, 403). This makes the recasting of the Bourdieuan field of power as the civil sphere somewhat problematic. In fact, he was fiercely critical of Alexander's cultural sociology (see, for instance, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992).

Overall, however, both Scholten's study and Uitermark's demonstrate the versatility and explanatory power that Bourdieu's analytical toolkit offers. While some governance-based arguments have been criticised for being too descriptive, such as the networks approach (Heard-Lauréote 2005, 43), field analysis can offer deep and distinct insights into individuals' behaviours and practices within the governance of immigrant integration.

Rather than try to mesh field analysis with other frameworks, this study seeks to demonstrate how governance and state-migrant relations can be viewed through a field analytical perspective. Following Scholten and Uitermark, the intention of this study is not to use Bourdieu's work as an off-the-shelf theoretical framework, but as

an insightful framework through which to explore the design and delivery of integration policies in Japan.

### **4.3 The field of integration policy-making**

#### **4.3.1 The structure of the field of integration policy-making**

In developing this analytical framework, I draw on the work of Vincent Dubois (2014b), who has outlined a field-based framework for introducing Bourdieu's political sociology into policy analysis. Dubois is specifically interested in what he terms the 'space of production of a policy' (Dubois 2014a). As Dubois points out, 'the notion of the field was conceived as a transposable tool capable of explaining the logics specific to each differentiated space of relationships and practices' (Dubois 2014b, 199). In other words, field-based approaches are designed to be flexible and to be used in different modes of study.

According to Paulle et al. (2012) there are three key concepts in a Bourdieu-inspired field analysis: the field/space, capital/power and habitus. An appreciation of all three concepts is essential for rethinking integration policy-making in terms of fields.

For the purposes of this study, I am interested specifically in what may be termed the field of integration policy-making (or using Dubois' terminology, the 'field of production of integration policies'). Within this space, integration policies can be regarded as:

[...] the product of the practices and representations of the agents involved in it, these practices and representations being determined by the social characteristics, interests and objective positions of the agents, and therefore the structure of the relationships among them. (Dubois 2014b, 204)

As discussed previously, the ensemble of actors and institutions involved in the governance of policy are often described as a 'matrix of governance' (Lieberthal 1995) or in terms of the 'choreographies of governance' (Swyngedouw 2005). Uitermark (2012) defines these relationships as 'figurations of governance', in an apparent nod to Norbert Elias's (2012) concept of figurations—essentially homologous with the Bourdieuan concept of field or space (for a comparison, see Paulle, van Heerikhuizen, and Emirbayer 2012). In order to avoid confusion,

however, I describe these relationships as ‘configurations of governance’ (within the integration policy-making field).

Bourdieu regarded the field as a ‘configuration of objective relations between positions’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97). More precisely, the field of integration policy-making can be conceptualised as a structure of relations not between the actors themselves (e.g. specific NPOs or the migrants supported by those organisations) but, rather, between the ‘nodes’ that those actors happen to occupy (Emirbayer and Williams 2005, 691). In other words, the units of analysis are not concrete or empirical entities but constructed or ‘epistemic objects’—objects of investigation employed in the research process (Knorr-Cetina 1999).

Epistemic objects are defined in terms of where they are situated within a relational system. Bourdieu indicates that the nodes or positions within a field are:

[...] objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their occupants, agents, or institutions, by their present and potential situation (*situs*) in the structure of the distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.) (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 97)

Put simply, the nodes or positions within the integration policy-making field must be analysed in terms of the distinctive profiles of capital associated with them. In fact, the concepts of field and capital are intrinsically interlinked: just as ‘a capital does not exist and function except in relation to a field’, so too, conversely, the distribution of types of capital ‘constitutes the very structure of the field’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 101). Or as Elias (2012) contends, power is an emergent property of relations that emanates from, and structures, social interactions.

Exactly what sort of power or capital is at stake depends on the field. Within the field of integration policy-making, the central stake is the power or authority to determine legitimate integration policies. This includes the power to decide *who* should legitimately benefit from those policies. For Bourdieu, the state has a monopoly on the legitimate use of symbolic violence, within a given territory, and so the state is often *a* dominant actor (if not *the* dominant actor) within a given field.

Different actors within the integration policy-making field will have different forms of capital which are relevant to the field. For example, some local governments or

NPOs may have more extensive or more close-knit networks of relationships than others. This social capital can be used to gain new forms of capital, such as informational capital (for an interesting discussion on informational capital, see Bourdieu 1994) as described below. However, we cannot determine the forms or volumes of capital that actors possess without empirical investigation.


As discussed previously, all governance approaches recognise that different actors are involved in the integration policy-making process beyond ‘the state’. However, by viewing these actors through the lens of the field, we can determine which actors have relatively more or less control in determining integration policies and whether particular actors are using their existing power or capital to gain more control.

For Bourdieu, capitals function both as weapons and as stakes in the struggle to gain ascendancy within fields: a struggle for successful monopolisation of the specific authority which is characteristic of the field in question (Emirbayer and Williams 2005). This means that the competing stances and choices vying to define and implement policies in a particular way (e.g. assimilationism) can be related to the positions and interests of those who advocate them. Put another way, there may also be some form of correspondence between the content of a particular integration policy (its orientation, its style) and the relational structure of the configuration of governance actors involved in its production (Dubois 2014b, 205).

Hence, what Bourdieu’s perspective highlights is the structural tension between occupants of ‘dominant’ and ‘dominated’ positions within any social microcosm. Indeed, Bourdieu conceives of the field along the lines of an electromagnetic field, with dominant and dominated poles that actors (or agents, as Bourdieu would say) seem to gravitate towards. In Bourdieu’s work, these poles are often identified as the temporal/economic pole and the spiritual/cultural pole respectively (see Figure 4.1).

Especially significant in all such struggles (again, as both a stake and a tool) is what Bourdieu terms ‘symbolic capital’: capital in any of its forms insofar as it is accorded legitimacy (positive recognition, esteem, honour, and so forth) by relevant actors within the field. Contestations over symbolic authority are a crucial feature of field dynamics and those actors who succeed in amassing it gain considerably in their efforts to assume a dominant position within the field as a whole (Emirbayer and Williams 2005).

**Figure 4.1 Basic structure of a Bourdieuan field**



In Bourdieu's early writings, he focused on three particular forms of capital—economic, cultural and social capital—as highlighted in the following excerpt.

[...] capital can present itself in three fundamental guises: as economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights; as cultural capital, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of educational qualifications; and as social capital, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the form of a title of nobility. (Bourdieu 1986, 242)

Previous migration studies have fixated on social capital (e.g. Cornelius, Tsuda, and Valdez 2003). The terms 'social capital' and 'social networks' have at times been used interchangeably (Ryan, Erel, and D'Angelo 2015), but here it is taken to mean the means by which actors within the field of integration policy-making, including migrants, are able to mobilise their social networks and ties.

Bourdieu identifies various kinds of capital within a field that can be accumulated and strategically deployed by actors within a field, including political capital and informational capital. Political capital allows its holders to define what is at stake within the field of integration policy-making and, ultimately, to define integration policies. Informational capital (of which cultural capital is one dimension) endows its

holders with a seemingly ‘authentic’ understanding of the integration issues affecting ‘foreigners’ in Japan.

In any field analysis, it is crucial to inquire into the tacitly shared interests, concerns, and ultimate beliefs that constitute the ‘cost of admission’ into those fields. These attachments also guarantee that the ‘dynamism and processuality constitutive of fields do not involve perpetual upheaval’ (Emirbayer 1997). Bourdieu (2000) points out that unspoken agreements are often lodged at the level of what he terms the ‘habitus’.<sup>8</sup> By this, he means the system of dispositions that become like second nature to actors either through childhood socialisation within the family (‘primary habitus’) or more specific mechanisms of socialisation in later life (‘specific habitus’). Such dispositions include deeply ingrained modes of perception, emotional response and action within the world, but also manners and bearing, ways of speaking, forms of dress, and so on, as discussed in more detail below.

Before continuing, however, it is worth reiterating that the field of integration policy-making is a configuration of objective relations between positions or nodes determined by the kinds of capital possessed by the actors within the field. How these actors are positioned in physical space is only relevant insofar as it influences, or is influenced by, the kinds of capital that those actors are able to accumulate and use. So, for example, this could mean that actors who are positioned in different geographical territories, or who act at different scales, may occupy nodes which are relatively closer in the field of integration policy-making than actors who are colocated. Viewed from a geographical perspective, this relationship may appear as ‘scale jumping’, but from a field-analytical perspective what is of importance is the nature of the relationship between those actors—how it came to be and what it enables those actors to do.

It is also worth pointing out that integration policy-making is likely to intersect with other policy areas, particularly immigration policy-making. By extension, the fields in which these policies are produced are also likely to intersect. While immigration policies are not the focus of this study, they are still considered to be important for understanding the integration regime in Japan. What happens in immigration policies,

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<sup>8</sup> While the concept of habitus was already in use before Bourdieu appropriated it (Bourdieu 1985), his formulation of habitus has been considerably influential.

and other relevant policy areas, may have a bearing on integration policy-making processes.

### **4.3.2 Governmental and non-governmental actors from a field perspective**

In the previous chapter, I proposed that the state should not be viewed as a monolithic whole but split between central government—including the Diet and government ministries—and local government, which can be further divided between prefectural governments, municipal (city) governments and local ward offices.

There is some precedent for this in Bourdieu's writing. In Bourdieu's later works, he construes the 'state' not as a monolithic, coordinated ensemble, but as a splintered space of forces, which he calls the 'bureaucratic field', vying over the definition and distribution of public goods (Bourdieu 1994).

According to Wacquant's interpretation of the bureaucratic field:

The bureaucratic field is traversed by two internecine struggles. The first pits the 'higher State nobility' of policy makers intent on promoting market-oriented reforms against the 'lower State nobility' of executants attached to the traditional missions of government. The second opposes what Bourdieu calls the 'left hand' and the 'right hand' of the State. The left hand, the feminine side of Leviathan, is materialized by the 'spendthrift' ministries in charge of 'social functions'—public education, health, housing, welfare and labour law—which offer protection and succour to the social categories shorn of economic and cultural capital. The right hand, the masculine side, is charged with enforcing the new economic discipline via budget cuts, fiscal incentives and economic deregulation. (Wacquant 2015, 239–40)

Bourdieu's perspective on the state is instructive insofar as it reminds us not to objectify the state and to be aware of the tensions that characterise *intragovernmental* relations, namely relations between different central government departments or ministries.

This study attempts to fill a gap in Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the state, by examining the role of local government in integration policy-making processes in more detail. One way to do so is to analyse the relationship between central government and local government as a form of struggle by developing Bourdieu's treatment of local government as part of the so-called 'lower State nobility' (Bourdieu 1994). Another is to treat the structure of local government as homologous

with that of the bureaucratic field, with local governments characterised by the same ‘tensions’ that characterise the bureaucratic field in general.

Following Medvetz’s (2015) analysis of think tanks, there are at least three different ways to conceive of the role of migrant-supporting organisations: as part of the field of integration policy-making, as a separate field within their own right or as ‘boundary organisations’ operating at the intersections between the field of integration policy-making and other fields. For the purpose of this study, I will not be looking at local governments or at migrant-supporting organisations as part of separate fields but as part of the field of integration policy-making. However, the theme of intersections—which has also been taken up by Scholten (2011)—is relevant to this study. Of particular pertinence is the intersection between the field of immigration policy-making and the field of integration policy-making.

#### **4.3.3 Field-specific strategies**

Since habitus—or dispositions acquired through experience—serve as a generative principle for strategies of action, differences at the level of habitus help to explain the different strategies of control and resistance that actors find themselves inclined to pursue in a ‘context of indeterminacy’ (Peillon 1998, 222). Habitus, or the ‘feel for the game’ as Bourdieu often describes it, ‘is what enables an infinite number of “moves” to be made, adapted to the infinite number of possible situations which no rule, however complex, can foresee’ (Bourdieu 1990a, 9).

Those actors who occupy the weakest positions in the field of integration policy-making, in terms of control over integration policies, are likely to be those with habitus least well-suited for the struggles specific to that field. However, commonalities at the level of habitus also serve to bind all actors within the field together, despite the structural tensions that may separate them. As Bourdieu puts it, a ‘fight presupposes agreement between the antagonists about what it is that is worth fighting about; those points of agreement are held at the level of what “goes without saying”’ (Bourdieu 1993, 73).

For Bourdieu, there are three core forms of field strategy: strategies of conservation, succession and subversion. Understanding these strategies can help inform our



understanding of changes in configurations of governance within the field of integration policy-making.

If the habitus (which informs practice) is aligned with the objective structure of the field of integration policy-making, we can expect the field to be defined by a relatively stable social order and a collective memory that favours constancy and is resistant to change (Bourdieu 1990b). The legitimacy of capital or other entities within the field would then be based on cognitive and moral judgments about the ‘consistency’ of those entities with the taken-for-granted norms, or *doxa*, associated with the field. If there is alignment between the habitus and the field, or a strong hierarchical structure within the field, the ‘space of possibles’—a phrase often used by Bourdieu (see, for instance, Bourdieu 1996)—may be limited and therefore the habitus would incline toward orthodoxy rather than policy transformation.

Dominant actors in the field of integration policy-making may use conservation strategies aimed at defending their position and sustaining the doxic social relations of the field (Swartz 1997). The collective memory structures of habitus also structure cognition, leading to phenomena such as path dependence or the closing down of the space of possibles (Bourdieu 2014). New actors may pursue strategies of succession aimed at gaining access to dominant positions in the field, consistent with ‘fitting in’: adopting existing cognitive norms and patterns of behaviour (Stringfellow and Maclean 2014). By contrast, activists in the field of integration policy-making are likely to lack institutional legitimacy. It is therefore less likely that transformative integration policies will be espoused if the field of integration policy-making is relatively stable.

The need to achieve or maintain institutional or policy legitimacy in the field of integration policy-making may limit the potential for creativity and transformative policy-making practices, unless the relationship of actors to the field changes in such a way that the field itself is transformed. Such a transformation could be described as a ‘break in equilibrium’ (following Bourdieu) or ‘critical juncture’ (P. Pierson 2003). Pierson argues that once path-dependent processes have been put into motion, ‘specific patterns of political mobilization, the institutional “rules of the game”, and even citizens’ basic ways of thinking about the political world will often generate self-reinforcing dynamics’ (P. Pierson 2003, 196).

If the field of integration policy-making is less stable or undergoing a period of flux, actors may be able to establish new patterns of legitimate behaviour during a critical juncture. Taken-for-granted structures and doctrines that were previously invisible, and subconsciously accepted, may then be identified and challenged. Competing narratives or discourses, such as those associated with policy transformation, may therefore emerge. These discourses would still relate to the past and present dynamics of the field, but would position actors in accordance with anticipation of institutional or policy change. Actors could use these ‘windows of opportunity’ (cf. Kingdon 1995) to generate strategies of succession aimed at achieving dominance, while balancing the dual requirements of ‘fitting in’ and ‘standing out’. Hence, the stability or instability of the field of integration policy-making could be a key factor in explaining policy change or transformation.

By contrast, activists may pursue strategies of subversion—more radical attempts to break free from dominant policymakers and other actors by challenging and delegitimising the logic and practices associated with the status quo (Stringfellow and Maclean 2014, 178). These strategies are more likely to be used by less dominant actors in the integration policy-making field, who have less to lose by disrupting the field. However, by adopting strategies that run counter to the taken-for-granted rules and behaviours of the field, these actors are essentially trying to swim against the tide, making it more difficult to destabilise the authority of dominant actors in the field.

#### **4.3.4 Governance and social praxeology**

The way in which theories in policy studies are brought into dialogue is problematic. Theory inevitably entails ontological and epistemological commitments, but these are explicitly examined less frequently than would be desirable (Cairney 2013). Hence, this section draws out some of the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of field analysis more explicitly.

Bourdieu was ‘not a governance theorist’, according to David Swartz, nor did he ‘use the language of governance’ (Swartz 2003, 141). This is primarily because Bourdieu did not cast his work in terms of disciplinary boundaries, whereas concepts such as governance are heavily associated with disciplines such as political science and political sociology. At the same time, Bourdieu disagreed with much of the literature

associated with governance, especially where it made normative claims about the implementation of public policy. Nonetheless, many of the concerns reflected in Bourdieu's work (e.g. the crisis facing the modern welfare state) and in his personal views (e.g. the wish to make public services more democratic) are shared by many 'governance theorists'.

In identifying the overlap between Bourdieu's field analytical framework and the concerns expressed by governance theorists, Swartz goes on to say that:

Field analysis brings Bourdieu close to the analytical level and strategy recommended by Rod Rhodes (1997, 29) for a governance perspective; namely, a 'meso-level' approach that links micro expressions of particular interests with macro power concerns. Thus Bourdieu's field analytical approach to politics, like the new governance perspective, brings into play a broader range of power centres contributing to political life than do approaches focused on the central organism of government. (Swartz 2003, 151)

Despite the overlap, it should also be noted that the tone of Bourdieu's work is also very different to the approach taken by many governance theorists. Bourdieu does not talk about collaborative or cooperative forms of governance, but instead focuses on domination and the struggle for power.

This is particularly evident in Bourdieu's writing on the delegation of political authority, which he viewed as a form of political alienation. Delegates obtain their power from the group and the group in turn is shaped by delegates. However, by handing over some authority to a delegate, people in dominated positions (such as migrants) are at risk of 'dispossession', i.e. migrants become more constrained to rely on delegates for their political voice. According to Swartz, Bourdieu's analysis of delegation is a wake-up call for governance theorists who believe that acts of delegation such as decentralisation may lead to more democratic forms of representation and policy implementation (Swartz 2003, 107–11). As a result, migrants, for instance, may not find increased representation in these configurations of governance.

While governance based theories that adopt rational choice as a starting point believe that individuals behave in ways designed to maximise their ability to choose particular options based on their preferences (whether purely rational or based on self-interest), embedded within the field are assumptions about the behaviours people

engage in. Bourdieu's 'social praxeology' contends that individuals behave in ways consistent with the 'rules of the game' (the taken for granted assumptions inherent within a particular field). In other words, their behaviours are either part of their habitus—their 'natural' dispositions within the field—or else designed to disrupt the taken for granted principles (doxa) within the field.

For our purposes, this means that actors are not developing integration policies based purely on what is rational or what they themselves may desire. Instead, the agency of policymakers and other actors within the field of integration policy-making is structured by the structures and institutions within the field. Likewise, those structures themselves are constructed and reconstructed by actors whose actions are based on principles consistent with the field in which they are positioned.

There may appear to be some similarities between the field-based understanding of people's behaviours and that of the bounded rationality approach to governance (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). Based on the work of Herbert Simon, the bounded rationality approach has recently gained traction as it provides a counter to the rational choice assumptions that underpin the delegation approach to governance. While rational choice suggests that individuals behave in ways that maximise their preferences, given the constraints presented by an external environment, bounded rationality suggests that individuals also have to deal with their inner world. It suggests that rationality is 'bounded' by the framing role of the human mind (Chhotray and Stoker 2009). However, the fundamental difference between the approaches is that the social praxeological approach regards individuals as having cognitive instruments which are structured by the world (socially bounded), while Simon's focus is on the biological limitations of human reason.

In this sense, the social praxeological assumptions underpinning the field-based approach have more in common with cultural institutional theory, which posits that people's interests are the product of social relations. People's preferences and their management strategies to realise these preferences are shaped by their ways of life. cultural institutional theory regards decision-making processes not as purely cognitive but also as socially influenced: 'mental activity is embedded in and justifies social relations' (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 58).

Terms such as ‘strategy’ thus take on a different meaning within field analytical frameworks, as they are closely connected with the habitus characteristic of particular fields. As Bourdieu explains:

This word, strategies, evidently has to be stripped of its naively teleological connotations: types of behaviour can be directed towards certain ends without being consciously directed to these ends, or determined by them. The notion of habitus was invented, if I may say so, in order to account for this paradox.  
(Bourdieu 1990a, 9–10)

Hence, actors within the field of integration policy-making will follow courses of action that are consistent with their habitus, rather than actions that are based on rational calculations or utility maximisation.

## **4.4 Interactions at the frontline**

### **4.4.1 The position of migrants in the field**

The position of migrants within the field of integration policy-making can be viewed in different ways. One possibility is to view their relationship with other actors as an *uchi-soto* (‘insider-outsider’) relationship. Migrants and other foreign residents may play a key role in integration policy-making processes as ‘insiders’ (*uchi*). This could be as community leaders or as members or employees of key organisations. On the other hand, migrants are also ‘consumers’ of policies and services designed to support their settlement and integration. As consumers (*soto*), they are less likely to play a direct role in the formulation of integration policies.


The concept of habitus becomes particularly relevant at the interface between social policy ‘providers’ and foreign residents who consume integration and social policy services. For Bourdieu, this relationship is marked by ‘misrecognition’—where acts of control are often (mis)recognised as benign or benevolent (see, for instance, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). By contrast, migrants who recognise these acts as forms of discipline or coercion may pursue different ‘strategies’ of resistance to counter strategies of control, as discussed above.

Strategies of control and resistance should not necessarily be perceived as intentional, for they may be enacted through routine practices which are generated by a habitus (Peillon 1998). Two sets of practices are particularly pertinent: practices generated by the habitus of those who produce and deliver integration and social policies, and

practices engendered by the habitus of those who consume or are targeted by those policies. In fact, diverse habitus are probably involved in each category, as both ‘producers/providers’ and ‘consumers/recipients’ do not constitute uniform categories.

Following Emirbayer and Williams (2005), Figure 4.2 presents a template for viewing the position of migrants within the field of integration policy-making. The field is polarised between forms of capital which are most valued by service providers (‘provider-sanctioned capital’) and those forms which are most valued by migrants as service users (‘client-sanctioned capital’). Immigrants and other foreign residents who are rich in provider-sanctioned capital may be looked upon more favourably by service providers than those who lack such capital. In other words, foreign residents (in their positions as denizens, clients or consumers) who do not rock the boat, so to speak, may garner more support from ‘street-level bureaucrats’ than those who do.

**Figure 4.2 Basic structure for viewing the position of migrants vis-à-vis service providers within the field of integration policy-making**



While some migrants may be relatively rich in either of these forms of capital, others may be rich in neither. This is not to say that those migrants would have no influence in the field, but that they may have to rely on other strategies in order to secure the services and support they need or desire.

#### **4.4.2 Migrant capital as substantive citizenship**

In addition to configurations of governance, Bourdieu's ideas on capital suggest that citizenship constitutes a key mechanism of distinction between migrants and Japanese ethnonationals. From this perspective, citizenship is a strategically produced form of capital (or capitals), which manifests itself (or manifest themselves) in formal (legal and institutional) as well as informal (practised and cultural) aspects (Bauder 2008). Both aspects of citizenship can render migrants more vulnerable than Japanese ethnonationals, for example by channelling migrants into the secondary labour market or the informal economy. This view of citizenship corresponds to the treatment of citizenship as a strategic concept not only in association with constructions of identity and belonging, struggles over recognition, and the politics of participation and contribution, but also in relation to regulating access to scarce resources and institutionalising difference (Bauder 2008, 316).

Formal citizenship, arguably, functions as a form of capital in the sense intended by Bourdieu: it is a strategically deployed category that can be exchanged with other forms of capital and serves the aim of accumulation and reproduction (Bauder 2008, 321). In the sense that formal citizenship permits the denial of economic rights, formal citizenship (or lack thereof) is a legal mechanism of inclusion/exclusion. When migrants, qua denizens or non-citizens, can only enjoy a limited bundle of rights (e.g. conditional labour-market access), the lack of formal citizenship can be said to function as a 'mechanism of subordination' (Bauder 2008, 322).

Informal citizenship is a dimension of membership in a national community related to practices of identity and belonging. This substantive dimension of citizenship complements formal citizenship as a mechanism of distinction and applies to migrants who 'are not considered "to belong" to the nation state community' (Bauder 2008, 323) regardless of any formal entitlement they may or may not have.

In this sense, Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital is particularly relevant. Cultural capital, according to Bourdieu (1986), appears in three states: embodied, institutionalised and objectified. Thinking about the first two categories, embodied cultural is perhaps best expressed in the concept of habitus, which includes bodily comportment and speaking as markers of distinction; while institutionalised cultural capital includes formal education qualifications and certifications (Erel 2010).

Bourdieu's articulation of cultural capital could be used to reconsider ideas associated with informal citizenship. For example, informal citizenship cannot entirely be separated from 'race', as 'racial markers' often signify cultural non-belonging. These markers can be considered to be an embodied form of cultural capital. However, the notion of informal citizenship as a category of distinction and exclusion can be applied in a more territorial manner than the category of race: a person's belonging may not be defined so much by racial markers as by having access to 'territorially defined cultural codes and conventions and by being able to enact place-particular habitual performances' (Bauder 2008, 324). In other words, informal citizenship is dependent on the space or field in which it is enacted.

Informal citizenship distinctions associated with belonging and entitlement also shape migrants' situations in a more direct manner. For example, migrants are often unable to give the cultural performances expected from the members of an 'imagined community' (Anderson 2016). They may be unable to speak Japanese fluently, especially the more formal Japanese required in administrative environments (linguistic capital), or they project embodied images or institutionalised symbols of non-belonging which limit their access to employment, education or other opportunities. This process of exclusion or discrimination also extends to policy-making processes, which tend to privilege certain forms of cultural and political capital at the expense of others.

Formal and informal aspects of citizenship can further be translated into economic and other forms of capital. For example, particular categories of migrants (such as highly skilled migrants) may be able to afford privileges and opportunities that are not available to migrant groups. In this context, of course, citizenship is not independent from class, race, gender or other categories of distinction (Bauder 2008, 326).

## **4.5 Summary**

This chapter has considered how concepts associated with governance and citizenship may be analysed through a relational framework—more specifically, the field analytical framework developed by Bourdieu, based on the conceptual triumvirate of fields, capital and habitus.



By viewing the production of integration policies through the lens of the field of integration policy-making, actors involved in these policy-making processes become reconfigured in terms of their relative positions within the field. Actors in the field are characterised by the capital they are able to accumulate and wield in their struggle to formulate integration policies at different scales and to decide who may benefit from those policies.

While actors' behaviours may be shaped by the specific habitus associated with the field of integration policy-making, they are also likely to use different strategies to try to maintain or conserve the status quo or to try to subvert it. Again, these strategies will depend on their relative dominance within the field and the kinds of capital they have at their disposal.

As actors in their own right, migrants' actions in the field are also characterised by the specific forms of capital that they are able to leverage to access particular services and forms of integration support. However, it is important to consider how migrants' cultural capital (in particular their embodied and institutionalised cultural capital) may promote or hinder their ability to achieve particular outcomes in terms of their own or their families' settlement and integration.

As Peillon observes in his use of Bourdieu's analytical toolkit, 'the usefulness of this framework will be decided by the empirical work it performs: by the way it makes sense of practices and institutions observed in concrete welfare situations' (Peillon 1998, 214).

## 5 Methods

### 5.1 Introduction

As discussed in the previous chapters, this study has explored integration policies and policy-making in Japan through a relational framework. This framework has drawn on the concepts of governance and citizenship, but the relational dimensions of these concepts have been viewed through the lens of field analysis. Hence, appropriate research methods were needed in order to be able to investigate these phenomena with due appreciation for their complexity.

As part of this approach, the policy-making processes in question were explored through detailed case studies of the policies and practices involving actors and institutions operating within and across two particular cities, namely Osaka and Yokohama. A review of the particular, historically-endowed sociocultural, political and economic contexts that have combined to form these urban contexts has helped construct ‘the objective structures [...] that define the external constraints bearing on interactions and representations’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 11).

Data were gathered from multiple sources for this case study research in order to triangulate and validate the findings. One aspect of the research focused on identifying and gathering integration policy documents: central government legislation and reports and local government reports and policy documents, supplemented with reports produced by NGOs and trade associations. These documents were reviewed in order to assess their relevance in terms of the research questions. Relevant documents were analysed thematically to better understand how and why certain integration policies have come into existence, and how their implementation was steered, while ‘deconstructing’ the categories embodied in these texts with reference to the contexts in which they were produced.

Building on the data gathered through the document review, the main aspect of the research involved interviews and focus groups with integration policy stakeholders. Interviews were conducted with ‘policymakers’ (government advisors, civil servants and local government officials) and representatives from migrant-supporting organisations, while focus groups were carried out with migrants and other foreign residents in order to understand the positions they occupy in the field of integration

policy-making. The fieldwork was carried out over three time periods: December 2014 to March 2015, September 2015 to October 2015 and March 2016 to April 2016.

These qualitative research methods were used to explore the ‘immediate, lived experience of agents in order to explicate the categories of perception and appreciation (*dispositions*) that structure their action from inside’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 11). Allowing policymakers to put forward their accounts of the processes and relationships involved was a crucial step towards piecing together the patterns of integration policy-making processes. Moreover, the assumptions and perceptions that underpin policies toward migrants—as well as the expectations that are placed on migrants in the design of particular services, initiatives or measures—were also investigated.

## **5.2 Exploring integration policies and practices relationally**

### **5.2.1 The case study approach**

There was a strong rationale for choosing a comparative case study strategy to address the research questions in this study. Case studies usually focus on a small number of instances of a particular phenomenon with the aim of exploring various aspects of it in detail. While more than one instance may be investigated, case studies are used to extract in-depth information that cannot be gained from mass studies such as surveys. In other words, the ‘aim is to illuminate the general by looking at the particular’ (Denscombe 2007, 36).

Case studies are appropriate where phenomena cannot be generated artificially, or controlled by the researcher, but must be investigated in their natural settings. The complexity of the policy-making processes in question meant that there was a need to carry out fieldwork in situ, namely in the cities of Osaka and Yokohama. While a comparison of two case studies has its limitations, using embedded units or subunits (such as wards within the cities) can lead to a richer analysis (Ragin 1994). Data can be analysed within each subunit separately (within case analysis), between the different subunits (between case analysis) and across all of the subunits (cross-case analysis).

Case studies focus on relationships and processes rather than outcomes; or in Yin's (2009) terms, a focus on *how* and *why* questions. For this study, I was interested in the ways in which actors and institutions based in Osaka and Yokohama—and to some extent, the prefectures of which they are part—have created and implemented policies towards foreign residents under their aegis, with reference to other actors and institutions. This called for a meticulous understanding of the relationships between the various actors and foreign residents themselves, as well as an appreciation of the ways in which policies are shaped and produced at different scales. Indeed, this is where Bourdieu's approach was particularly instructive, as it is intended to explore 'bundles of relations' (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 16).

What separates case studies from other social research is that information is gathered from a variety of sources using a variety of methods. One advantage of this approach is the greater potential for validation through triangulation of methods (Denzin 2009, 297–313). For example, the views of central and local government officials and NGO representatives were compared with the accounts of foreign residents. However, care was taken to ensure that there was continuity of purpose in the collection of the data. This required coherence between the methods used to collect the various data and the objectives that these data contributed towards (as discussed below).

According to Yin (2009), one of the major problems in single-case and few-case research is a failure to make the transition from analysis at the subunit level to analysis at a level where the research questions can actually be addressed. In other words, researchers can become so engrossed in the details of the case that they neglect the goals of the project. While coding reorganises the data, it is the task of a connecting strategy to understand the data in context and to draw connections between the various utterances and events into a 'coherent whole' (Maxwell 2009, 238). In a case study design, the holistic case study is used to connect the various strands of the research.

Categorising and connecting strategies should not be viewed as mutually exclusive and it is important that both are used to make sense of the data. As Maxwell explains, both 'categorizing and connecting strategies are legitimate and valuable tools in qualitative analysis, and a study that relies on only one of these runs the risk of missing important insights' (Maxwell 2009, 238). These considerations were taken

into account when analysing the data obtained through the different collection methods (see below).

## 5.2.2 Osaka and Yokohama: key sites of immigrant integration

There were several reasons for selecting Yokohama and Osaka as the case cities for this study. As mentioned in chapter one, Osaka and Yokohama are the two ‘designated cities’ (municipalities with over 500,000 residents and designated as cities by government ordinance) with the highest numbers of foreign residents. Both cities are home to migrants and other foreign residents from the most prevalent groups of non-Japanese ethnonationals in Japan. Moreover, the policies and practices in these two cities alone have the potential to affect a considerable number of foreign residents.

With a combined population of over six million people, including 200,000 registered foreign residents, Yokohama and Osaka are not just populous cities but places with a significant history of migration that have become important sites for interactions between Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonationals (see chapter two). This was an important factor in the selection of Osaka and Yokohama as the study sites, as it increased the likelihood of being able to secure an ethnationally diverse sample of participants.

**Table 5.1 Number and percentage of registered foreign residents by nationality in Osaka and Yokohama, as at December 2016**

Nationality	Osaka		Yokohama	
	Number	Percentage	Number	Percentage
China	30,072	23.7%	36,444	40.8%
Korea	66,530	52.5%	12,986	14.5%
Philippines	3,431	2.7%	7,420	8.3%
Vietnam	7,432	5.9%	4,964	5.6%
Brazil	962	0.8%	2,589	2.9%
Nepal	1,140	0.9%	2,789	3.1%
USA	1,485	1.2%	2,407	2.7%
Taiwan	4,287	3.4%	2,672	3.0%
Other	11,471	9.0%	17,127	19.2%
<b>Total</b>	<b>126,810</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>89,398</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Note: The nationality column is ordered by prevalence of those nationalities among the registered foreign resident population of Japan as a whole.

Source: *Shikuchōson-betsu kokuseki/chiiki-betsu zairyū gaikokujin* (foreign residents by municipality and by nationality/region). Available at <http://www.e-stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/List.do?lid=000001177523>

In the case of Osaka, the *Zainichi* Korean community is particularly well established, with Korean nationals making up over half of the registered foreign resident population, while Chinese nationals accounted for a further quarter in 2016 (see Table 5.1). In Yokohama, Chinese nationals represented approximately 40% of the registered foreign resident population. The ethnonational diversity of the local populations was treated as one potential explanatory factor for any observed differences in integration policy-making processes between the two cities.

Another consideration in the selection process was the wider impact of the integration policies being investigated. While innovation has played an important role in the development of local government policies toward foreign residents, Tegtmeier Pak (2000, 70–71) believes the diffusion of these policies to other local governments is as likely to happen through the adoption of ‘best practices’ as it is through other means. The designated cities have greater influence in this respect, as their privileged positions have afforded them greater fiscal capacities and budget flexibility (Kitayama 2001). Hence, Yokohama and Osaka were selected with the expectation that the policies and programmes in these cities may represent some of the most forward-looking initiatives of their type and may be typical of current best practices.

Within each city, the integration policy-making processes at ward level were treated as subunits for a potentially richer analysis. The distribution of the approximate 126,000 foreign residents in Osaka was found to be far from even across its 24 wards, but the proportion of foreign residents in every ward exceeded the national average (see Table 5.2).

Nearly 28,000 foreign residents were based in one particular ward, Ikuno, representing 22% of the ward population and roughly a quarter of all foreign residents in Osaka. Of these, close to 93% had a Korean background and the ward is home to several generations of Korean families as well as Japan’s largest ‘Koreatown’. Ikuno was also identified as one of the few wards to explicitly address the needs of foreign residents in the design of its ‘local welfare action plan’ (Ikuno-ku Chiiki Fukushi Akushon Puran Sakutei Iinkai 2006; Ikuno-ku Chiiki Fukushi Akushon Puran Suishin Iinkai 2011). Hence no investigation of integration policy-

making processes in Osaka would have been complete without reference to policies and practices in Ikuno ward.

**Table 5.2 Number of registered foreign residents in the city of Osaka, by ward and as a percentage of the total ward population, as at 31 March 2017**

Ward	Number	Percentage	Ward	Number	Percentage
Ikuno	27,516	21.6	Minato	2,523	3.1
Naniwa	7,672	11.6	Jōtō	5,147	3.0
Higashinari	6,915	8.5	Miyakojima	2,909	2.8
Chūō	7,611	7.8	Suminoe	3,286	2.7
Nishinari	7,931	7.4	Konohana	1,756	2.6
Tennōji	4,235	5.6	Higashisumiyoshi	3,293	2.5
Nishi	3,915	4.1	Abeno	2,714	2.5
Hirano	7,888	4.0	Sumiyoshi	3,812	2.5
Kita	4,782	3.9	Asahi	2,099	2.3
Higashiyodogawa	6,293	3.7	Taishō	1,335	2.0
Nishiyodogawa	3,372	3.5	Fukushima	1,325	1.8
Yodogawa	5,885	3.4	Tsurumi	1,940	1.7
			<b>City total</b>	<b>126,154</b>	<b>4.7</b>

Source: *Jūmin kihon daichō jinkō / gaikokujin tōroku jinkō* (registered resident and foreigner population), Osaka City. Available at <http://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/shimin/page/0000006893.html>

**Table 5.3 Number of registered foreign residents in Yokohama city, by ward and as a percentage of the total ward population, as at 31 August 2017**

Ward	Number	Percentage	Ward	Number	Percentage
Naka	16,278	10.9	Izumi	2,517	1.6
Minami	9,390	4.8	Tsuzuki	3,037	1.4
Tsurumi	11,971	4.1	Kanazawa	2,838	1.4
Nishi	4,140	4.1	Totsuka	3,727	1.3
Kanagawa	6,326	2.6	Seya	1,603	1.3
Isogo	4,151	2.5	Aoba	3,723	1.2
Hodogaya	4,952	2.4	Kōnan	2,290	1.1
Midori	3,294	1.8	Asahi	2,635	1.1
Kōhoku	5,741	1.6	Sakae	959	0.8
			<b>City total</b>	<b>89,572</b>	<b>2.4</b>

Source: *Yokohama-shi tōkei pōtaru saito—Yokohama no jinkō* (Yokohama City statistics portal site—Yokohama’s population). Available at <http://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/ex/stat/>

Like Osaka, the 18 wards of Yokohama are home to a diverse number of foreign residents in varying proportions. As Table 5.3 indicates, the number and proportion of foreign residents in each ward vary widely. While it was important to get a city-wide view, the wards of Naka and Tsurumi were used as key sites for investigation at the subunit level. Naka has the highest number of foreign residents of any ward in Yokohama, followed by Tsurumi. A review of documents produced by the Tsurumi Ward Office revealed that it had developed a *tabunka kyōsei* ‘action plan’ outlining

its approach to local integration issues, updated in 2011 and translated into several languages (Tsurumi Kuyakusho 2008; Tsurumi Kuyakusho 2011).

To summarise, the integration policy-making processes in the cities of Osaka and Yokohama are the units of analysis of this study and the findings from the study sites have been analysed in terms of the context shaped by national policies and the prefectural governments of Osaka and Kanagawa. At the subunit level, specific wards were explored as key sites: Ikuno in Osaka, and Tsurumi and Naka in Yokohama. Although it was not possible to conduct focus groups with foreign residents in each of these sites, at least one interview was carried out with policy stakeholders in all three sites. Research undertaken in these sites was used to better understand whether different configurations of local-scale policies and institutions may lead to different subnational modes of integration.

### **5.3 Reviewing policy documents: a window into integration policy-making in Japan**

Collecting and analysing policy documents was an important aspect of the three-prong approach adopted in this study, alongside interviews with policy stakeholders and focus groups with foreign residents. Bowen describes documents as ‘non-reactive’ sources of data (Bowen 2009, 31), highlighting the fact that they can be ‘reused’ in the research process without the data being affected by the researcher’s interrogation of it.

The documents analysed for this study include documents produced by the Diet and central government, namely government legislation and reports published by relevant ministries and departments. Relevant statutes included the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act and the Alien Registration Act; other relevant documents included the Basic Plan for Immigration Control (*shutsunyūkoku kanri kihon keikaku*) and integration-related reports produced by the TSKS (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006) and other government agencies. These policies and reports were scrutinised to determine the rationale behind the enactment of particular immigration and integration policies. As noted in the next section, the interviews were carried out predominantly with stakeholders engaged with integration policy-making at a local scale and so the documents provided useful



information on developments at the national scale that could not be obtained through other sources.

While national policies are legislated centrally, the influences on these policies and the ways in which these policies are enacted depend, crucially, on other actors such as local governments, NGOs and business organisations. Hence, another source of primary data was local government documents (including *tabunka kyōsei* promotion plans) and other reports produced by subnational actors. This involved the collection of documents from specific ward offices within Osaka and Yokohama, as well as from local government websites.

Substantial preliminary research was concluded through a review of existing literature, especially scholarly articles and research papers. This literature was found through a combination of key search terms using search engines (including Google Scholar), databases (including CiNii) and relevant journals (such as the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*).

The fieldwork phase was used as an opportunity to access and critically engage with the extensive Japanese literature relevant to this study, as well as acting as a check on potential methodological Eurocentrism or, conversely, Japanese relativism (Hijiya-Kirschnereit 1988). The CiNii search engine was used to locate relevant library holdings at national and local institutions in Japan, some of which I was able to use for this study. New documents of relevance were located on local government websites, especially those of Osaka Prefecture, Kanagawa Prefecture, Osaka City and Yokohama City. These documents were also used to identify key search terms and further sources of information were then located through citation tracing. Many of the interview participants also provided further documents at interviews or during follow-up correspondence, some of which were relevant to this study. It was unclear whether or not these documents were furnished by the participants because they had been requested as part of the interview arrangement process, but their provision was welcomed.

While these documents provided a rich and accessible window into Japan's political institutions over a period of time, it was borne in mind that they were not written for research purposes (Mangen 2004, 313–14). While some contained useful information, others yielded little information of value, and some might have contained inaccurate

or inconsistent data. For this study, the documents reviewed were not treated as purely objective reflections of the actors or institutions that produced them, nor of the policies, processes or decisions that they professed to describe. As Bowen (2009) suggests, researchers should be vigilant about potential biases in documents, as well as the researcher's own potential biases. Hence, documentary research was just one aspect of the overall research strategy, with methodological and data triangulation achieved using the other data collection methods described below.

#### **5.4 Interviews and focus groups with integration policy stakeholders**

Interviews with key stakeholders—especially policymakers, representatives from NPOs and international exchange foundations (with and without migrant backgrounds), and Japanese academics—were carried out in order to better appreciate integration policies and policy-making from the actors' perspectives. These semi-structured interviews were designed to gather information about the relationships between actors, in terms of how integration policies have been formulated and implemented at different scales, and to understand the issues that those policies were designed to address.

Focus groups were carried out with the aim of understanding foreign residents' experiences of the integration process, with reference to the actors and institutions that are involved in integration policy-making and the responsibilities and expectations that have been placed upon foreign residents. In addition, unpicking the sociopolitical frameworks in the study sites and the wider Japanese context and examining how they shape the way in which migrants settle in those cities is a key feature of this study that was investigated through the focus groups.

To some extent the focus groups were used to understand how the experiences of newcomer groups compare to those of more established *Zainichi*, who have more extensive rights (bar the right to participate in national elections) owing to their status as predominantly 'special permanent residents'. As there is a rich body of research concerning *Zainichi* people in Japan, the majority of the focus groups were carried out with non-*Zainichi* people.

#### 5.4.1 Ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations

Just as the conceptual framework for this study rejects simple binaries, so too were they rejected in the collection and analysis of the data. To begin with, many researchers suggest that working ‘in an elite field poses major difficulties which stem from the challenges of *researching up*, which are quite different to those encountered in *studying down*’ (emphasis added; Desmond 2004, 262). As Woods points out, the term *elite* ‘remains remarkably unproblematised, employed largely as a short-hand term for those agents who are in some way perceived to be more powerful or more privileged than some unidentified group, but without any substantive conceptual depth’ (Woods 1998, 2101).

The changing dynamics between the researcher and the participant in an interview situation is well-documented, but notions of ‘studying up’ and ‘studying down’ imply that there is a definite hierarchy in a given interview situation; the former applying to interviews with ‘elites’, the latter to interviews with ‘non-elites’. Yet, there is no reason to assume that contextually-specific patterns or distributions of power, and the contextually-specific sources from which individuals derive their relative authority or ‘legitimacy’, will carry forth into the interview space. Indeed, Smith’s (2006) experience suggests that the special behaviours reserved for elite interviews in contrast to non-elite interviews may be misplaced.

Just as this study has eschewed the use of the term ‘multilevel governance’ for its hierarchical connotations, so too does it avoid hierarchy-implying binaries. Thus, rather than reproduce assumptions about elites and non-elites and their anticipated dispositions in the interview scenario, *all* the interviews and focus groups were considered to be research with relevant stakeholders. As Smith (2006) remarks, sensitivity and reflexivity are key to the interview process, such as being cognizant of the space in which a particular interview is conducted and the language register used. And these considerations were applied equally to *all* interviews conducted. Indeed, Dexter’s (2006) definition of a ‘specialized interview’ goes further than most in suggesting this should be so.

It is an interview with any interviewee—and stress should be placed on the word ‘any’—who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is given special, nonstandardized treatment. By special, nonstandard treatment I mean: stressing the interviewee’s definition of the situation; encouraging the interviewee to

structure the account of the situation; letting the interviewee introduce to a considerable extent (an extent which will of course vary from project to project and interviewer to interviewer) his notions of what he regards as relevant, instead of relying on the investigator's notions of relevance. (Dexter 2006, 17)

There was no guarantee that the officials best situated to give views about policies toward foreign residents—as a result of their involvement in the policy-making process or their work with foreign residents—would be available for interviews. However, certain steps were taken to increase the likelihood of getting an interview and to make best use of the participants who were available. Following Goldstein (2002), these included the creation of a suitable sampling frame (to identify key actors), precise letters of introduction and professional conduct to improve the likelihood of further introductions.

Purposeful sampling was used to identify potential participants with knowledge of integration policies and policy-making processes at national and subnational scales. Maxwell (2005) identifies at least four goals for purposeful selection: typicality, heterogeneity, extremity and comparability. Focusing on typicality and heterogeneity, the first goal is to 'achiev[e] representativeness or typicality of the settings, individuals, or activities selected', while the purpose of the second 'is to ensure that the conclusions adequately represent the entire *range* of variation, rather than only the typical members or some "average" subset of this range' (Maxwell 2005, 89). Although the other goals of purposeful selection should not be ignored, this study was carried out with the goal of identifying cases of heterogeneity rather than looking for typical cases. Such an approach also helped mitigate the risk of 'key informant bias' (Pelto and Pelto 1975, 7).

Aberbach and Rockman advocate the use of open-ended questions in the exploration of 'value patterns and perceptions' of policymakers to 'provide a greater opportunity for respondents to organize their answers within their own frameworks' (Aberbach and Rockman 2002, 674), though the associated data may be more difficult to code and analyse. Flexibility is also important in the structure of the interview: semi-structured interviews gave the participants the space to bring in details that were not necessarily elicited by the topic guides (see appendix A).

Furthermore, there was a risk that civil servants or policymakers who were still in active service would be reluctant to offer opinions that could possibly damage their

working relations or compromise their positions in some way. Potentially, this guardedness might have led to ‘uninspiring’ interviews. Berry suggests several techniques to help overcome such situations, including ‘bridges’ to lead interviewees back on topic, the use of ‘probes’ on the interview guide as reminders to ask about key areas, and questions about the interviewee’s role or that of their organisation as a way of yielding more interesting responses (Berry 2002). Crucially, listening carefully to the interviewee, while referring back to the goals of the interview at appropriate moments, helped ensure that the time was used in the best possible way.

Interviews with stakeholders were partly used to validate data gathered from documentary materials. However, interview data cannot always be cross-checked with other interviewees, or other sources, as it is often not possible to speak to another individual who can verify the information given by the original interviewee (Seldon 1996).

In contrast to the interviews with policy stakeholders, the focus groups were used as opportunities to understand the lived experiences of migrants and other foreign residents in Japan. Participants were encouraged to discuss the formal and informal channels that they use to engage with policy-making processes—more specifically their engagement with civil society organisations, local governments, central government and others in areas that impinge on their lives as foreign residents. The discussions were also used to explore the dynamics that participants experience in terms of their relationships with these institutions—to form a material and symbolic understanding of their ‘citizenship’—together with the ‘strategies’ that they use to maintain or enhance their positions in their respective social spaces.

#### **5.4.2 Interviews with policy stakeholders**

As part of the purposeful sampling strategy, I produced a database of potential interview participants in each city based on key organisations identified in the existing literature and through internet searches. This enabled me to approach the fieldwork sites with a sense of who the key actors and institutions in the field of integration policy-making may be. I also produced information sheets, topic guides and consent forms for the interviews in English and Japanese (see appendix A). The Japanese versions were checked by various native speakers and revised in line with their feedback.

Although the literature suggests that ‘introductions’ are very important for gaining access to interview participants in Japan (Bestor, Steinhoff, and Lyon Bestor 2003), introductions were not found to be essential. In fact most of the interviewees were approached ‘cold’ (i.e. without formal introductions) and most consented to being interviewed. In one case, I received support from my host institution to arrange an interview (Interview 2). In another case, one of the earlier interview participants (Interview 1) was happy for their name to be used to secure a further interview. Most of the potential participants were initially contacted via email, but letters were used in two cases, as the email addresses of the target participants were not publicly available. One letter was unsuccessful, while the other yielded an interview with civil servants (Interview 20) suggesting that it was a worthwhile tactic.

Twenty interviews were carried out involving 35 individuals in total (see Table 5.4). Further investigation in the initial interviews was used to understand which actors may be more dominant within integration policy-making, at different scales, and which actors may be more peripheral. The database was continually updated to take account of these insights and was also updated to reflect other practical issues (such as staff changes in particular organisations). All 20 interviews were conducted during the first fieldwork period: December 2014 to March 2015. The interviews lasted for 75 minutes, on average, with a range of 50–90 minutes. I also recruited temporary research assistants through Jiscmail mailing lists to provide interpreting support at some of the interviews. Where interviews involved multiple participants, the contributions of the participants varied considerably; some said little or nothing and seemed to be present just to support their colleagues.

Three groups of integration policy stakeholders were interviewed. First, local government representatives and policymakers were identified, especially those with specific knowledge of policies and programmes that have shaped integration processes as they apply to Osaka and Yokohama. Local government officials are often privy to information that is not readily available in policy documents and reports and so their knowledge of integration policies and policy-making was an important source of data. In particular, these stakeholders were interviewed to help determine whether there were any key differences between integration policies and policy-making at a national scale and at a regional/local scale. The interviews were

also used to check whether there is growing consensus in central and local government approaches toward integration.

**Table 5.4 Details of interviews with integration policy stakeholders**

Reference	Organisation	Male/female	Location
Interview 1	NPO	Male (1)	Osaka
Interview 2	City government	Male (1) Female (1)	Yao
Interview 3	NPO	Male (1)	Osaka
Interview 4	International exchange foundation	Female (1)	Osaka
Interview 5	International exchange foundation	Male (2)	Yokohama
Interview 6	NPO	Male (1) Female (1)	Tokyo
Interview 7	University	Male (1)	Tokyo
Interview 8	International exchange foundation	Female (1)	Yokohama
Interview 9	City government	Male (2) Female (2)	Yokohama
Interview 10	CLAIR	Male (2)	Tokyo
Interview 11	NPO	Female (1)	Yokohama
Interview 12	NPO	Male (1) Female (1)	Yokohama
Interview 13	Prefecture government	Male (2) Female (1)	Osaka
Interview 14	City government	Male (2)	Osaka
Interview 15	NPO	Female (1)	Kanagawa
Interview 16	City government	Female (1)	Hamamatsu
Interview 17	Migrant-supporting organisation	Female (2)	Yokohama
Interview 18	NPO	Female (2)	Yokohama
Interview 19	Migrant-supporting organisation	Female (1)	Yokohama
Interview 20	Central government	Male (3)	Tokyo

On the whole, local government representatives were found to be neither openly critical nor complimentary towards central government actors—preferring to offer professional opinions rather than personal ones. In line with Berry’s (2002) suggestions, probes and ‘bridges’ (to return to subject areas that were not fully explored) were used to elicit relevant information from the participants, but the quality of the data varied from interview to interview.

As mentioned in chapter three, there were over 50,000 specified NPOs in Japan in 2016. Roughly one in seven (14%) specified NPOs were registered with Osaka Prefecture or Kanagawa Prefecture or one of the designated cities in those

prefectures (see Table 5.5). A search of the ‘NPO Homepage’ (administered by the Japanese Cabinet Office) revealed that there were over 260 specified NPOs with either *tabunka kyōsei* or *kokusaika* in their names (at the end of 2014) of which 30 were registered in Osaka Prefecture (5), Osaka City (17), Kanagawa Prefecture (4) or Yokohama City (4). This search helped narrow down the pool of potential interview participants.

**Table 5.5 Number of specified NPOs in Japan by jurisdiction, as at 30 September 2017**

Agency which has jurisdiction		<i>Ninshō</i> (‘authenticated’)	<i>Nintei</i> (‘authorised’)	<i>Tokurei nintei</i> (‘special case’)
Prefecture	City			
Osaka	-	1,776	8	1
Osaka	Osaka	1,548	36	0
Osaka	Sakai	269	1	0
Kanagawa	-	1,500	40	3
Kanagawa	Yokohama	1,512	48	1
Kanagawa	Kawasaki	360	8	0
Kanagawa	Sagamihara	221	9	0
Other		44,542	791	91
<b>Total</b>		<b>51,728</b>	<b>941</b>	<b>96</b>

Source: NPO Homepage, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. available at <https://www.npo-homepage.go.jp/about/toukei-info/kenbetsu-ninshou>

Interviews with representatives from migrant-supporting organisations, especially specified NPOs, helped provide a more complete picture of integration policies, particularly in terms of policy implementation. The stakeholders were also interviewed for their perspectives on central and local government. The stakeholders interviewed were generally found to have well-developed insights through their work with migrants and other foreign residents. Moreover, some of the NPO and MSO representatives were willing to use their networks to help recruit migrants and other foreign residents as focus group participants (see below).

The views of civil servants in key ministries were sought as they are directly involved with policies and programmes affecting foreign residents in Japan. This group was the most difficult to access and so the majority of interviews were carried out with participants from the first two groups. Only one group interview was carried out with civil servants, all working for the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC). One senior civil servant was the key participant in this interview and he took the decision to switch from Japanese to English at the



beginning of the interview. Surrounded by Japanese-speaking colleagues outside the interview room, this appeared to be a deliberate tactic designed to allow him to speak more candidly.

### **5.4.3 Focus groups with foreign residents**

Participants were chosen using a combination of purposeful selection—to reflect the ethnocultural, gendered and class-based aspects of migration experiences—and convenience sampling, which allowed a higher number of migrants to be included in the study. The focus groups highlighted the diversity of migrants, while countering the tendency of migration research to ‘use “ethnic community” as both the object of study and the unit of analysis in migration research’ (Glick Schiller, Çağlar, and Guldbrandsen 2006, 613).

Participants were recruited in a variety of ways. In some cases there were ‘warm contacts’ (Okumus, Altinay, and Roper 2007, 14), made through earlier stakeholder interviews, who then acted as gatekeepers to potential focus group participants. Participants were also identified by approaching suitable gatekeepers in migrant-supporting organisations with a view to obtaining their support for the project. Some were recruited through NPOs and international exchange foundations—especially those where interviews had taken place—while others were recruited through gatekeepers’ wider social and employment-based networks. I also recruited participants through my own social network, which I developed during the course of fieldwork, by telling acquaintances about the study and encouraging them to cascade this information through their own networks. Other contacts were approached ‘cold’, by contrast, through direct solicitation at events and particular NPOs. This strategy involved the use of printed flyers explaining the purpose of the research, the participation criteria and information on how to take part (made available in both English and Japanese) but this tactic was not successful. In order to compensate for these recruitment difficulties, I undertook an additional visit to the case study sites in 2016.

Cash incentives (2,000 yen) were also offered to participants. Although the original plan was to offer vouchers or gift cards, this plan was soon abandoned due to the lack of readily available, widely-used options, in contrast to the comparative simplicity of a cash-based system. Some participants accepted gifts in kind (refreshments, etc.) in

lieu of cash incentives, while some chose to donate their incentives to a good cause. In one case, the incentives were donated to the NPO through which the participants were recruited. Three gatekeeper organisations expected a donation in return for helping recruit participants.

**Table 5.6 Details of focus group participants**

<b>Reference</b>	<b>Ethnonationality (and number)</b>	<b>Male/female</b>	<b>Location</b>
FG 1	Western (8), Korean (1)	Female (2) Male (7)	Osaka
FG 2	Brazilian (5)	Female (1) Male (4)	Yokohama
FG 3	Filipino (5)	Female (4) Male (1)	Yokohama
FG 4	Filipino (3), Western (2)	Female (4) Male (1)	Osaka
FG 5	Western (6)	Female (2) Male (4)	Osaka
FG 6	Filipino (4)	Female (4)	Yokohama
FG 7	Brazilian (5)	Female (4) Male (1)	Yokohama
FG 8	Chinese (2)	Female (2)	Yokohama
FG 9	Korean (5)	Female (3) Male (2)	Yokohama
FG 10	Korean (3), Chinese (2), Brazilian (1)	Female (6)	Osaka

Note: Western is used as shorthand for non-Japanese nationals from Europe or North America

In total, four focus groups were carried out in Osaka and six were carried out in Yokohama across two separate visits to Japan (September–October 2015 and March–April 2016). The focus groups generally lasted for 90–120 minutes. The participants' backgrounds were indicative of the ethnonational heterogeneity characteristic of migrants in Japan (see Table 5.6). Participants were required to have lived in Japan for at least two years and to be living or working in the cities in question. The residency requirement helped ensure that the chosen participants had had time to experience a range of interactions, particularly through civic participation and the use of services. As per the stakeholder interviews, topic guides were prepared before the focus group discussions, and information sheets and consent forms were given to all participants (see appendix A).

Representatives from the gatekeeper organisations were given the option to be present at the focus groups depending on the demands of the organisations and the practical needs of the participants. Although there was a risk that this could affect the

resulting data, participants were found to be quite open in the four focus groups where a representative was present. In one instance, the representative asked the participants not to focus on the benefits of the gatekeeper organisation (an international exchange foundation) but to talk about their lived experiences, which was a welcome intervention.

While most of the focus groups were conducted in Japanese or English, some of the focus groups were carried out in Filipino with the help of a Filipino-speaking research assistant. The research assistant acted as an interpreter, relaying the information from English to Filipino, and vice versa, at convenient points during the focus group discussions. Another focus group was carried out in a combination of Portuguese and Japanese, again with the help of a research assistant who acted as an interpreter. While the use of interpreters is inevitably more intrusive than translation (Jentsch 1998), I deemed it essential to use interpreters in these instances as it allowed the participants to speak freely in the language that they felt most comfortable with.

All the interview and focus group data were transcribed before being analysed. Transcription is a time-consuming process, made more complex in this case by the fact that the transcriptions had to be transcribed in Japanese, English, Filipino and Portuguese. Native speakers were recruited to transcribe the non-English audio recordings and asked to translate the Filipino and Portuguese transcriptions into English. In most cases the translator had also acted as the interpreter, which helped ensure some level of continuity. By contrast, the Japanese transcripts were left untranslated and were analysed in Japanese. All Japanese-based quotations used in this text were kept in the original language up to the write-up stage—a strategy advocated by Ungerson (1996). This allowed time for the translations to be refined, but also meant that any nuances that might have been missed during the analysis phase, and that would have been lost after translation, could still be identified at a later stage.

#### **5.4.4 Reflections on being in the field**

Several researchers have spoken of their experiences of doing fieldwork in Japan and a common thread is the need for institutional affiliation and introductions before entering the field (Bestor, Steinhoff, and Lyon Bestor 2003). While institutional

affiliation was not essential to the fieldwork, as mentioned above, it was essential for the visa application process which was an important practical consideration. Access to an institution based in Osaka (Osaka City University) was secured through my supervisor. Although I did not have corresponding affiliation in Yokohama, this did not hinder the research as I was able to use lessons learned in Osaka to conduct research in Yokohama more effectively.

Before entering the field, I had read a host of relevant Japanese scholarship and this helped ensure, to some extent, that I was able to adopt the appropriate vocabulary and jargon in my interviews. Coleman also advocates learning colloquial expressions used by potential participants as a way to ‘unlock whole areas of discussion’ (Coleman 2003, 111). Before embarking on fieldwork, I had acquired sufficient language skills to be able to engage with participants in Japanese without the need for an interpreter, but interpreting support was helpful nonetheless. Immersion in Japanese-speaking environments certainly helped improve my Japanese skills and my understanding of sociocultural norms.

Being in Japan and having regular interaction with Japanese scholars made the task of identifying relevant literature much easier. Some theoretical validation was achieved by regular discussion of emerging findings with academics. However, I also gained valuable insights living as a ‘foreigner’ in Japan. Having to undertake many of the same processes as those required of migrants helped me develop a deeper appreciation of some of the issues at stake and the challenges associated with life as a foreign resident in Japan. These processes included registration at the local ward office and opening a bank account. While I already had some command of the Japanese language before entering the study sites, which made these activities considerably more manageable, I still found it difficult to perform these tasks. I could therefore appreciate that it would be much more difficult for people with little or no prior knowledge of Japanese to engage in many of the administrative activities that are essential for life in Japan, unless formal or informal translation or interpretation support were available.

I also met many people, including migrants, outside of my fieldwork during the course of day-to-day tasks and activities, such as shopping or visiting restaurants.

These encounters helped shape my views on the experiences of migrants living in Osaka and Yokohama.

## **5.5 Analysing the data: maintaining a relational approach**

A close reading of the transcripts and policy documents contributed to a better understanding of integration policies and policy-making activities, including the policy frames and narratives bound up with these phenomena. Although analysis is often seen as conceptually different from the design process, I adopted the view that analysis is an integral part of the design process and that informed decisions must be made with regards to how it should take place (Coffey and Atkinson 1996). For the purposes of this study, I reviewed and analysed data from the document review throughout the fieldwork periods. Indeed, many researchers recognise the need to conduct data analysis simultaneously with data collection in order to modify data collection methods accordingly and to make sense of emerging data.

Strategies for qualitative analysis fall into three main groups: categorising strategies (such as coding and thematic analysis), connecting strategies (such as narrative analysis and individual case studies) and written and diagrammatic field notes. While much has been written on these strategies (for more detailed discussions, see Coffey and Atkinson 1996; Maxwell 2005), the analytical techniques employed for this study were designed to maintain the relational approach outlined in chapters three and four.

The coding process was a vital part of the analysis, which allowed tags and labels to be attached to segments of the data in order to ‘rearrange it into categories that facilitate comparison between things in the same category and between categories’ (Maxwell 2009, 237). Maxwell (2005) distinguishes between three categories of codes: organisational, substantive and theoretical. Organisational categories allowed the data to be sorted into ‘bins’ and were useful for structuring the data in the final presentation. However, it was the substantive (or descriptive) and theoretical categories that allowed the connections between the data to be analysed.

The first stage in the coding process involved identifying organisational categories based on the broader topics that emerged from the research questions. I then used NVivo to help me undertake a ‘close’ reading of the data and to apply substantive

and theoretical categories. Thematic analysis formed the bedrock of the qualitative analysis, in which the substantive and theoretical categories were used to highlight the relational dimensions of the production of integration policies and migrants' experiences of those policies.

Although the use of software is not a substitute for analysis, there are advantages to using software such as NVivo. In particular, NVivo allows users not only to create 'theme nodes' (a collection of codes related to a particular theme), but also 'relationship nodes' to show how different actors or categories are related. As with ordinary nodes, NVivo users can code content at relationships: a feature which proved to be particularly useful for this study.

## **5.6 Ethical considerations**

Ethical approval for this study was granted by the School for Policy Studies Research Ethics Committee before the fieldwork was carried out. Informed consent was obtained from all participants and no data were collected without consent. As mentioned above, all participants were given an information sheet explaining the interview procedure, research aims and topics of discussion. It also explained the consent procedure and issues relating to confidentiality and data management.

The consent forms and information sheets were written in Japanese (including a furigana version) and English (see appendix A). Information had to be translated sufficiently well to enable participants to understand the scope and aims of the research, as poor translations might have resulted in misunderstandings or, more seriously, misinformed consent. Hence, I checked the accuracy of the translations with several native Japanese speakers before using them. The information sheets and consent forms were shared with participants at the start the interview or focus group to ensure that they had adequate time to read both documents. A verbal explanation was also given, even where participants filled in the forms without questions. This is because some people might have ticked the boxes without fully understanding what they were consenting to. It also gave the participants an opportunity to ask any questions they might have had.

Focus groups with foreign residents took place in suitable public locations, which were identified with the help of gatekeepers. As mentioned above, research assistants

were able to act as interpreters in situations where the participants felt uncomfortable speaking in Japanese, and a female gatekeeper and/or research assistant was always present in interviews or focus groups involving female participants. Participants were engaged in preliminary conversation, for example about their jobs, before any discussion of confidentiality issues was initiated. All participants signed the consent forms, but one interview participant did not consent to the interview being recorded. Participants were given copies of the consent form to keep, along with the information sheet. In most cases, there was a second person who witnessed this consent.

With respect to data reporting, I explained to the participants that direct quotes from their interviews and focus groups may be used for publication. Migrants and other foreign residents might have particularly been concerned that ‘sensitive information may be intentionally or inadvertently disclosed to the authorities’ (Mackey and Gass 2011, 27). Therefore, I took time to explain to participants how their data would and would not be used and how confidentiality and anonymity would be maintained. All of the quotes used here have been anonymised: the names of organisations (including employers) and other personal information were obscured so that participants cannot be identified. Some of the participants made comments that have the potential to affect how other people view them, such as their employers, so extra care was taken to ensure that participants cannot be identified from potentially harmful comments.

The data for this project consisted of participants’ contact details, electronic recordings, interview notes, transcripts of electronic recordings, consent forms and email correspondence. During fieldwork, I identified secure locations to hold the data, including physical documents which were securely held at my host institution in Osaka. Consent forms were scanned and stored on an encrypted hard drive, while the original documents have been destroyed. Electronic recordings, transcripts, contact details and notes from the interviews have also been stored on an encrypted hard drive, using unique identifiers, and no physical copies of these have been kept. An identification code was assigned to each participant in a log, which was created from the surnames of the participants. This log has been stored as an encrypted file, separately from the hard drive containing the actual contact details. All email correspondence with the participants was eventually deleted.

## 5.7 Summary

One of the aims of this study was to understand the relationships at the heart of policy-making processes related to the settlement and integration of foreign residents in Japan, using conceptual notions drawn from governance and citizenship-based research. These policy-making processes were explored through detailed case studies of the policies and practices involving institutions and actors operating within and across two particular cities, namely Yokohama and Osaka. These two cities have the highest number of foreign residents of all the designated cities in Japan, as well as rich histories of migration, hence offering pertinent case study sites for this project.

A key element of the data collection process was interviews with integration policy stakeholders, the majority of which were carried out with actors from local governments, international exchange foundations and civil society organisations/migrant-supporting organisations based in Osaka and Yokohama. The interviews carried out for this study allowed policymakers and other policy stakeholders to put forward their accounts of the processes and relationships involved in the production of integration policies. This was a crucial step towards understanding the ‘insider’s view’ of the development of current policies.

The assumptions and perceptions that underpin policies toward foreign residents—as well as the expectations that are placed on foreign residents in the design of particular services, initiatives or measures—were investigated through focus groups with foreign residents. In total, ten focus groups were conducted across the two cities—with the majority of participants hailing from non-*Zainichi* backgrounds. Along with the interview data, the focus group data were analysed thematically.

The data from the interviews and focus groups were complemented with data gathered through a review of policy documents produced by the national government and local governments—government legislation, white papers, briefings and bulletins—supplemented with reports produced by civil society organisations, industry associations and businesses. These were analysed not in terms of content, per se, but to determine how and why various integration policies have come into existence and how their implementation has been steered.





## **6 The field of integration policy-making**

### **6.1 Introduction**

This chapter draws on the interview and documentary material to explore the production of integration policies in Japan, beginning with information on the key actors involved in the governance of these policies. The findings are then used to understand the competing narratives in the field, namely the way in which integration-related issues are framed and interpreted. They also suggest how policy targets or subjects are constructed within these policy-making processes and what this reveals about the nature of the integration regime(s) in Japan.

Looking at some of the key actors and institutions in turn, the findings are also used to examine the relationships between the dominant actors and the roles they play within this field, particularly in terms of agenda setting and policy formulation. To the extent that the interview participants talked about change, some of the findings indicate important changes that have occurred with respect to integration policies or policy-making activities. Attitudes and opinions towards various actors were also expressed and where these reveal something about the nature of the relationship between the speaker and the actor or institution in question, these are included in the discussion.

The findings also reveal some of the ways in which actors' positions in the field enable them to influence the production of integration policies, both directly (e.g. through advocacy) and indirectly, for example by controlling certain policy-making mechanisms. The focus group material is then considered in the next chapter.

### **6.2 Participants' perceptions of other integration policy actors**

Within government, various ministries have some role in terms of integration policy-making. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication (MIC) was frequently discussed as a key actor, mostly due to its relationship with local government and in relation to the 2006 report produced by the TSKK (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) was also mentioned, mostly in relation to immigration control rather than integration policies. However,

one interview participant, from an international exchange association, spoke of the considerable ‘administrative discretion’ (*gyōsei sairyō*) that the MOJ has in terms of policy-making and how this creates uncertainty for local government actors (Interview 5).

The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and the Cabinet Office were also mentioned by various participants, either in direct relation to integration policies or in relation to related policies (e.g. immigration policies). For example, when one of the interview participants was asked whether or not she thought that central government wants to create immigrant policies, she immediately point out that MEXT has become more active in developing policies for migrant schoolchildren:

I think so. I really think so. So now, because the number of children in schools who have roots in a foreign country is increasing, MEXT too is gradually making new policies on various things. For example, with Japanese education now, it seems as if the special curriculum [for migrant children] has really been made part of the curriculum. Still, absolutely no budget has been put towards this... There may be difficulties, but I feel they want to promote it further. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

Aside from the bureaucracy, two of the non-government interview participants also talked about the role of the executive. One interviewee commented that ‘there are times when it’s better to say things are difficult because of the Abe administration rather than because of the *jimintō* [LDP] administration’ (Interview 6). This implies that there are challenges for integration policy stakeholders in the current climate, but also suggests that Prime Minister Abe’s policies are not necessarily in line with those of his party.

The interviews also confirmed the importance of prefectural and city governments in the development of integration policies at a local scale. The key local government departments charged with the formulation and implementation of policies and programmes that fall under the banner of *tabunka kyōsei* or *kokusaika* varied in terms of size and organisational/administrative position across the local government fieldwork sites.

Looking at the four governments shown in Table 6.1, it is clear that there are divergent practices in terms of where formal responsibility lies for *tabunka kyōsei* or internationalisation-related policies. Within Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City these policies are either linked to wider economic or ‘urban appeal’ strategies, while in Kanagawa they are regarded as an issue affecting the lives of prefectural residents. Yokohama City has a specific department for ‘international’ issues, but there seems to be considerable overlap between the functions of all four sections.

**Table 6.1 Local government organisational structures with respect to *tabunka kyōsei* or *kokusaika* policies**

Government	Department	Sub-department	Section
Osaka Prefecture	Prefectural residents’ culture ( <i>fumin bunka-bu</i> )	Urban appeal creation ( <i>toshi miryoku sōzō-kyoku</i> )	International ( <i>kokusai-ka</i> )
Osaka City	General affairs ( <i>sōmu-bu</i> )	Economic strategy ( <i>keizai senryaku-kyoku</i> )	International ( <i>kokusai-ka</i> )
Kanagawa Prefecture	Prefectural residents ( <i>kenmin-kyoku</i> )	Prefectural residents’ life ( <i>kurashi kenmin-bu</i> )	International ( <i>kokusai-ka</i> )
Yokohama City	International ( <i>kokusai-kyoku</i> )	International policy ( <i>kokusai-seisaku-bu</i> )	General affairs ( <i>sōmu-ka</i> )

Note: Departmental names were correct at the time of publication

Source: Local government websites

Positioned at the interface between central and local government, CLAIR (the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations) was mentioned by three of the local government interview participants, particularly in terms of the financial support it provides for local internationalisation activities.

While it may be regarded as an important actor, CLAIR has also been criticised in recent years for its lack of efficiency and effectiveness by high-profile policymakers. This includes criticisms by the *jigyō shiwake* (‘budget screening’) working group set up by the former DPJ (the Democratic Party of Japan, or *Minshutō*, which was the ruling party between 2009 and 2012) and strained relations with Osaka City Government, as discussed by a representative from CLAIR:

Well, there’s Mayor Hashimoto of Osaka, and then there’s the *Minshutō* party’s—you know about *shiwake*, right? There’s a Diet member called Renhō, who was previously working on issues such as money management for national activities, budget cuts and those kind of things. At that time, CLAIR was certainly being criticised. Has CLAIR been spending money on things it ought to be doing? Is it carrying out its work properly? Those kinds of things. And then there’s Mayor Hashimoto, too. As I mentioned before, CLAIR collects money

from local government and so there was a period where they did not want to pay that money. The relations between CLAIR and Osaka City certainly worsened at that time, but now Osaka City is also paying money regularly and hasn't said anything especially critical of CLAIR. (Interview 10, male representative from CLAIR, Tokyo)

Interview participants also confirmed the importance of international exchange foundations/associations (*kokusai kōryū zaidan/kyōkai*), which provide various services for foreign residents, and the importance of local government advice services for foreigners (*sōdan madoguchi*). Other institutions were also mentioned in relation to specific areas of social policy—for example, local education boards (*kyōiku iinkai*) were discussed in relation to the education of children with a migrant background. These institutions are discussed in more detail in the next chapter.

Representatives from NPOs felt that NPOs play a key role in the delivery of services (which is discussed further in the following chapter) and, to a lesser extent, in helping to shape government policy. The former role was confirmed during the interviews with local government representatives, while the latter was more difficult to confirm.

Private sector companies/businesses were viewed as having a peripheral role in integration policy-making by the interview participants. One participant suggested that they have an occasional role in terms of sponsorship, mentioning that cities such as Toyota may have stronger links with businesses due to the dependence of local manufacturing firms on migrant workers (Interview 5). However, the findings from the focus groups suggest that the role played by companies may have been downplayed in previous research (see the next chapter). In addition, *Keidanren* (the Japanese Business Federation) has issued a number of policies and recommendations that advocate for support for 'non-Japanese residents', as the following two examples illustrate.

There is a need for private enterprises, local governments, international exchange associations, non-profit organizations and other entities to work together to successfully address such issues as finding housing, Japanese language teaching, and education for the children of non-Japanese workers. Furthermore, a study should be conducted into the establishment of schemes for the disbursement of funds in each region by the national government and local governments, with private companies also contributing on a voluntary basis, to provide the financial assistance some non-Japanese workers may require for their livelihood. (Nippon Keidanren 2007)

The role of social integration policies will be important in building an environment where Japanese and foreigners can understand each other's cultures and customs, and live without difficulties in local communities. (Nippon Keidanren 2008)

Although *Keidanren* has said little about (social) integration in the period following the global financial crisis, these examples demonstrate the organisation's concern not only for policies that facilitate the migration of skilled workers to Japan, but also for policies that facilitate migrants' settlement and integration.

Other organisations were also mentioned during the interviews, but these were regarded as having a weak role in terms of integration policy-making. For example, one of the interviewees cast doubts on the importance of the Commission for the Protection of Human Rights (*Jinken Yōgo Inkai*), suggesting that it is a talking shop rather than an active player.

The Ministry of Justice has so-called Commissioners for the Protection of Human Rights. Well, those people act by talking about this and that but basically all they do is talk and listen. [...] Well, as for the government, they are mostly, um, unhelpful. When we get consulted for various things, we never think "Let's take this to the human rights commissioners" [laughs]. (Interview 3, male NPO representative, Osaka)

The interviewee's misgivings about the effectiveness of the Commission suggest that it is a minor actor within the MOJ and, by extension, within the field of integration policy-making more generally. Indeed, no other interview participants mentioned the Commission, and subsequent checks revealed that the Commission has been criticised for its lack of independence by organisations such as Human Rights Forum 21—a network of human rights organisations in Japan—seemingly supporting the interviewee's stance.<sup>9</sup>

## 6.3 Migration, *tabunka kyōsei* and competing narratives

### 6.3.1 Desirable migrants

One of the biggest changes in recent times to the Japanese immigration system was the introduction of a points-based system which gives preferential treatment to 'highly-skilled migrants' (*kōdo jinzai*). A leaflet produced by the Immigration

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<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.hurights.or.jp/archives/focus/section2/2002/06/japanese-national-human-rights-commission.html>

Bureau of Japan enthusiastically states that ‘foreign nationals recognized as “highly-skilled foreign professionals” will be given preferential immigration treatment!’ (see appendix C). However, the artwork for the leaflet also appears to portray these migrants as being ‘white’, suggesting a racialised view of skilled migration.

Commenting on the points-based system, one of the interview participants stated that ‘people had lots of different ideas about it, but [he] personally didn’t think it would work’. When asked why, the interviewee felt that Japan’s restrictive approach to immigration policies should be viewed in the context of Japan’s changing role in regional politics.

Japan’s—that way of thinking, like it was still 20 years ago when people had this image of Japan as being the number one power in Asia, and because of that, they think that if you open the gate, foreigners will flood in! That was in the past. They won’t come like that [group laughter], because other countries are better. They can’t understand that—the Japanese government in particular can’t understand that. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka)

As Japan has given way to China as the economic powerhouse of Asia, and as other countries across Asia continue to exhibit much stronger economic growth than Japan, the interviewee is suggesting that there may be more attractive destinations for migrants than Japan. Implicit in his comments is that economic capital drives many of the decisions that immigrants and policymakers make in terms of immigration policy. However, he went on to say that ‘nobody will come if there aren’t proper social integration policies in place [...] social integration policy is more important than immigration policy’ (Interview 1).

This view was echoed by another interviewee, who believes that many things are needed to make Japan a more attractive destination for foreigners (Interview 8). She also commented that ‘the Japanese alone cannot maintain the country as it is’, pointing to the demographic imperative often cited by pro-immigrant groups as the key reason for making Japan’s immigration control policies less restrictive.

Speaking from an international exchange foundation perspective, another interview participant believed that having more certainty over immigration would allow cities such as Yokohama to plan more (Interview 5). Like many people, he described Japan’s approach to immigration as a ‘side door’ rather than an ‘open door’ approach, but he believed that having a basic law on immigration (*kihon-hō*) would allow local

governments to budget accordingly. Linking this back to Yokohama, he felt that Yokohama City can create policies around tourism and ‘make the city a place where it is easier for foreigners to lead active lives’.

In terms of the advantages provided by more transparent immigration policies, the interviewee seemed to be suggesting that an immigration plan would give local governments more certainty about the numbers of immigrants that they can expect, which should lead to greater budget certainty. Again this underlines the economic logic that seems to be at the heart of the immigration policy-making field, and which seems to characterise its relationship with the field of integration policy-making.

### **6.3.2 *Tabunka kyōsei* and the subjects of integration policies: competing narratives**

As one of the key policy approaches associated with integration policies in Japan, participants’ views about *tabunka kyōsei* reveals some of the competing narratives inherent in the integration policy-making field.

For at least two of the interview participants, *tabunka kyōsei* seemed to be well regarded as a policy approach but they recognised its translation into English as problematic. For example, one of the interview participants felt that the term should be translated as ‘intercultural living’ rather than the more literal ‘multicultural coexistence’ (Interview 1). This suggests that *tabunka kyōsei* is considered to be more akin to interculturalism, in the interviewee’s eyes, than to multiculturalism.

Despite emanating from ‘civil society’, however, two of the NPO stakeholders were dissatisfied with the term *tabunka kyōsei* to the point where they felt it should be discarded. One interview participant, who happened to be *Zainichi* Chinese, said that she dislikes *tabunka kyōsei* due to its exclusivity.

The phrase *tabunka kyōsei* is an expression made by the state. When the Japanese government was thinking about *tabunka kyōsei*, the way they were thinking about it was, to put it simply, “people called newcomers and Japanese people, please coexist multiculturally”. [...] Oldcomers like us aren’t included. [...] Not only that, but the phrase *tabunka kyōsei* was made just to cover foreigners who have come to Japan since the 80s. So I dislike it. (Interview 18, female NPO representative, Yokohama)

This is in line with Kibe’s (2017) argument that *tabunka kyōsei* seems to exclude migrants of Korean origin. However, the participant suggests that it has developed



for ‘newcomers’, as opposed to ‘oldcomers’, while Kibe proposes that it targets *Nikkeijin* immigrants rather than non-*Nikkeijin*. It is also worth noting that the participant believes that the term was developed by the ‘state’ (*kuni*) rather than by civil society organisations, as is commonly suggested. The interviewee seems to be implying that the term *tabunka kyōsei* has been constructed or appropriated by the state in such a way that it seems to exclude *Zainichi* Koreans and Taiwanese—the two most established migrant groups in Japan.

Another issue raised by several interview participants was the meaning of the term ‘foreigner’. For one interview participant, foreigners, like other citizens, are residents who pay their taxes and so it is ‘reasonable’ for them to receive the same services (Interview 4). This seems to suggest that economic contributions entitle foreign residents to be treated like other citizens, but it is not clear whether unemployed migrants, for example, should also be treated thus.

For another NPO representative, the discussion should be about ‘identity’ rather than ‘nationality’ in a legal sense (Interview 3). So, for instance, ‘special permanent residents’ should be able to identify as Japanese without having to naturalise. He was also critical of *tabunka kyōsei*, but for different reasons. Focusing on the term *kyōsei* (or ‘coexistence’), he suggested that *kyōsei* implies tolerance towards ‘so-called foreigners’ but not acceptance.

Basically, according to the way Japan way of thinking, the idea that people who hold so-called foreign nationality can live in Japan as *seikatsusha* [ordinary citizens] is extremely exceptional. Therefore, the fact of living in Japan as a so-called foreigner is not recognised as a right. Accordingly, well, the term *kyōsei* [coexistence] began to be used as a policy term in the 2000s, from about 2005, 2006, but the term *kyōsei* wasn’t used as a policy issue, nor perceived as the target of social integration. (Interview 3, male NPO representative, Osaka)

This points to a division not just between ‘oldcomers’ and ‘newcomers’, but between Japanese ethnonationals and non-Japanese ethnonationals (qua *seikatsusha*) more generally.

This division was also evident in an exchange with a local government official in Yokohama City. Having enquired about the use of the word *imin* (‘immigrant’) in the information sheet connected with the project, he went on to explain that he could not use the word in an official capacity as it goes against government policy, which does

not officially recognise Japan as an immigrant-receiving state. Whether or not he agreed with that position was unclear, but he was certainly unwilling to contest that position in the presence of his colleague and the interviewer.

### 6.3.3 Local interpretations of *tabunka kyōsei*

Yokohama and Osaka are among two of the 400 cities and prefectures that have developed their own '*tabunka kyōsei* promotion plans' (or five-year integration plans) as stipulated by the TSKS report (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). As noted by one NPO interview participant (Interview 1), about a quarter of all local governments have plans in place, so the developments that take place in large cities such as Osaka and Yokohama could have some bearing on developments in a high number of other local governments.

The prevalence of the plans notwithstanding, what is particularly relevant is how *tabunka kyōsei* is applied in those plans. The 2007 Yokohama City plan acknowledges the language of *tabunka kyōsei* but is framed in terms of *kokusaisei yutakana machizukuri*, more akin to 'building a community rich in internationality'. The plan notes that terms such as *tabunka kyōsei* have become more prominent recently, but 'uses the phrase *kokusaisei yutakana machizukuri* as a general rule' (Yokohama City 2007, 5). The plan describes its aim as:

Building a community where people living within the city overcome differences of nationality, ethnicity and so on, and recognise one another's differences, and making an appealing city where it is easy for temporary visitors such as tourists and business trip-makers to carry out their activities. (Yokohama City 2007, 5)

In the section on *tabunka kyōsei* community building/planning, the aims of this process are described as 'exchange' (*kōryū*), 'mutual understanding' (*sōgorikai*) and 'everyday mutual support'. This section also mentions the importance of the independence or autonomy of foreign residents, and Japanese language proficiency is regarded as a prerequisite for this. Other mentions of *tabunka kyōsei* in the plan include *tabunka kyōsei kyōiku* which could be translated as multicultural or intercultural education.

The 2009 Osaka City plan points towards the realisation of a 'society of coexistence' (*kyōsei shakai*), involving 'respect for the human rights of foreign nationals', the 'realisation of a society of multicultural coexistence' and 'community participation'

(Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2009). In the English language version of the report, the title is translated as ‘building a tolerant community’, signifying that *kyōsei* has been translated as ‘tolerance’ rather than ‘coexistence’. All eleven items that appear under the theme of *tabunka kyōsei* are related to education policies (including learning the Japanese language), while other social policy areas appear under the theme of ‘respect for human rights’. In other words, the Osaka City government views *tabunka kyōsei* as a way of framing education policies towards migrant children or the children of migrants.

It is also worth noting that social and civil rights issues affecting foreign residents in Osaka are subsumed under human rights apart from education, even though education issues have also been associated with the human rights discourse in previous decades (Okano 2008).

To a large extent, the association between *tabunka kyōsei* and education was reinforced in the interviews with stakeholders from NPOs and government foundations, with all of the Osaka-based interviewees using primarily education-based examples when talking about key policies affecting foreign residents in Japan. When asked what they think the key issues are for foreign residents in Japan, stakeholders from both Osaka and Yokohama invariably said learning the Japanese language.

These examples from Osaka and Yokohama illustrate that the term *tabunka kyōsei* has not been adopted in a uniform fashion, but it seems to be heavily associated with education policies and Japanese language learning. In Yokohama City, its use is closely correlated with its use in the original TKSK report, while other social policy areas are linked to the *machizukuri* (‘community building/planning’) discourse.

In terms of *chiikizukuri* [or *machizukuri*] activities, one of the pillars of *tabunka kyōsei*, along with our work to help Japanese people better understand, we try to provide proper living information to foreign residents, and to promote everyone’s safety. Then, in terms of support to facilitate foreign resident’s lives, we’re trying to build this model area—it’s a bit of a trial, this kind of work that we’ve been doing. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

In Yokohama, at least, one of the local government officials was keen to point out that issues are not just peculiar to migrants: many issues are shared by immigrants

and Japanese people. He recognised these issues not just as individual or ‘group’ issues but as community issues (Interview 9). This view was also shared by an NPO representative in Osaka, who believes that issues affecting foreigners have been reframed as ‘community issues’ as part of the *tabunka kyōsei* policy approach.

For one thing, within *tabunka kyōsei*, there’s been a reframing of “foreigners’ problems” as “community issues”. That’s been the biggest change—a change in how things are viewed. For example, teaching Japanese isn’t just for foreigners, it’s for the benefit of the community. At the same time, foreigners aren’t viewed as passive service recipients; they’re viewed as “players” or “stakeholders” who share some of the responsibility for developing their communities. For example, whereas before Japanese people were recruited as volunteer interpreters, about half are now foreigners. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka)

Most of the interview participants did not explicitly describe or frame issues affecting foreigners as ‘community issues’. However, the idea of migrants as being ‘key players’ or ‘stakeholders’ with a stake in, or responsibility for, issues affecting their communities certainly reappeared in other interviews and focus groups.

## **6.4 Relationships between key actors in the field: power struggles and partnerships**

One of the key aims of this study is to use the research findings to construct the overall configuration of governance operating within the field of integration policy-making. Hence, in this section the relationships between the key actors involved in integration policy-making processes are explored in more detail.

This section begins by looking at relationships between central government and local government, and between NPOs and central government; while the relationships between local governments and NPOs are reviewed in the next chapter. Findings concerning the relationships between local governments and the local executive are also analysed, before looking at how migrants are able to engage in participatory forms of governance. The role of transnational actors and institutions is also considered.

### **6.4.1 Central–local government relations: contradictory accounts of convergence and control**

Previous literature suggests that local governments have taken hold of the reins in the field of integration policy-making—in terms of agenda setting and policy

formulation—in the absence of any overarching control by central government. To a large extent the interview data support the belief that local governments are in a position of relative influence and control within the field, at least in comparison to NPOs and other non-governmental actors. Central government has, arguably, shown less interest in integration policies than it has shown in other policy areas, leaving a space for local governments to fill. As one interviewee put it:

[...] For certain problems the state makes a bigger effort and local governments are either given lots of money or they have to make cuts. Along with that part, I think there's also a part where the state makes rather less effort. So the state has hardly any influence. [...] Therefore, if local government people don't think about it, it's not going to happen. (Interview 5, male international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

Without describing any specific policies, the interviewee indicated that local governments may play an influential role in integration policy-making processes, particularly in areas where central government actors are less engaged.

Commenting on the changing nature of central–local government relations, one of the interview participants suggested that local government autonomy has grown, rather than diminished, since the 1990s. Speaking as an NPO representative, he observed that the ‘menu’ of services provided is now decided by local government:

Over the last 20 years the power balance between national and local government has changed. Before, the national government held the power and the money and controlled local government, but now local governments are becoming more independent. The government sets the direction, but local government decides the ‘menu’. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka)

This lends weight to the arguments of other scholars who have suggested that local governments have played an increasingly important role in terms of integration policy-making processes since the 1970s (for example, Tegtmeier Pak 2006). Within the interviewee's statement, however, it is worth noting that the ‘direction’ is set by central government. While local governments may have some freedom in formulating what integration policies look like locally, there is a suggestion that the framework for what they can do is still determined by central government.

The most recent articulation of central government's approach to integration appeared in the form of the 2006 TSKS report (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). While a spate of *tabunka kyōsei* promotion plans were prompted by the TSKS report, Osaka Prefecture already had a plan in place by 2002.

When asked whether any changes were made to the plan as a result of the TKSK report, a representative from Osaka Prefecture made the following remarks.

In particular, there wasn't any talk of having to transform things depending on what direction the state takes after we do this. As this has persistently been Osaka Prefecture's way of thinking, our guidelines, to the extent that our views didn't differ from those of state staff, it means that various policies have come into effect, you know? As the state's way of thinking is, similarly, about looking after foreigners living in Japan, maintaining the environment, I don't think we differ on the fundamental points. Therefore, when the state's way of thinking appeared, we didn't feel obliged to change ours. (Interview 13, male prefectural government representative, Osaka).

It is not clear what Osaka Prefecture's position would have been if there had been significant differences between their published approach and the policies recommended by the TKSK report. However, there seems to have been sufficient convergence in their 'ways of thinking' (*kangaekata*) to allow the prefectural government to press on with its policies.

This contrasts with what was said by another interviewee, who believes that a gap has grown between central and local government:

In Japan, to put it bluntly, central government needs policy transformation. Policy transformation—how shall I put it? Reality is rapidly changing, so it's no good if people from local government make policies that don't match with other local authorities. So it's becoming a kind of gap, but you'd think that central government needs policy transformation that corresponds with reality? But it hasn't become like that, you know. Especially now, with the Abe administration, it's particularly difficult. (Interview 6, male NPO representative, Tokyo).

While some local government officials seem to think that there is a shared understanding with central government of what a desirable integration policy approach may look like, this particular NPO representative believes that central government has not done enough to keep up with real-world changes. This apparent contradiction may reflect different expectations about the role of central government.

Aside from the publication of the TKSK report, another key event in recent history was the global financial crisis. When asked about the impact of the global financial crisis (or 'Lehman Shock' as it is known in Japan), most participants from local governments felt that while the purse strings had tightened, it had not had any discernible impact on integration policies. At the same time, however, several interview participants pointed out that while local governments may seem to hold

some power, their financial capital is very much controlled by central government—any deviation from government policy could result in funding changes. In addition to the material value of economic capital, this points to its symbolic value as a tool for compliance. The fear of losing economic capital may be used by central government to subtly modify local government behaviour.

#### **6.4.2 Local executive power and local government partnerships**

The interview findings suggest that prefectural governors (*chiji*) and city mayors (*shichō*) can have a direct impact on the issues that make it on to local policy agendas and hence the direction of policy-making in their jurisdictions.

A female interview participant from an NPO in Yokohama felt that a former governor played an instrumental role in the direction that Yokohama City subsequently took in terms of its ‘internationalisation’ (*kokusaika*) policies.<sup>10</sup> Based at an organisation set up under the auspices of Governor Nagasu, the interviewee felt that subsequent policy developments ‘would not have been possible had another governor been in place’ (Interview 8). Her take on the *minsai gaikō* approach, or ‘people-to-people diplomacy’ promoted by the Governor, was that ‘if citizens are better able to interact, then the world would probably become more peaceful’.

This contrasts sharply with the experiences outlined by stakeholders in Osaka. One particular participant related how their NPO had previously maintained a good relationship with Osaka City Government, but less so under the former mayor, Hashimoto Tōru (Governor of Osaka Prefecture, 2008–2011, and then Mayor of Osaka City, 2011–2015).

Moreover, the interviewee felt that key figures within the local government executive can influence whether policies are implemented or not.

*Tabunka kyōsei* has no legal basis so it’s not essential. If, for example, the mayor changes, it may not be done. If the governor changes it won’t get done. If the head of a [local government] department changes, it won’t get done. It’s that kind of uncertainty. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka)

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<sup>10</sup> For two decades, Kanagawa prefecture was overseen by Nagasu Kazuji (Governor from 1975–1995) who believed that international diplomacy should not just be enacted between states, but could also involve subnational actors, such as local governments and NPOs. Governor of one of the so-called ‘progressive local authorities’ (*kakushin jichitai*), Nagasu described this approach as *minsai gaikō* (‘people-to-people diplomacy’).

In the case of Osaka, there is an on-going battle to turn Osaka Prefecture into a metropolis organised along the same lines as Tokyo. As one interview participant described it, a bigger challenge than the global financial crisis, as far as Osaka's Mayor is concerned, is 'reconstructing' the city (Interview 1). Although the plans were defeated by a narrow margin in a 2015 referendum, the legislative changes brought about by Osakan politicians have paved the way for other prefectures and cities to restructure if they wish to do so, while the door is open for Osaka to re-attempt to become a metropolis in the future. In fact, both the current Mayor of Osaka City (Yoshimura Hirofumi) and the Governor of Osaka Prefecture (Matsui Ichirō) are members of the Osaka Restoration Association (*Ōsaka Ishin no Kai*)—a political party presided over by former mayor Hashimoto with the aim of fulfilling the plan to create 'one Osaka' (*Ōsaka-to kōsō*).

These structural changes could have practical or substantial implications for the way in which integration policies are formulated or implemented in the future. For now, however, these discussions seem to be pushing integration-related issues further down the policy agenda.

Speaking about other cities, it was also suggested that the wrong kind of people were in post when Tokyo made a bid for the 2020 Olympics. The then-Governor, Ishihara Shintarō, 'knew nothing about foreigners' according to one interviewee (Interview 1). He is certainly known for making negative, and at times incendiary remarks, about foreigners in Japan (Shipper 2005).

In addition, local governments and migrant-supporting organisations have also changed the scope of their activities to manage the issues presented by integration, and new organisations have sprung up specifically to support immigrants living in Japan. This includes umbrella or network organisations such as the GSTK (*Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi*), which Tegtmeier Pak (2006) translates as the 'Committee for Localities with a Concentrated Foreign Population'.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup> Although several variations of this translation are present in the literature, they all convey a broadly similar meaning to Tegtmeier Pak's translation. However, Tegtmeier Pak then goes on to refer to the organisation as the CLCFP. I believe that an abbreviation of the original Japanese name is preferable to an abbreviated translation.



The GSTK was established by 13 cities in May 2001, with Hamamatsu being the largest by population. The membership has since grown to the point where there are currently 22 members, of which 21 are cities (see Table 5.2). The group made its policy intentions clear with the publication of the ‘Hamamatsu Declaration’ (Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2001).

Despite its name, GSTK members are primarily cities with comparatively high concentrations of Brazilian *Nikkeijin*, which means that cities such as Yokohama and Osaka are not currently members. However, the impact of the GSTK’s activities has certainly been felt by other cities. The GSTK was established to facilitate horizontal knowledge sharing and to lobby central government for greater involvement in integration policies, which is discussed in more detail below.

**Table 6.2 Population of GSTK members and observers, as at 1 April 2017**

Municipality	Prefecture	Total population	Foreign resident population	Foreign residents as percentage of local population (%)
Ōta	Gunma	223,786	9,856	4.4
Ōizumi (town)	Gunma	41,740	7,341	17.6
Ueda	Nagano	158,881	3,414	2.1
Iida	Nagano	103,023	2,132	2.1
Minokamo	Gifu	56,293	4,438	7.9
Hamamatsu	Shizuoka	806,407	21,842	2.7
Fuji	Shizuoka	255,060	4,740	1.9
Iwata	Shizuoka	170,430	6,716	3.9
Kakegawa	Shizuoka	117,685	3,815	3.2
Fukuroi	Shizuoka	87,274	3,660	4.2
Kosai	Shizuoka	60,306	2,656	4.4
Kikugawa	Shizuoka	47,827	2,831	5.9
Toyohashi	Aichi	376,886	14,956	4.0
Toyota	Aichi	423,916	15,341	3.6
Komaki	Aichi	153,335	8,153	5.3
Tsu	Mie	280,710	7,566	2.7
Yokkaichi	Mie	311,672	8,339	2.7
Suzuka	Mie	200,151	7,294	3.6
Kameyama	Mie	49,530	1,691	3.4
Iga	Mie	93,369	4,540	4.9
Koka	Shiga	91,587	2,804	3.1
Sōja	Okayama	68,237	1,039	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>4,178,105</b>	<b>145,164</b>	<b>3.5</b>

Source: *Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi*, <http://www.shujutoshi.jp/member/pdf/2016member.pdf>

### 6.4.3 NPOs as (unequal) partners with central government

Although the relationships between local governments and central government are not always clear, NPOs and other civil society organisations seem to be more vocal in terms of their asks to central government and the kinds of relationship they wish to have with respect to ‘the state’. Hence, this section reviews findings concerning the relationships between NPOs and central government, while their relations with local governments are discussed in the next chapter.

To begin with, one of the NPO stakeholders suggested that the relationship between government and NPOs should change (Interview 1). In his view, the government is set up to provide universal services with little specialisation, but this conflicts with the differing needs of migrants with respect to the Japanese. He suggested that NPOs should decide what services to deliver, and how, and that the government’s role should be to distribute funds accordingly.

[...] The government’s job is about gathering taxes, and producing the same services. It’s a great system, but, what should I say, services—when various different services are needed, the government system doesn’t really work. Because the things that Japanese people want and the things that foreigners want are different, it’s very difficult for the government to specifically provide services which are needed by foreigners. And so that’s where it’s better for NPOs to do it. So having more NPOs—it’s not just for foreigners though. Because various minorities have social issues, it’s better if those people think about what kind of things are they concerned about and what kind of services they want. And when they’ve thought about it... it needs to be firmly backed up with money and by the system. And that’s the government’s role... It’s better if NPOs do the project management. But, all the, the planning etc., how do I put it? The government distributes the money. I think that kind of relationship would be better. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka)

The interviewee recognised this as a partnership model, but one with serious limitations. In particular, he suggested that it is not a partnership of equals. At the moment, if the government agrees to a certain policy or initiative, the semblance of a partnership is maintained; but where the government is unsupportive, the partnership no longer holds. While NPOs are also able to end the partnership—by withdrawing support for a particular project, for example—this is unlikely to happen unless alternative forms of support for migrants are in place. Otherwise, it jeopardises the mission of the NPOs. By contrast, the material and symbolic loss to the government is, arguably, much smaller.

The interviewee went on to highlight potential policy learning (more specifically, policy transfer) to improve the relationship between the state and NPOs, highlighting Australia and Canada as places where state–NPO relations do not seem to follow the principal–agent model. He also suggested that NPOs need to wrestle more power from the government.

In Japan, responsibility for social issues, responsibility for resolving issues has, up to now, been held by the government. So, the money too—it's distributed by the government. And, that—now NPOs have to gradually shift it towards us, we have to shift the power. When the Japanese economy was doing really well, of course the government held a great deal of power. But that was then, and gradually its power's becoming smaller. NPOs have to take back power once again. We're now on the way, well, we've only got about 10%. [...] If we can do it, I think that Japanese communities would still be sustainable, but if we can't, it's a lot to ask. (Interview 1, male NPO representative, Osaka)

While it is impossible to tell how likely it is that the relationship between the state and NPOs will change as a whole, what is of relevance is that NPOs (or one, at least) seem to be questioning the nature of their ties with the government. Indeed, the interview data also revealed some of the ways in which NPOs are trying to influence government politics and policies, which are discussed later in this chapter.

It is also worth noting that the interviewee felt that NPOs held more sway in the past. It is likely that he was referring to the early 2000s when Japan's economy was showing signs of recovery under the Koizumi administration—a period where local governments, NPOs and other organisations were pushing the government for immigration and integration-related changes with some success, as discussed in chapter two.

#### **6.4.4 Participatory governance in Osaka and Kanagawa**

There are notable differences between Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Kanagawa Prefecture in terms of their approaches to participatory governance, namely the ways in which they engage foreign residents in integration policy-making processes as discussed in chapter two.

Osaka Prefecture established an expert group in October 1992 charged with discussing policy measures concerned with foreigners living in Japan (*Ōsaka-fu Zainichi Gaikokujin Shisaku Yūshikisha Kaigi*). The meetings currently comprise no more than ten members identified as academic and professional experts, with the

most recent meeting attended by university lecturers, NPO representatives and other professionals. The majority of current attendees seem to have a migrant background, but not all of them.

The ‘Osaka City foreign resident policy expert group’ (*Ōsaka-shi Gaikokuseki Jūmin Shisaku Yūshikisha Kaigi*) was established in November 1994 but abolished in March 2014. Its membership consisted of 14 academic and professional experts and its meetings were open to the public, but its records suggest that few or no members of the public attended the last few meetings. From August 2017, a new group policy coordination group tasked with developing *tabunka kyōsei* related policies has been in situ (*Ōsaka-shi Tabunka Kyōsei Shisaku Renraku Kaigi*). Unlike the previous meetings, these are cross-departmental meetings comprising internal staff only. It is not clear how many attendees have a migrant background, but it is likely to be low given that foreign residents are unlikely to have managerial or leadership roles within local government.

The Kanagawa Foreign Residents’ Council (*Gaikokuseki Kenmin Kanagawa Kaigi*) was established in 1998 following in the footsteps of the ‘Kawasaki City Representative Assembly for Foreign Residents’ (*Gaikokujin Shimin Daihyōsha Kaigi*)—the first of its kind in the prefecture. There does not seem to be a separate assembly for Yokohama City, but nine of the 20 attendees at the last meeting were from Yokohama City. At the time of its establishment, the Governor promised to ‘respect as much as possible’ the assembly’s views, but it has no statutory footing (Yoshida 1998).

The criteria for membership was having lived, worked or studied in Kanagawa for at least one year. Members also have to be able to speak Japanese as all meetings are conducted in Japanese. Applicants were initially selected for two-year terms by an independent committee of scholars and other experts on issues pertaining to foreigners, although it is not clear how this committee was selected.

Overall, there seems to be a strong difference between the approach taken by Osaka City and that taken by Kanagawa Prefecture. While the latter provides a forum where foreign residents can raise issues and try to influence the policy-making process, albeit without statutory backing, Osaka City seems to have no forums in which foreign residents can participate. Osaka Prefecture seems to have developed an

approach combining aspects of both of the aforementioned approaches, incorporating a selection of experts with a mix of Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonational backgrounds.

#### **6.4.5 Transnational institutions and influences on Japanese policies**

While the interview participants spoke predominantly about actors and institutions at the national and local scale, some of the interview participants also touched on transnational activities and institutions that may have a bearing on integration policy-making within Japan. These include activities generated by actors operating primarily at the transnational scale, as well as activities instigated at the transnational scale by actors operating at the subnational scale.

One of the NPO stakeholders noted that they were interested in the work of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), specifically mentioning the work of the Human Rights Committee which had completed its consideration of the sixth periodic report of Japan on its implementation of the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Interview 3). Of particular relevance for the interviewee were the concluding observations in the report, which noted that Japan has made little progress on the recommendations outlined in the fourth and fifth periodic reports (see Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2012).

As mentioned above, organisations such as *Ijūren* have forged their own transnational links and networks. This includes links with the Asian Migrant Centre: a regional NGO based in Hong Kong, which, according to its website, ‘carries out action oriented research on migration issues, policy and media advocacy, and capacity building for organisations working to empower, protect and promote the rights of migrants in Asia’. Since 2002, the AMC has enjoyed a Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. *Ijūren* also has ties with its Korean counterpart, the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK).

Another interview participant commented that ‘the biggest difference between Europe and Japan/Asia is, of course, the fact that there is no EU’ (Interview 1). Although he did not make any specific comments about the UN, he was implying

that the lack of a transnational governance structure made it more difficult to challenge the Japanese government's policies. He felt that broader politics in the region would be different if there was an institution like the European Union, but also felt that the prospects of such an institution being created seemed unlikely.

## **6.5 Field strategies: using capital to influence integration policies**

This section explores how organisations have been trying to influence integration policies produced at the national scale. It looks at actors' relative positions in the field of integration policy-making—including the forms of capital (or power) that they are endowed with—and the kind of strategies and behaviours they have employed to influence the policy-making process.

### **6.5.1 NPO advocacy: negotiation and strategies of succession**

This study found that a certain number of NPOs, but by no means all, are trying to build up their relationships with central government, which includes negotiating with various government departments and lobbying Diet members to influence government policy.

As one participant noted, a single NPO may not have much bargaining power, but multiple NPOs speaking in concert may be able to wield greater influence.

In particular, when we make policy proposals, requests and so on to the government, because our influence is weak as a solo organisation, if we work with various other people and refine [our argument] before negotiating [...] That's the form it takes. (Interview 3, male NPO representative, Osaka)

Of all the network organisations or alliances that migrant-supporting organisations have formed, *Ijūren* is probably the most well-known and the most influential. Set up to provide collective support for migrant-supporting NPOs and to lobby the Japanese government, all the NPO representatives interviewed for this study had links to *Ijūren*, either as members or in an informal capacity. Its mission is described as follows.

Reforming policies and regulations at the national level, combined with local level efforts is key to securing the rights of migrants and people with foreign nationalities. *Ijūren* plays an important role in connecting both.<sup>12</sup> (*Ijūren* website)

There seem to be good practical reasons for having such a network in place: many of the NPOs spoken to had a handful of staff and relied heavily on volunteers, making the economies-of-scale offered by lobbying the government through *Ijūren* attractive. In fact, the majority of NPOs in Japan have fewer than six staff, who are likely to be paid much less than their counterparts in the private sector (NPO Homepage, Cabinet Office).

According to one of the representatives of *Ijūren*, the organisation has held ‘opinion exchanges’ with ministries on such issues as labour, poverty, gender, refugees, education and health.

In addition, it was found that *Ijūren* is lobbying not only institutions based in Japan, but also transnational institutions. One example is around working visas. There are currently several problems with the working visa system in Japan, making it vulnerable to abuse, and it has been argued by NPOs that this has led to infringements of the rights of migrant workers. In particular, *Ijūren* has been lobbying the United Nations (via the Migrant Forum in Asia or MFA) to urge the Japanese Government to reform the working visa system.

While there are several issues that local governments are in a position to deal with, issues such as reforming the visa system can only be dealt with by central government, as one interview participant explained.

There is a gap between central government and the circumstances that local government are facing but policy change is particularly difficult at the moment. That’s because of the policies of the Abe administration rather than the party itself (LDP). But local government cannot deal with all the issues that affect foreigners by themselves—they need support from central government for issues such as working visas. (Interview 6, male NPO representative, Tokyo)

The interviewee also seems to be implying that difficulties in engaging with the Abe administration may be one of the motives for approaching transnational institutions, which could be described as a ‘strategy of succession’ (Swartz 2003). In addition, his

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<sup>12</sup> See <http://migrants.jp/activities>

claim that it is difficult to get any traction under Prime Minister Abe suggests that the current climate is not conducive to achieving policy change at the national scale.

### **6.5.2 Local government advocacy: the struggle for recognition**

While NPOs in Japan seem to be using various strategies to influence policies at the national scale, local governments seem to be employing their own strategies. Unlike smaller governments, Osaka and Kanagawa Prefecture seem to be large enough to be able to approach central government directly with their concerns. For example, a representative from Osaka Government noted that Kanagawa Prefecture plays an important intermediary role between central government and local governments.

As I said before, even for relations between the Prefecture and the municipalities, there are *renraku kaigi* ['liaison conferences'], as Osaka Prefecture occupies an intermediate position between the state, the wards and the cities. It's a kind of situation where we're always coordinating. Because it's focused on shared issues, the prefectures gather various issues such as these, and within those, these issues are particularly important, so let's make a request to the state... (Interview 13, male prefectural government representative, Osaka)

Although neither Osaka nor Yokohama, nor their respective prefectures, are represented in the GSTK, their absence does not preclude the possibility of the activities of the GSTK having an impact on the policies affecting migrants residing in Yokohama, Osaka or beyond. Like *Ijūren*, the GSTK has more influence than individual members would be able to have, as pointed out by one of its representatives. By lobbying central government on issues such as the comprehensive coordination of policies affecting foreigners and calling for the establishment of organisations that can provide the technical expertise and resource to implement these policies (Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2001), the GSTK is effectively calling for policy changes that would 'reach' into Osaka and Yokohama.

In the future, however, the GSTK may hold an open conference which any city can attend, not just those with high concentrations of *Nikkeijin* residents (Interview 16). The interview participant confirmed that Osaka and Yokohama would be able to attend this conference if they choose to participate. At the moment, the GSTK members represent areas which are home to about 6% of the total foreign resident population in Japan, but expanding its membership could increase this tremendously.



The GSTK seems to have had an impact on various integration policies and initiatives adopted by central government, but not always directly or in their entirety.

While central government has made some concessions to the GSTK, e.g. by establishing a portal website where ‘long-term foreign residents’ (primarily *Nikkeijin*) can access information related to integration, there are still many areas where the GSTK continues to push for changes. In particular, the GSTK has continued to call on the government to ‘establish a *gaikokujin-chō* [foreign residents agency] to comprehensively implement policies for foreign residents in line with *tabunka kyōsei*’ (Gaikokujin Shūjū Toshi Kaigi 2017).

### 6.5.3 Influencing by committee: controlled expertise

Another way in which national integration policies may be influenced is from the ‘inside’, using ‘outside’ expertise. As mentioned in chapter two, the policy-making process in Japan is replete with ‘advisory committees’ of various kinds, including *shingikai* (‘commissions’) and *kenkyūkai* (‘research committees’) specifically, and *iinkai* (‘committees’) more generally. Although these committees have received scant attention in recent scholarship on integration policies in Japan, they were mentioned by several stakeholders during the interviews.

Of particular note is the *tabunka kyōsei no suishin ni kansuru kenkyūkai* or TKSK: the ‘study group’ or ‘research committee’ that was set up in relation to the promotion of *tabunka kyōsei*, which produced the 2006 TKSK report (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The committee included a dozen representatives drawn from various sectors (public, private and voluntary) and was chaired by the scholar Yamawaki Keizō, known for his work on integration policies in Japan. One of the committee members was Tamura Tarō—director of the Osaka-based NPO called *Tabunka Kyōsei Center*—who is regarded as having had considerable influence on the content of the final report.<sup>13</sup>

The committee met seven times in the run up to the publication of the report, including hearings with representatives from *Keidanren* (the influential Japan Business Federation), the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (or MEXT) and the Tokyo Metropolitan Government respectively. The

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<sup>13</sup> Personal correspondence with one of the committee members.

input of these organisations is also likely to have shaped the content and framing of the report.

As with committees at the national scale, local-scale actors such as NPOs are also able to influence the direction of policy by local governments. One NPO stakeholder in Osaka explained that he was a member of the local ward committee tasked with producing a local welfare action plan (*chiiki fukushi akushon puran*). Had they not been a member of this committee, the stakeholder felt that they would still engage with the local ward office to exchange ideas, but this role gave them the opportunity to help shape the local welfare action plan

As discussed in the next chapter, many of the activities associated with *tabunka kysōei* seem to involve education in some form, and several participants spoke of interactions with local education boards (*kyōiku iinkai*). One interviewee stated that they have a strong and favourable relationship with the Osaka education board, thereby enabling their NPO to exchange ideas with the board as an influential adviser. These interactions have led to support for particular projects such as minority education programmes (Interview 3).

While committees allow different actors to engage in the policy-making process and may lead to changes in the way that policies are framed, formulated or implemented, committee members also have to conform to the norms and expectations associated with this membership. This may constrain their ability to call for transformative policy changes.

#### **6.5.4 The symbolic capital of field-specific institutions**

Drawing on data from the document review, this section looks at the way in which the recognition of international exchange associations or foundations (*kokusai koryū kyōkai/zaidan*) has gradually become formalised.

In Osaka, the two main foundations are the Osaka Foundation of International Exchange (*Ōsaka-fu Kokusai Koryū Zaidan*) known as OFIX, and the Osaka International House Foundation (*Ōsaka Kokusai Koryū Sentā*) known as i-house; affiliated with Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, respectively. Likewise, in Kanagawa, the two main foundations are the Kanagawa International Foundation (*Kanagawa Kokusai Koryū Zaidan*) or KIF, and the Yokohama Association for

International Communications and Exchanges (*Yokohama Kokusai Koryū Kyōkai*) or YOKE.

What all these organisations now have in common is a government-designated abbreviation in front of their names: *kōeki zaidan hōjin* or ‘Public Interest Incorporated Foundation’.

The early years of the 21st century witnessed remarkable changes in Japan’s legal and regulatory frameworks for public benefit corporations as part of the government’s administrative reform. Most recently, on 1 December 2008, the new Public Interest Corporation laws (PIC Laws) went into effect. Six different types of Public Interest Corporations (PICs) exist as a result of these changes.

The timeline below shows show the various international exchange foundations/associations in Osaka and Kanagawa gained legal recognition at various times (see Table 6.3)

**Table 6.3 Timeline of the establishment of key international exchange foundations in Osaka and Yokohama**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Event</b>
Feb 1977	Kanagawa International Association (KIA) established—the forerunner to KIF
Jul 1981	YOKE established as a voluntary organization (originally called <i>Yokohama-shi Kaigai Kōryū Kyōkai</i> )
Dec 1982	YOKE recognised as a Foundation
Feb 1987	i-house established with permission from MOFA
Jan 1989	OFIX established as a Corporate Foundation
Jan 1990	i-house authorised as a regional international association by the MHA
Oct 1992	Kanagawa scientific study interchange foundation (K-FACE) establishment
Mar 1993	YOKE authorised as a Specific Public Interest Promotion Corporation
Apr 1993	i-house authorised as a Specific Public Interest Promotion Corporation by MOFA
Apr 1999	YOKE changed its Japanese name
Apr 2007	KIA merged with K-FACE and renamed as KIF
Nov 2010	YOKE re-registered as a Public Interest Incorporated Foundation
Apr 2012	OFIX re-registered as a Public Interest Incorporated Foundation, as recognised by the Governor of Osaka Prefecture

These labels may not be regarded as being particularly important by migrants who are more interested in the kinds of support they can access, than the legal status of a particular organisation. On the other hand, migrant-supporting organisations which

lack the ‘legitimacy’ conferred by these labels may be less well regarded by local governments and other actors in the field than those who hold such symbolic capital.

As one of the focus group participants explained, migrants themselves are accorded greater legitimacy if they are endorsed by an NPO.

Interviewer: Do you think when the local government talks to NGOs—do they actually listen to you? Like, “look, we want you to change this, we don’t like this...”?

Participant: Well, we can say that it’s yes and no. Yes, because they have a system of endorsement. If you’re a migrant endorsed by an NGO, you are recognised and given assistance. Number two, the NGOs are the ones who can stand for you. This is what we always tell our members. If you do not want to be discriminated, ask somebody to go with you to the city hall. Never go alone. That is what I always tell them. (FG 3, female NPO representative, Yokohama)

## 6.6 Summary

The findings in this chapter highlight how the issues related to migrant integration in Japan are interpreted and addressed by actors through the lens of *tabunka kyōsei*. Although different actors have different understandings of *tabunka kyōsei* and the policy approaches that it seems to describe, it seems to be heavily linked with education policies, particularly in Osaka. At the same time, it is certainly not free of criticism.

Documentary evidence and interview data have also been used to shed light on some of the key actors and institutions involved in the development of integration policies in Japan—especially the assymetric relations between them, which shape the policies affecting migrants in Japan. What is particularly notable from the analysis is the minor role that migrants themselves are permitted to play within these processes.

For the more dominant actors in the field—central government, local governments and NPOs—various strategies are being used to influence existing policies or control the processes through which they may be changed. While local governments and NPOs are in dialogue with central government-based actors to try to influence integration policies, mainly through negotiation, NPOs are also trying to challenge government policies through transnational mechanisms. At the same time, central government has considerable control over ‘visible’ institutions such as committees and also over symbolic institutions (such as the power to create legal entities) which

allows it to control which actors may ‘legitimately’ engage in policy-making processes.

The findings also illustrate the complexities of policy-making which are not adequately captured when policy-making is viewed as a sequence or cycle of chronologically ordered events or stages (see, for example, Borkert and Penninx 2011). For integration policies in Japan, talking about problem framing, agenda setting, policy formulation and implementation as a sequence of activities and processes is belied by the fact that it is often very unclear when any of the activities that fall under those headings were started or finished. It also seems to be the case that many of the activities involved in policy-making seem to proceed simultaneously, especially at different scales. For example, Osaka City published its integration plan and proceeded on to policy implementation before the policy agenda was even recognised by central government.

Overall, this chapter has sought to illuminate the dynamic relationships between the key actors involved in the governance of integration policies, and the mechanisms by which those actors have tried to control or influence those policies. The next chapter presents the findings from the focus groups carried out with foreign residents, with the aim of understanding how integration support is provided to, and experienced by, migrants.

## **7 Social services and integration support for foreign residents**

### **7.1 Introduction**

While the previous chapter presented findings about the nature of the field of integration policy-making—and the roles and relationships of actors within the field—this chapter explores the delivery of integration support and services. In particular, it focuses on the capital that migrants and service providers are endowed with and the relationships between and among these actors.

It is clear that local governments and migrant-supporting organisations (especially NPOs and international exchange foundations) provide or help provide a range of social services that are either specifically designed for migrants or foreign residents or offered to all prefectural/city residents including foreign residents. Hence, this chapter explores the relationships between migrants and service providers from two perspectives. On the one hand it looks at the way services are delivered by ‘service providers’ (or policy implementers); on the other hand, it unpicks how migrants engage with those services, primarily as ‘service users’ (or policy subjects).

The findings presented in this chapter are based primarily on the data gathered through the focus groups and interviews (see chapter five). To a lesser extent, findings have also been included from the document analysis, particularly questionnaire data from surveys carried out by local government departments in the study sites. (In order to avoid confusion, foreign residents who took part in these local government surveys are described as respondents, while the individuals who took part in this study are described as participants.)

To help contextualise the findings further, data have also been included from the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 2015: a tool designed to compare national government efforts to promote the integration of migrants across multiple dimensions in a number of European countries, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the USA.

## 7.2 Problem framing at the frontline

### 7.2.1 Language issues: problem framing and ‘linguistic agency’

Language and communication support was regarded as a key policy issue by both migrants and non-migrants alike. However, participants’ perspectives on the issue revealed that the way in which the problem is framed from a policy perspective is not necessarily how it is understood by migrants.

When asked what they felt to be the key issues facing foreign residents in Japan, the majority of the interview participants spoken to as part of this study identified learning Japanese as one of the main issues, if not *the* main issue. This corresponds with the findings of an attitudes survey carried out by Yokohama City, where the issue that foreign residents identified as the one they were most worried about was, by far, a lack of Japanese language skills (Yokohama-shi Seisaku-kyoku 2014).

In fact, Japanese was cited as a concern by a quarter of respondents to the Yokohama survey. A further 14% of respondents reported that not having someone who can understand foreign languages in a hospital or clinical setting was a concern, and 11% were worried that an interpreter would not be available when they were seeing a clinician in a hospital or clinical setting. Just over 9% of respondents were concerned that foreign languages would not be understood at government advice services and almost 8% were worried about a lack of information in their native language.

Respondents to the foreign resident survey carried out by Osaka City reported that they thought they needed interpreting support when visiting the hospital (26%) or the ward office (21%), for emergency evacuation drills (17%) and for explanations at work (13%) (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015).

Speaking from an international exchange foundation perspective, one of the interview participants in this study described what he felt to be the consequences of not being able to speak Japanese fluently.

Of course there’s an issue there right? If you have a lack of Japanese, you could call it a problem, but that’s because being unable to understand Japanese can lead to other problems in one way or another. Because you can’t understand Japanese, you won’t be to find work and not being able to find work is a problem, so for that reason if you can speak Japanese, you’ll probably find work. But even if you can speak Japanese, there are still other problems around whether or not you’ll

find work. For things like—it's just a difficult thing, but basically as I said before, because we take the results of the survey seriously, we grasp that a lack of Japanese is probably the biggest problem. (Interview 5, male international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

The narrative that this interviewee is describing, echoed by another interview participant working at an international exchange foundation in Osaka, was presented as a logical sequence of events. To some extent this narrative was also supported by the focus group participants. For example, one young person explained that Japanese fluency was essential for his career prospects.

I really want to move to this one company but they require programmers to have N2 or N1 level Japanese [the highest levels of the Japanese Language Proficiency Test]. So you need to obtain a higher level of Japanese in order to get better opportunities. (FG 7, male Brazilian, Yokohama†)

However, while there was some support for this narrative, other findings seemed to challenge the way in which the language issue has been framed. In particular, these findings suggest that migrants are affected by a lack of information in their native language in addition to, or rather than, a lack of Japanese language skills.

For example, when respondents to the Osaka survey were asked which language they prefer to receive information in, the highest response was from those who said that they wanted information in their native language (39%) with a further 11% saying that they wanted information in English (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015). About 20% of respondents wanted information in simplified Japanese and 21% wanted information in standard Japanese with ruby characters (*furigana*). Just 5% wanted information in standard Japanese without ruby characters. In addition, the majority of respondents felt that Osaka City's 'Multilingual Information at a Glance' was very useful (53%) or somewhat useful (24%).

Describing situations where migrants or their family members might require medical services, one focus group participant, M, described how individuals may be adversely affected by their Japanese language ability, but positively affected by the availability of translation or interpreting services.

For example, getting immunisation. When you go to a hospital, of course you don't know how to say [the word for immunisation] right? If your child gets vaccinated, you wouldn't know what it's for, right? You'd feel worried and anxious at the same time you cannot speak Japanese, unlike when there's an interpreter assisting you, at least you will learn the purpose of the vaccine. It's



been one of my experiences so I'd like to help other mothers this time. And at times, they don't want to study [Japanese]. (FG 6, female foundation representative/Filipino, Yokohama†)

This quote shows that the 'language issue' may be viewed as both an individual issue, in terms of a migrant's Japanese language skills, and a structural issue—for example, in terms of multilingual assistance.

However, for some migrants, being able to speak the Japanese language appeared to be much less of a concern. For example, when asked whether some migrants do not want to learn Japanese, M light-heartedly replied that 'They have no interest in it'. This response could be interpreted as an indication that, for some migrants at least, Japanese language proficiency is much less of a concern than implied by some of the interview participants. An alternative interpretation is that migrants are actively resisting linguistic integration, despite the pressure they may feel to learn the language.

Indeed, the Yokohama survey found that just 36% of respondents were learning Japanese compared to 60% who said they were not (Yokohama-shi Seisaku-kyoku 2014). At the same time, while 55% of respondents said that they want to learn Japanese, 18% felt there is no need to learn Japanese, 14% would learn Japanese if it is free and just over 4% reported that they did not really want to learn Japanese.

## **7.2.2 Disaster management: a problem of responsibility**

On the other hand, not all focus group participants felt that actors at the local scale should take responsibility for providing disaster-related information to migrants. One focus group participant, S, felt that embassies and consulate-generals, as representatives of one's *own* national government, could do more in this regard.

For example, when the Tōhoku earthquake occurred, what did [the Philippine government] do? The American government, as well as other governments—they constantly monitored the situation or status of their citizens here. They repatriated their people when in danger or in crisis. When it came to the Philippine government, they instructed the Filipinos to go home if they want to [laughs]. The embassy shouldn't just advise its people to go home, because it's not even that easy. But whenever Filipino migrants are in need, they tend to rely on the Japanese government since they can provide emergency response. But when it comes to the embassy's actual presence...? I think this is because they lack resources as well, and so many other things [laughs]. (FG 6, female Filipino, Yokohama†)

As this quote illustrates, the participant felt that the lack of capital (particularly economic capital) possessed by the Philippine embassy made it less effective than those of other countries, hence making it necessary for Filipino migrants to rely on the Japanese government.

Other actors felt that migrants themselves should play a greater role in disaster management. An interview participant from CLAIR felt that more needs to be done to engage immigrants in disaster management, giving examples related to earthquakes and the fire brigade.

Speaking for myself, up until now there have been a lot of foreigners who have been supported by Japanese people. But as the number of foreigners has grown and Japanese people can't support everyone, foreigners are actually learning for themselves and settling down in Japan. I think there's a need to make an effort to settle in Japan. Take disaster response, for example. When an earthquake has happened, because Japanese people have been trained to what to do and have been doing shelter-taking drills, up to now they've been the ones telling foreigners to come. But they haven't really been coming. Because it's not a very fun event, they haven't really been coming. But it's not just Japanese people, but also foreigners who have to learn what to do if an earthquake happens out of the blue. (Interview 10, male CLAIR rep, Tokyo)

The interviewee seems to be suggesting that migrants should try harder to conform to the behavioural norms expected of Japanese ethnionationals. However, there also seems to be a suggestion that migrants are not interested in disaster response. This is slightly at odds with findings from the Osaka City foreign residents survey, which found that the community activity that foreign residents were most keen to participate in was emergency evacuation drills, with 30% reporting a desire to be involved. (The second highest score was for cooking and delivering meals for older people at 17%).

### **7.2.3 Reframing housing issues as pro-tourism measures**

Considering how the system may change in the future, a representative from CLAIR felt that the Tokyo Olympics could offer an opportunity to advance policy changes under the banner of *tabunka kyōsei*. For example, he felt that the law should be changed to make it easier for foreigners to be able to rent rooms in Japan.

Even now, as the number of tourists has substantially increased, Japanese people are holding the idea that, for example, signs must be written in English and Chinese, etc. When the Olympics start, because more foreigners will come and because we need to prepare for that, we should provide more multilingual

information and things like that. And the law needs to change to make it easier for foreigners to rent rooms. I think that there's a high likelihood that *tabunka kyōsei* will rapidly increase as an increasing number of foreigners arrive. I think that the Olympics will become a big opportunity to promote *tabunka kyōsei*. (Interview 10, male CLAIR representative, Tokyo)

At the time of speaking, the Olympic Games were still five years away. Yet, the interviewee clearly felt that the best way to precipitate changes in the rental system would be to link it to increased tourism. While the interview participant made this connection in relation to tourists, his argument seems to suggest that such a change could also benefit foreign residents in Japan in the long run.

## **7.3 Controlling capital and collaborating at the frontline**

Local governments and migrant-supporting organisations in both Yokohama and Osaka seem to have well-developed networks in a number of policy areas affecting foreign residents, such as education. This section looks at how these networks allow these organisations to gather, share and make use of information, as well as deliver support and services to migrants.

### **7.3.1 Accumulating information, capitalising on knowledge**

All of the interview participants spoken to said that their organisations shared and exchanged information and expertise with other organisations. In many cases this included examples of existing support and services that are offered to foreign residents. As one international exchange foundation representative explained (Interview 4), this allows organisations to inform others that they are working on similar projects, presumably to share ideas and examples of best practice.

All of the NPO and international exchange foundation interviewees said that their department/section was collaborating with organisations within the same city or prefecture, while roughly half said that their department/section was supporting or working with organisations located in other cities or prefectures. For example, an interview participant in Yokohama said that they had received local government visitors from places such as Kyoto City and Okinawa Prefecture to discuss what kind of services they could provide for foreign residents (Interview 5).

The interviews with NPO representatives confirmed that those NPOs not only provide services but often carry out or commission research on issues concerning

migrants and other foreign residents in Japan. Both experiential learning and research-based learning have the potential to increase the expertise of the NPOs and may give them the legitimacy to try and influence policy, as evident in the presence of NPO representatives in various committees and expert advisory groups (as highlighted in the previous chapter).

One of the international exchange foundation representatives explained that her organisation arranges meetings, akin to focus groups or deliberative workshops, to gather information about particular issues.

So if you have a question or something like that, we gather a group of foreigners here [deliberately] because they're unlikely to come here by chance. If it's a small organisation within the municipalities, they may be offering Japanese classes to people who live in the area or something like that [...] It doesn't really happen with organisations at the prefectural level, but we may gather a certain group of people, for a particular theme or something, and we have a meeting based on that theme, with people representing foreigners coming too. [...] We do it twice a year, and now we call out to 35 organisations, so that even if it's not convenient for everyone, we still get about 20 people coming. Everyone gets on reasonably well, and among other things we announce things that are necessary for our work. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

In one sense, these organisations are pooling informational capital from migrants, and 'people representing foreigners', which they are then able to use for advocacy purposes, service development and other strategic purposes. At the same time, it helps these organisations develop the label of 'experts' on integration-related issues, which carries its own symbolic capital within the field.

The activity of sharing and accumulating information is not just achieved through informal institutional links but also encouraged by organisations such as CLAIR. As discussed previously, CLAIR was set up to support local governments in their internationalisation efforts. Over time its remit has expanded to include the promotion of measures that fall under the heading of *tabunka kyōsei* (Interview 10).

At one level, the role of CLAIR can be seen as practice diffusion, supporting local governments and international exchange foundations to develop and implement measures to support foreign residents. For example one of the staff members at CLAIR described his role as follows.

Since international exchange associations are very small, there are many problems which they can't solve just on their own. So we gather everyone here, and actually hold a *renraku kaigi* [liaison conference] for people to resolve issues together. A lot of this is linked to my work. For example, twice a year we gather representatives from all the [regional] blocks, and we hold workshops together, and so on. I'm particularly involved with meetings connected with the liaison conference. (Interview 10, male CLAIR representative, Tokyo)

Another duty discharged by CLAIR is the allocation of central government funding to local government and NPO projects. Many scholars have suggested that central government left a void in terms of integration policy-making, which was filled by local government and later NPOs. Yet, this description ignores the role of organisations such as CLAIR, which acts as an intermediary between central and local government, helping to control the flow of finance and information between these institutions.

Furthermore, many of the staff working at CLAIR are seconded from local governments across Japan for one or two years, while the remainder come from MIC or MEXT. Hence this model could be viewed as a habitus-reinforcing mechanism—helping align the behaviours of local government staff with those of central government staff, and vice versa, during their interactions at CLAIR.

Despite the fact that NPOs and local governments use their knowledge and expertise to provide advice and consultation services to foreign residents, few focus group participants seemed to rely on these services for their information needs. The majority of focus group participants said that they obtained much of their information from the Internet and through Facebook groups or other social networking sites.

In fact, the kinds of sources used seemed to vary according to factors such as the participant's country of origin and age. For example, one of the younger focus group participants of Filipino origin said that he obtained information about current events through Rappler, a social news network based in the Philippines and Indonesia (FG 9). Other participants talked about relying on internet resources such as GaijinPot—an English language site holding a plethora of information on subjects such as jobs, travel, apartments and studying in Japan.

These findings correspond with the results of Osaka City's foreign resident survey, which asked respondents in which ways they preferred to receive important information (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015). Most respondents to the survey selected the Internet (23%) or emails and mailing lists (12%), while a sizeable number (13%) also wanted to receive information through their Japanese classes (either teachers or volunteers). Just 5% identified local government sources (the city government or ward offices) as their preferred means of getting information. In a similar vein, 71% of respondents to an attitudes survey conducted by Yokohama City reported that they obtained essential information through the Internet (Yokohama-shi Seisaku-kyoku 2014).

### **7.3.2 Networks and partnerships: using social capital to deliver services**

Aside from gathering information, organisations in Yokohama and Osaka were found to be using their ties with local governments or migrant-supporting organisations to provide various services to migrants. The findings also suggested that these ties were deliberately and strategically cultivated.

Local migrant-supporting organisations seem to be pragmatic—willing to cooperate with other partners to deliver services. For instance, when talking about his foundation's relations with other organisations, a representative from an international exchange foundation felt that 'cooperation' was the most appropriate descriptor.

Rather than influence, [I'd say] cooperation with whom; because in order to solve a problem, we can't just do it on our own. As I said before, if you need legal advice about divorce and so on, we'd coordinate with the bar association, as well as the *gyōsei shoshi-kai* [associations of legal specialists in administrative procedures]. And if it's this kind of problem, [it would be] schools, education boards, and then the local ward office. So rather than influence, it's about resolving issues through cooperation. That's how it's become. (Interview 5, male international exchange association representative, Yokohama).

There are several points to note here. The picture of cooperation depicted in the following quote contrasts sharply with the 'partnership of unequals' between central government and NPOs described in the previous chapter. It is also clear from this quote that organisations such as these have been able to cultivate considerable social capital and that they are able to draw on their relationships with other organisations to support migrants in a range of policy areas such as education.

It is also worth highlighting that the participant went on to justify the organisation's cooperative approach by pointing out that they are neither legal nor education experts, hence the need to work with other organisations. However, it was clear from the conversation that the people working at this particular association held considerable knowledge and expertise in a range of areas. What they lacked were the credentials (i.e. the symbolic capital) that come with being a certified expert.

In addition to these kinds of links with professional organisations, international exchange organisations were also found to be building community-based connections. For example, an interview participant from another international exchange foundation explained that her organisation was forging links with community leaders through 'information exchange meetings', before going on to describe the various issues and projects that are discussed at these meetings.

And, another thing we do is hold an information exchange meeting with migrant community leaders twice a year. [...] we, the foundation, want to form better relations with those people, and we're forming relationships but we do this too because we'd like to form horizontal connections. It's about empowering these people too. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

According to the interviewee, her foundation identifies 'key persons' (*kiipāson*) in migrant-supporting organisations who can distribute information on their behalf. Much of their work involves outreach to community or organisational leaders, who were said to not know about the full range of services available to migrants in their local areas, and whose ability to circulate information among their communities was described as being weak, despite their efforts to support their compatriots.

Hence, the foundation set up a website—where migrant community members can post their own messages, such as notifications about forthcoming festivals—which receives an average of 3,000 unique visitors a month. The foundation also provides information that may be useful to foreign residents, such as the location of advice services or medical centres, and summarises statistics and reports for Japanese ethnonationals who want more information about the issues affecting migrants.

What is clear from this account is that the interviewee's organisation has expended considerable effort to forge community links—both through 'community leaders'

and via a web-based platform—and to use these links to gather and deliver advice and information and promote services for foreign residents.

In addition, international exchange foundations have also used their positions to bring migrant-supporting organisations together. Speaking about her experiences of engagement between migrant-supporting organisations, a Filipino NPO representative described how YOKE acted as a hub for networking.

Here in Yokohama, I had the chance to get involved with YOKE because my organisation is connected to it. When we were still in [another city in Kanagawa], we were pioneering participants in NGO-sponsored cultural festivals in Yokohama. So we're always having meetings at YOKE together with other NGO representatives. I've been here in Yokohama for 28 years—so compared to Tokyo, it's more progressive when it comes to mobilising NGOs and encouraging local participation in symposiums and other events involving both Japanese people and migrants. (FG 3, female Filipino/NPO representative, Yokohama†)

It is worth highlighting that the focus group participant felt that Yokohama is more progressive than Tokyo—by which she is referring to specific local governments in Tokyo—in terms of ‘mobilising NGOs’. (In fact, another participant in the same focus group pointed out that ‘there are so many networks here in Kanagawa’). These comments suggest that networks of migrant-supporting organisations in Yokohama have not appeared haphazardly, but have in fact been cultivated through the actions of organisations such as YOKE.

### **7.3.3 Informational and social capital in disaster management**

The use of networks and information sharing is particularly evident in relation to disaster management. Japanese history has been punctuated by earthquakes and both Osaka and Yokohama are in regions that have been affected by major earthquakes. Against this backdrop, the local government and NPO interview participants in both cities highlighted the need for cross-sector collaboration in terms of disaster management as it relates to foreign residents.

According to Osaka City's foreign residents survey, over half (54%) of the respondents did not know where to evacuate to in case of emergency (including natural disasters and other emergencies such as fires), and 61% did not know how to obtain real-time information on emergency situations or evacuation procedures (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015). Against this backdrop, actors at the local scale are



providing targeted information and support for migrants, especially those with lower levels of Japanese language proficiency, as the following example demonstrates.

Together with Kanagawa Prefecture, we opened an information centre for foreigners here, which among other things provides disaster information in foreign languages, and we've also decided to create a system that can respond if there's a request for advice. Although that was done by Kanagawa Prefecture, even Yokohama City, Kawasaki City and Sagami-hara City are talking about setting up these kinds of centres. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

Various cities in Kanagawa Prefecture have these information centres, but in order to avoid duplication of effort they collaborate in a number of ways, such as sharing information and carrying out joint training procedures.

Similarly, an interview participant from an international exchange association in Osaka suggested that one of the benefits of collaborating with other organisations in the Kansai region lied in the increased capacity available to collaborating partners during times of crisis (Interview 4). For example, an earthquake may mean that local governments cannot function normally. In such cases, a neighbouring authority could mobilise volunteers (e.g. volunteer interpreters). The Kansai region was said to be the first region to develop this kind of partnership, which was later formalised.

#### **7.3.4 Collaboration in education**

Japan has unfavourable or slightly unfavourable scores for all four dimensions of education identified in MIPEX, namely access to education, targeting migrants' needs, leveraging new opportunities and developing intercultural education. Yet, this obscures the considerable differences between policies and practices at the national and local scales.

After showing a manga (a Japanese-style comic book) made by a schoolteacher to illustrate the issues affecting migrant children, one of the interviewees went on to describe what they do to support migrant children.

We also make things like this [manga], and we also organise information-exchange type meetings where we gather the education boards from the municipalities [in Kanagawa], and the Prefectural Education Board, and we ask everyone what they're concerned about. So we also listen to these kinds of conversations, and we collate everything we want to communicate to school teachers. While working with education boards, we do that—we produce things like this and we distribute them. Then there are some real differences between the

various municipalities. So we introduce places where they're developing advanced initiatives, and for things that people from education boards and ourselves are really worried about and there isn't any money—there isn't any money but we're creating a space for people to share their knowledge about what to do as the number of children keeps increasing like this. And once a year we also hold networking meetings with NGOs and the government, and create spaces where education boards and NGOs that support children can talk to each other. Those are the kinds of links we have. As for links with other organisations, we have a funding system called [name of fund] and this is just [shows a document]... on page 8 and page 9 you can see what kind of projects we've funded, but with this fund, we have an annual budget of about 6 million yen and we provide funding support to NGOs and NPOs. So, we get applications from NGOs and we choose the best projects and try to support them. Those are the kinds of things we do. (Interview 8, female international exchange foundation representative, Yokohama)

Once again, it is worth highlighting the considerable social capital that organisations such as these are able to leverage in order to create spaces where organisations can meet and discuss how social policies are developed or delivered—in this case education policies for migrant children. It is also clear that unless migrants are present in any of the NGOs or other organisations involved, either as staff or volunteers, they are likely to have very little say in these discussions or the kinds of projects that will attract funding.

International exchange associations also hold conferences with local education boards (from different municipalities as well as the prefectural board) to share and discuss information and consider potential collaborations. They also hold a separate conference between the prefectural education board and civil society organisations that support immigrant children's education.

Generally, the findings suggest that siloed ways of working seem to have been challenged by migrants and other actors at the local scale, as the following quote illustrates.

Within the ward, I think there's been a particularly big change in terms of learning support for children. Put simply, children who've accompanied their parents here and have suddenly been entered into Japanese schools, where they don't understand the language, are bound to have problems. So, in terms of having to provide more support there, we gather head teachers, from within the ward as well as the neighbouring ward, and we run network sessions. So, as you'd expect, each school raises things which have become issues for them, and for us it's become a place to think about what we can do [to help]. There probably haven't been any initiatives like that within the city until now. I think it's been an extremely big change, moving from a situation where you feel like

schools are schools, wards are wards and YOKE is YOKE, and where everyone's been dealing with these issues in a disconnected way, to one where we've become able to tackle things together. (Interview 9, female local government representative, Yokohama)

On the face of it, this approach seems to be encouraging collaborative ways of working and creating new forms of social capital with the aim of supporting migrant children with education issues. Although it may not be clear from the translation, however, there was a nuance in the way in which the participant spoke about migrant children, which implied that they are not to blame for being brought to Japan, seemingly suggesting that their parents have created this problem for them and it is up to statutory bodies to try and resolve these issues. At the same time, there is no suggestion that the parents themselves should be involved in the sessions. Arguably, there are administrative and practical challenges associated with expanding these sessions to include migrant parents, but their stake in the education of their children could warrant such an expansion.

Indeed, the focus group discussions suggested that parents, particularly mothers, seem to engage much more with their children's education than with other issues—either directly through schools or via local education boards and education committees. In Yokohama, there are several international schools which serve the large English-speaking 'ex-pat' communities living there. The focus group participants whose children attend these schools seemed keen for them to be educated in an international environment that would not disadvantage them if they continued their higher education elsewhere—a sentiment that seemed common among migrant families with a relatively high socioeconomic status, and with a less apparent inclination to settle in Japan permanently.

### **7.3.5 Cooperation in housing and employment**

When asked what kind of problems foreign residents experienced in terms of housing, respondents to the Osaka City foreign residents survey identified high rent (16%) and issues in searching for a home (13%, including issues such as not letting to foreigners) as two of the key problems. Just 3% reported not understanding waste disposal rules.

Few of the focus group participants touched on housing issues without prompting. Some participants noted that they received support from their company to arrange

rental accommodation, particularly those participants with European and North American backgrounds employed in relatively well-paid jobs. However, one of the interview participants was able to discuss some of the housing and community issues that affect foreign residents in more detail.

If you talk about what kind of issues there are with real estate agents, [they'll say] they're noisy, messy, don't dispose of their rubbish properly, and when they come home from work in the evening they drink and sing and make too much noise. And then there's smelly food, subletting, debt defaults... (Interview 18, female NPO representative/Chinese, Yokohama)

The interview participant noted that while many of these issues affect immigrants, *Zainichi* people are also affected by discrimination in housing/renting on the basis of their ethnicity/race, despite the fact that they can speak Japanese, understand Japanese sociocultural norms, and are generally indistinguishable from Japanese ethnionationals.

Again, the interview participant noted that collaboration with other organisations was vital for addressing these issues.

From the beginning, we didn't intend to coordinate with various places. By which I mean, as I said before, when you get introduced to real-estate agents and when problems happened, while we consulted with business people we were thinking about how we should address these problems, but in practice, as I said before, because we're consulted about various problems, we have to get in touch with the bar association. We have to get in touch with *shihō shoshi* [people qualified to handle real-estate transactions]. With school teachers, with hospitals. Basically if you don't cooperate with various people, you can't solve various problems, so we cooperate with various places. (Interview 18, female NPO representative, Yokohama)

Another social policy area in which NPOs are collaborating with government, albeit at arm's length, is that of employment. Support with employment and unemployment insurance benefits in Japan is provided primarily through Hello Work, a government-funded employment agency roughly equivalent to Jobcentre Plus in the UK. NPOs are increasingly working jointly with Hello Work to deliver advice-based services for migrants looking for work, such as where to look for job openings. One of the interview participants, from an international exchange foundation, talked about joint projects with Hello Work to provide *seikatsu hogo* ('livelihood protection'):

Unions, right? Again, they're different. They, somehow—when workers have problems or when they've been dismissed or their wages haven't been paid, they

provide advice for them. But, recently, the government and Yokohama have also been doing so [?] but they've been doing a joint project with Hello Work. Do you know about public assistance? Hello Work has set up an advice counter together with Yokohama City for people who are claiming public assistance and looking for job opportunities. That's the kind of joint projects we've been starting up recently (Interview 5, male international exchange association representative, Osaka)

This suggests that support is given to those people claiming public assistance who are looking for paid employment, which would either reduce or eliminate their need for public assistance. Hence, it seems to have a dual aim of increasing employment rates while reducing social security claims.

## **7.4 Field strategies among migrants: leveraging limited capital**

The findings from the focus group discussions suggest that many migrants are not able to access or secure the social services or integration support that they need. Instead, they may require additional support from other actors or institutions in order to make the most of the limited capital at their disposal.

### **7.4.1 Navigating the social security system with expert support**

Findings in relation to social security claims illustrate how migrants are supported by actors with expertise in this area. Very few focus group participants had made social security claims, but those that did had done so with the support of local governments or migrant-supporting organisations—and, by extension, those organisation's wider networks—which facilitated the claim-making process.

Focus group participants with a comparatively low socioeconomic status were more likely to be employed to do part-time or casual work, and some of these participants had had experiences of claiming social security benefits. (See appendix B for background information on the social security system in Japan.) Without generalising beyond the sample, this also seemed to be a gendered experience, with female participants more likely to claim than men.

Japan does not have any specific forms of social security for migrants or foreign residents, as C, one of the focus group participants, pointed out when asked about the topic.

I've been here for 28 years and I never received any support. Because in my time, there was not even—there was no support for children. And then they had this maternity insurance, but they paid for delivery. (FG 3, female Filipino, Yokohama†)

However, it was clear from the focus groups that migrants have additional challenges in accessing social security in comparison to Japanese nationals. Without assistance from friends and family, migrant-supporting organisations or local government staff, it seems that many migrants would not be aware of the benefits that they can claim or could struggle with the processes by which they can make those claims. For example, O, who had divorced her husband three years earlier, commented that:

That was the last time I went to the ward office! So, first I went to the ward office for registration, then for maternity needs, children's needs. I had to get a child book to give birth at the hospital. My ex-husband knew about this requirement. Then for day care, I needed to know which day care I could leave my child in. For the divorce, the ward office staff explained the process. (FG 3, female Filipino, Yokohama†)

It is clear from O's comments that there is a gender dimension to this situation in terms of the kind of support she was claiming. In addition, the majority of so-called 'international marriages' (*kokusai kekkon*) in Japan are between male Japanese nationals and non-Japanese women, and O's story suggests that many women may initially rely on their husbands' understanding of the social security system in order to make claims.

While O was supported by her local ward office to claim support, others may receive support from civil-society organisations, especially migrants who are not aware of the assistance they can claim or their rights in respect of those claims. For example, when asked about migrant workers who were injured at work, C, an NPO representative, explained how migrants injured at work could benefit from social security.

There were a lot of Filipino workers who lost a finger [at work], who had a permanent disability. The labour standards here are perfect. There are slight difficulties if the victim is undocumented, but under the law, you're protected whether you're documented or undocumented. We have cases where people went back to the Philippines with a permanent disability but are still receiving pensions. (FG 3, female NPO representative/Filipino, Yokohama†)

It is clear that C has a working knowledge of the law, and it is likely that her organisation has been able to use this knowledge to support migrants with their

claims and to secure assistance for those who do not know what kinds of support they are entitled to.

Of the different forms of social security available to migrants in Japan, ‘public assistance’ (*seikatsu hogo*), a residual form of support, was highlighted most often by focus group participants as a form of support that they had claimed. In 2014, just over 4% of households in Yokohama and fewer than 7% of households in Osaka claiming public assistance were headed by a foreign resident (see Table 7.1). Given that 2.4% of residents in Yokohama and 4.7% of residents in Osaka are registered foreign residents, this suggests that foreign residents are somewhat more likely to claim than Japanese nationals, but it is difficult to draw any other inferences from this comparison.

However, this situation could change. A recent court ruling found that foreign residents are not legally entitled to claim social security as they are not considered to be Japanese nationals (*kokumin*). While there have been no reports of substantial cuts to this support since the ruling came out, it could potentially have an impact on future social security claims by foreign residents. Local governments who continue to support foreign residents are doing so at their own discretion and are therefore expanding the de facto coverage of social security in Japan.

**Table 7.1 Number of households receiving public assistance in 2014**

<b>Public assistance claims</b>	<b>Osaka</b>	<b>Yokohama</b>
Claims by households headed by a foreign resident (A)	7,955	2,964
No. of claims by any households (B)	117,611	70,931
A as percentage of B	6.76	4.18

Sources: Osaka City Government (<http://www.city.osaka.lg.jp/fukushi/page/0000086901.html>), Kanagawa Prefecture Government (<http://www.pref.kanagawa.jp/cnt/f152/p2909.html>)

However, one of the NPO representatives felt that Filipino women should avoid claiming public assistance altogether if possible.

Actually, as an NGO leader, I don’t encourage my members to be on public assistance, because if you’re physically fit to work, why would you choose to be a government dependant? You don’t need to be on public assistance. There’s another type of government support, *boshi katei*, which is a single mother’s allowance given every four months. For me, that’s okay, because you need to

support your children, plus you can work. What's more important here is to have dignity. (FG 3, female Filipino, Yokohama†)

When asked what she meant by dignity, C went on to say the following.

Having dignity means working for your own money, through your own sweat. It gives you a good feeling so that even if you receive a meagre income, it's yours, you worked hard for it. As an NGO leader, I also encourage them not to work at night, in clubs, because it breaks up family relationships. There's a lot of temptation. Many families have been ruined because of it. And I told the members that if they want to settle in Japan, they must quit being on public assistance because it would be a liability for them if they seek permanent residence here. (FG 3, female Filipino, Yokohama†)

It is worth noting that although the focus group participant began by linking welfare receipt to dignity, she ended by noting that welfare claims can have a detrimental impact on migrants' ability to settle in Japan. In other words, those migrants who need to claim public assistance seem to be viewed less favourably than those migrants who do not.

#### **7.4.2 Overcoming barriers to healthcare services**

MIPEX health indicators suggest that Japan is 'halfway favourable' in terms of its responsiveness to the needs of immigrants. In particular, Japan scored 75 out of 100 for entitlement to health services, and 90 out of 100 for its policies to facilitate access—ranking it number one among the countries covered by the Index.

According to MIPEX, foreign residents are relatively well covered by the health insurance system in Japan, with Japan being ranked fifth overall in terms of access. Many migrants work for companies who pay for their health insurance (*kenkō hoken*), while those who are self-employed or unemployed have to pay for the state-provided National Health Insurance (*kokumin kenkō hoken*). However, despite the fact that foreign residents are required to have health insurance if they live in Japan for more than three months, many do not. For example, a local government representative from Hamamatsu City mentioned that at one point up to 80% of foreign residents in the city did not have health insurance, prompting the city to take measures to reverse this trend (Interview 16).

The process of registering for National Health Insurance is not straightforward, particularly for those who lack Japanese language proficiency. While migrants with well-paid jobs are likely to benefit from Employees' Health Insurance, migrants in



casual or precarious work may take the decision not to register and use their income for other purposes.

The high MIPEx score for policies to facilitate access to healthcare acknowledges the fact that much information is available in multiple languages in print and online and that medical interpreters are available at *certain* institutions and provided by *some* local governments. However, what is not immediately clear from the MIPEx report is the difficulty of accessing healthcare services in Japan without Japanese language skills.

When asked what kind of problems foreign residents experienced in terms of health and illness, respondents to the Osaka City foreign residents survey identified communication problems with hospital staff (14%), high costs (12%) not knowing which hospital to go to (10%).

One organisation that has sought to support migrants with medical interpreting is MIC Kanagawa. MIC Kanagawa is unique to Kanagawa and its founding mission is to ‘create a society where everyone can enjoy full access to medical services, regardless of their race, nationality or cultural background’. As M explained:

It’s a system of medical support that was initially an NPO enterprise. Now they coordinate with Kanagawa Prefecture. But they’re not connected to all hospitals, just those within the prefecture. Right now they have links with 60 hospitals. So, say there’s a Filipino patient who goes to one of those hospitals and she can’t speak Japanese... As you know, everyday Japanese is different from the Japanese taught in school, more so the Japanese used in hospitals. So when a foreigner seeks help from a case worker to explain a certain illness, the case worker seeks the assistance of an interpreter. I’m also one of those who interview incoming interpreters. (FG 6, female foundation representative/Filipino, Yokohama†)

Clearly, MIC Kanagawa plays an important ‘bridging’ role between the healthcare system and non-Japanese-speaking migrants who would otherwise struggle to access medical services. It is also apparent that the organisation’s ties with Kanagawa Prefecture seem to have grown over time, presumably as its value as a service has become more evident. While medical interpreters are available in several cities and prefectures, including Osaka, there is no comparable organisation in Osaka.

In addition, M mentioned that she had sent a proposal through to Kanagawa Foreign Residents’ Assembly to extend the service offered by MIC Kanagawa.

Before, MIC Kanagawa used to be independent from the local government, but when [the latter] realised the importance of giving support to foreigners by having language interpreters, they began to reach out and coordinate with MIC by sending interpreters to hospitals. In my proposal, I suggested that if there was an interpreter available at a hospital, they could attend to walk-in foreigners in need of medical aid. [...] So that's what I'm lobbying for, and [Kanagawa Foreign Residents' Assembly] is still reviewing it as of now. (FG 6, female Filipino/foundation representative, Yokohama†)

This example provides a good illustration of how Kanagawa Foreign Residents' Assembly enables foreign residents to engage with policy-making processes that affect the provision and delivery of local services.

#### **7.4.3 Tackling discriminatory practices in the workplace**

According to the MIPLEX indicators, employment (labour market participation) is one of the few areas where immigrants seem to be well integrated into Japanese society. According to the Osaka City foreign residents survey, while many foreign residents did not experience problems at work (27%), others experienced issues such as being unable to understand conversations at work (16%), problems with colleagues (12%), problems finding work despite a desire to work (10%) and unsatisfactory pay/work hours (10%) (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015).

However, for immigrants in less economically desirable/valued roles, the situation is more difficult. One of the Filipino participants spoke of her frustration at the lack of support for migrant workers with respect to discriminatory behaviours.

More the absence of job contracts than violation of job contracts. Even before they come to me, even those Philippine Nikkei from the Philippines who've approached me for help—they let me check their contract. Well, we try to do something about that. Most contracts are made in the Philippines. There are trainees from the Philippines whose contract was made in the Philippines, so I consulted the prosecutors in the Philippines and they determine if there's a violation. So one trainee was asked to go home [to the Philippines] because she got pregnant and had to quit work. Her boyfriend, who was also a trainee, also left. The Japanese employers didn't charge them but simply asked them to return to the Philippines. Japanese employers are very smart, they really don't fire employees. (FG 3, female Filipino/NPO representative, Yokohama†)

This quote demonstrates the considerable differences between migrants supported by their employers or by NPOs and those that are not. While some employers are using their resources to secure a range of support for migrant workers—such as support to find accommodation and benefits in kind such as health insurance—focus group

participants in less well-paid jobs seemed to receive little support from their employers. Others, such as the ones described in the quote, may even require support to tackle problems created or exacerbated by their employers. In this particular case, an NPO representative with transnational links and some knowledge of worker's rights was able to support the 'trainees' to challenge infringements.

## **7.5 Migrant influence and identity**

### **7.5.1 Not just service users: migrant influence as 'insiders'**

Much of this chapter has looked at service providers' interactions with migrants as 'service users'. However, apart from being service users, migrants also engage in the delivery of activities and services in their capacity as staff and volunteers. As M explained:

In terms of educational support, it is very clear that the government and migrants are working together, like here, the staff members are foreigners. (FG 6, female foundation representative/Filipino, Yokohama†)

However, Japanese language proficiency is often a prerequisite for this engagement (Interview 4), which means that many migrants are excluded from taking on these roles. It is almost a double whammy: potential exclusion from accessing services and from providing services due to language barriers.

It is not clear how much influence migrants may have as staff or whether they are able to input into key decision making processes. However, it is likely that they have more input into how services are targeted or delivered than they would as service users.

While influencing services is one option, migrants are also able to influence one another's behaviours, as the following quote illustrates.

Despite differences in culture and language, those of us who receive support from the Government or have lived here for quite a while—we've committed to acting as a bridge to other Japanese people. We can't just be getting support all the time; it should be a give-and-thank kind of assistance. (FG 7, male Brazilian, Yokohama†)

### 7.5.2 Rights and identity: permanent residence versus nationality

Some of the focus group participants talked about the differences between permanent residence and citizenship in terms of the benefits and challenges. When asked about permanent residence, a focus group participant, M, remarked that even if you acquire permanent residence, ‘you can’t get the same benefits as a citizen’.

He went on to say that ‘You can’t be a citizen here’. Discussing the situation with another focus group participant, he highlighted the residence requirement for citizenship as a barrier to naturalisation.

M: If you don’t stay here for ten years, let’s say, you can’t be a citizen here.

S: But you can naturalise as Japanese. You can give up your Filipino nationality.

M: Not really. For example, if you work in the US for five years, it’s like you becoming a citizen there. Here, you need to work for ten years to achieve that. [...] For example, if you go to Australia, New Zealand, the benefits may not be the same. (FG 6, Filipinos, Yokohama†)

This exchange highlights the migrants’ awareness of the differences between national citizenship and permanent residence. They recognised that national citizenship and permanent residence may confer different benefits in different national contexts, but concluded that national citizenship is associated with more benefits (or rights, perhaps) than permanent residence.

While the majority of the focus group participants did not have Japanese citizenship or permanent residence, one explained why she could not conceive of changing her nationality. S had recently acquired permanent residence, but went on to say that she does not want to naturalise.

[...] I don’t want to change nationality. I’m not Japanese. For me, if you change nationality, you change your true identity. So Grace Poe [a senator and former presidential candidate in the Philippines]—I don’t like her. To her, nationality is just something you can renounce and revert easily, based on convenience. For me, it’s your ultimate sense of identity so you shouldn’t renounce that. You can never take it back when you lose it for the sake of convenience. (FG 6, female Filipino, Yokohama†)

The participant referred to Grace Poe who is currently serving as a senator in the Philippines and mounted an unsuccessful presidential bid in 2016. Poe became a naturalised US citizen in 2001, but reacquired Philippine citizenship in 2010. Despite

the legality of Poe's decision, the focus group participant clearly felt that nationality should not be treated as a legal status, but instead as a form of identity more akin to ethnonationality. Hence, changing her nationality was not a strategy she could conceive of using to secure more rights.

## 7.6 Summary

The findings from this study suggest that actors at the local scale tasked with implementing or delivering integration-related policies and services, especially international exchange foundations and NPOs, have focused considerable energy on building networks and partnerships. In general, these relationships are presented as being collaborative or cooperative. While some of these connections have been used to gather and share relevant information, others have been used to enhance the delivery of services and integration-related support.

At the same time, migrants have developed their own networks. Among other things, the focus group findings suggest that migrants use their personal or social networks to access information, often through social networking sites such as Facebook.

Although the findings suggest that migrants generally rely on the Internet for their information needs, it is also worth considering who makes this information available online. For instance, even though migrants may not *physically* visit international exchange foundations for their information needs, it is possible that they access information through such organisations' websites.

The focus group participants were also found to receive support from civil society organisations, especially ones identified through their own coethnic networks, to access or make better use of existing services. What is of particular relevance to this study, however, is how migrants use these links to amplify their limited capital and to challenge taken-for-granted assumptions or normative ideas. It was clear from the findings that NPOs or coethnic associations can enhance migrants' abilities to turn their civil or social rights into substantive rights, assisting migrants to make social security claims, for instance. However, the focus group participants also demonstrated agency in these processes, challenging some of the expectations seemingly placed upon them. For example, some focus group participants challenged the normativity of learning Japanese, particularly those from the Philippines. Some

did so implicitly, by calling for greater use of medical interpreters; others did so explicitly—simply refusing to learn Japanese.

While the interview participants tended to describe migrants as service users or passive policy recipients, with some exceptions, there were indications from the focus groups of different ways in which migrants may be able to influence integration policy-making processes. For example, some of the interview and focus group participants who held directorial positions in migrant-supporting organisations were from a migrant background themselves. Others worked as members of staff or volunteers in international exchange foundations and other organisations which provide services and support to foreign residents.

In sum, the findings from this chapter and the previous chapter have highlighted the cast of actors and institutions, and the relationships between them—in the form of networks, partnerships or asymmetric relationships, formal or otherwise—which shape the policies affecting migrants in Japan. In the next chapter these findings are discussed in more detail, with reference to the frameworks developed in chapters three and four.



## 8 Discussion

### 8.1 Introduction

Having reviewed the findings in the previous two chapters, it is now possible to discuss the field of integration policy-making in more detail. Returning to the research questions set out at the beginning, this chapter considers the key actors and institutions involved in the development of integration policies at the national and local scale. More specifically, it reflects on the specific dimensions along which the field of integration policy-making is organised, and what separates those who occupy the relatively more privileged nodes or positions within the field from those who occupy relatively less privileged positions.

While integration policy-making actors, and to some extent their relationships, have been explored in previous studies, I argue that the narratives regarding integration policy-making processes warrant further attention. Taking this a step further, the next section of this chapter explores how migrants and other foreign residents are constructed within integration policies and what this tells us about the nature of integration politics in Japan.

The following section looks at two particular junctures that allowed the configuration of actors involved in the production of integration policies to change, leading to a reconfiguration of their relationships. The first is the Kobe earthquake, a ‘critical juncture’ (P. Pierson 2003) or ‘break in equilibrium’ (Bourdieu 1988, 156–58) which led to the proliferation of (specified) NPOs. The second is the inclusion of central government as a more dominant actor in integration policy-making processes in the mid-2000s, which was largely precipitated at the insistence of local government and non-governmental stakeholders.

Using field analysis, the next two sections analyse the relationships between the key actors identified in chapter three in order to understand strategies used to influence integration policies at the national scale and to help explain variations at the local scale. The final section considers the kinds of capital that migrants have at their disposal and the ways in which this capital may be used in the pursuit of social citizenship.



## 8.2 *Tabunka kyōsei* and the construction of ‘foreigners’ in integration policies

### 8.2.1 Foreigners as anything but immigrants

The restrictive approach to immigration that has characterised the Japanese immigration regime for decades, underpinned by a belief in the uniqueness and racial homogeneity of Japanese people, seems to be part of the *doxa* (taken-for-granted principles) of the immigration policy-making field. This is evident in official statistics, for instance, where nationality is recorded for foreign residents but ethnicity is not recorded for Japanese nationals. Thus naturalised citizens such as ‘Korean Japanese’ are simply counted as Japanese nationals, while data related to their ethnonational heritage simply are not collected.

This logic extends to the integration policy-making field, where there seems to be tacit agreement between actors about the kind of terminology that is acceptable. For example, even where interview participants were not completely comfortable with the terms ‘oldcomer’ or ‘newcomer’—describing them as ‘so-called oldcomers’ (*iwayuru ōrudokamā*) or ‘so-called newcomers’ (*iwayuru nyūkamā*) instead—they continued to use these terms.

The term *imin* or ‘immigrant’ is hardly ever used outside of academic discourse (see, for instance, Kawamura, Kondō, and Nakamoto 2009; Kondō 2009; Roberts 2018). Immigrants used to be described as ‘foreigners’ (*gaikokujin*) or ‘foreign workers’ (*gaikokujin rōdōsha*), but now tend to be described as ‘foreign residents’ (*gaikokujin jūmin*) or ‘foreign nationals’ (*gaikokuseki jūmin*). Even non-governmental interviewees seemed reluctant to use the term, generally referring to migrants as ‘foreign residents’ instead. In some cases, however, frontline practitioners used more nuanced expressions such as ‘people/children with foreign roots or roots in a foreign country’ (*gaikoku ni aru/motte iru rūtsu no kata/kodomo*). On the one hand, this is recognition of the fact that some people (particularly children) might have been born in Japan, rather than a foreign country, and may have very different needs to those born outside of Japan, whose primary socialisation experiences may be markedly different. On the other hand, it does little to challenge the underlying logic of the field—that non-Japanese ethnonationalities have less symbolic value than Japanese ethnonationality.

‘Skill’ has also been used as a way of categorising migrants, with migrants divided between the ‘highly skilled’ (*kōdō jinzai*) and ‘low skilled’ workers (*rōdōsha*). While difficulties in measuring a person’s skills abound, this does not stop immigration regulations from wielding ‘skill levels’ as a cleavage to differentiate between ‘desirable’ and ‘undesirable’ migrants, alongside other axes such as race, ethnicity and gender. Highly-skilled migrants are essentially presented as economically desirable migrants, which is in keeping with the economic logic of the Japanese immigration policy-making field. However, there are also indications that the concept of highly-skilled migrants within the Japanese context is racialised. This is evident in artwork for a poster about the points system introduced in 2012—described as preferential immigration treatment for highly-skilled foreign professionals—which appears to present highly-skilled migrants as ‘white’ migrants (see appendix C).

What is clear is that the ability to categorise migrants lies predominantly with central government. The ‘power to name’ is an important device that central government can use to regulate the entry and exit of foreign nationals and the activities that those nationals can undertake during their time in Japan (Roberts 2018). Other actors can contest these labels, as the Korean Community has tried to do, but the state’s ‘monopoly over legitimate naming’—as Bourdieu (1989, 21) describes it—is not easy to challenge.

### **8.2.2 *Tabunka kyōsei*: a habitus-reinforcing concept?**

In constructing the field of integration policy-making, we need to reject the ‘common sense’ narratives that are perpetuated by dominant actors and question the taken-for-granted categories that those actors use. In order to do so, we need to critically review the various ways in which *tabunka kyōsei* is understood and used by key actors and institutions in the field.

Many scholars have been critical towards *tabunka kyōsei* as a unique approach to integration (Burgess 2004; Chapman 2006). Their criticisms have generally been levelled at the second component of the expression—the idea of ‘coexistence’. Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonationals living side by side, as an act of toleration, is how many observers perceive *tabunka kyōsei*. For others, it represents assimilation of difference into a homogeneous state.

Although the term has become increasingly widespread since the 1990s, several interview participants mentioned their dissatisfaction with *tabunka kyōsei*. One participant was dissatisfied with the way the term is translated as ‘multicultural coexistence’, suggesting that ‘intercultural living’ is a better translation. This echoes the arguments that Yamawaki (2007) has made, with the suggestion that the translation of the term as ‘multicultural coexistence’ implies an overt similarity to ‘multiculturalism’ that belies the differences between the two policy approaches. The latter is a pluralist approach, while the former lies somewhere between the ideal types of pluralism and assimilation.

The *tabunka kyōsei* policy approach appeared at a time when a ‘new wave’ of migrants were coming to Japan, ostensibly different to previous ‘waves’ (Sellek 2001). The distinction between policies aimed at ‘oldcomers’ and ‘newcomers’ was a feature of *tabunka kyōsei* that was heavily criticised by the *Zainichi* interview participants. The oldcomer–newcomer dichotomy implies that integration policies are based on need and duration/permanence of residence. Put another way, less-established migrants have not had time to familiarise themselves with Japanese norms or, depending on their inclination, time to acquire Japanese language proficiency. As a result, integration policies directed at this group of migrants are presented as being designed to address practical needs. By contrast, more-established migrants are unlikely to require Japanese language assistance (with the possible exception of older people, who may require language support in social care settings due to dementia) but are engaged in a struggle to win greater political capital (Chung 2010).

Another way to look at this issue is as a division between immigrants who are of concern and those who are deemed to be sufficiently integrated (or assimilated) as to warrant little or no concern. To a large extent this division is racialised. The majority of those who are permanent residents (or naturalised citizens) are of Korean or Chinese descent. If these individuals are able to speak Japanese fluently and operate in Japanese society unaffected by sociocultural barriers, they become, to all intents and purposes, ‘hidden’ migrants; and once hidden, they are of less concern to policymakers. At the same time, *tabunka kyōsei* seems to represent an ideal of inclusivity through a narrative of ‘coexistence’ that seemingly ignores Japan’s colonial and post-colonial history and decades of assimilationist policies.

While participants recognised the division that *tabunka kyōsei* creates between ‘newcomers’ and ‘oldcomers’, they seem to have lost sight of a much more fundamental division. What *tabunka kyōsei*, or simply *kyōsei*, masks is that all people who are not ostensibly Japanese ethnonationals lack the embodied cultural capital to ‘live in Japan as *seikatsusha*’—fully contributing members of Japanese society.

### **8.2.3 *Tabunka kyōsei* and the welfare regime**

This study has found some evidence to suggest that the Japanese welfare regime is restrictive, or differentiated, but none to suggest that this is peculiar to *tabunka kyōsei* as per Kibe’s (2017) assertion that *tabunka kyōsei* is characterised by ‘welfare chauvinism’: the notion that social security should be restricted to Japanese nationals. Instead, the findings were more in keeping with Zincone’s (2011) work: the Japanese welfare regime is not particularly favourable or unfavourable towards migrants, but the strength and configuration of the regime may indeed influence the way in which migrants are treated.

Some of the focus group participants, particularly Filipino mothers, had made social security claims and none had spoken of experiencing a rejected claim. Although welfare stigma was evident in the way some of the focus group participants spoke about their experiences, or the experiences of other migrants, participants who claimed welfare assistance did not suggest that it was a particularly difficult process. However, this may be due to the fact that they received assistance in making their claims.

It is worth highlighting that social security seemed to be regarded as a less ‘legitimate’ form of economic capital than income earned through paid employment. This is evident in the permanent residence application process, as noted by one of the focus group participants, where those whose economic capital is derived through employment are looked upon more favourably than those who receive some level of state support. Many migrants could face a dilemma as a result of this policy—forced to choose between social security and security of residence status.

While this could be regarded as a form of governmentality—an implicit way for the government to discourage social security claims—it did not seem to be recognised as problematic by the focus group participants. Instead, claiming social security was

regarded as a moral failing and, against this backdrop, discouraging claims was viewed as an acceptable policy. Although it is beyond the scope of this study, this alludes to a narrative of welfare shame that seems to be part of the doxa of the Japanese welfare regime (Sutton et al. 2014).

Although welfare stigma is likely to affect all social security claimants, a recent court ruling has called foreign residents' entitlement to claim social security into question. The ruling found that local governments are not legally obliged to provide social security to non-Japanese nationals, as the legislation in its current form states that only *kokumin*—taken to mean 'Japanese nationals'—are legally entitled to claim welfare assistance (Osaki 2014). This means that local governments now have the authority to decide whether to continue with the status quo, or whether to restrict provision to *kokumin*. As yet, there is little sign that local governments will adopt a more restrictive approach, not least because it could propel many foreign residents into destitution, but this could change.

Scholars such as Chung believe that 'shifts in Japanese civil society following the 1995 Hanshin earthquake and the passage of the Nonprofit Organization (NPO) Law in 1998 have created subtle yet significant changes to the language of citizenship in Japan, so that foreign residents are increasingly recognized as citizens' (Chung 2010, 176). However, if local governments adopt more restrictive policies in the future, it could fundamentally change the relationship between foreign residents and the Japanese welfare state.

#### **8.2.4 Unravelling the conundrum of *tabunka kyōsei***

A number of scholars have commented on the ambiguous, and even contradictory, nature of *tabunka kyōsei* (Chapman 2006; Nakamatsu 2014), but how do we make sense of it? Following Medvetz's (2015) approach, I argue that conceiving of *tabunka kyōsei* as an evolving discourse that has emerged as the outcome of multiple, intersecting fields is one possible way of proceeding. Such an approach has the potential to make sense of the competing views in the literature in a more theoretically-grounded way.

Of particular pertinence to this study is the intersection between the field of immigration policy-making and the field of integration policy-making. The current

focus of immigration policies in Japan is to attract the ‘best and the brightest’, while allowing labour migrants to continue to work in various sectors. The findings of this study suggest that *tabunka kyōsei* is linked to the differential integration of these migrants into Japanese communities, but is less concerned with the needs of permanent residents such as *Zainichi* Koreans. Although all registered foreign residents in Japan are described as *gaikokujin jūmin*, this term seems to refer to more recent immigrants when used in conjunction with *tabunka kyōsei*, thereby excluding ‘special permanent residents’ such as *Zainichi* Koreans.

In addition, the terminology of integration policies and immigration policies seems to be heavily influenced by political discourse. For instance, while the term *imin* (meaning ‘immigrant’ or ‘immigration’) is used within academic discourse, the findings suggest that it is not used by government or non-government stakeholders in the field of integration policy-making, where the ‘power to name’ seems to have been monopolised by central government.

At the same time, we also need to pay attention to discourses operating in other fields, such as the field of welfare. As stated above, Kibe’s (2017) claim of a link between *tabunka kyōsei* and welfare restrictions was not supported by the findings of this study. However, it was clear from some of the focus group participants that other issues such as welfare stigma were affecting their decision making-process with regards to social security claims. Understanding the interactions between the welfare field and the field of integration policy-making could help explain how welfare discourses impinge on *tabunka kyōsei*, or vice versa.

While scholars and activists are happy to debate the representation of Japan as a ‘zero-immigration country’, this narrative persists at the national scale. Decades of assimilationist policies have allowed policymakers to continue to portray the Japanese citizenry as consisting uniquely of Japanese nationals (*kokumin*), aided by the the lack of statistics on the actual ethnonational diversity of Japanese nationals. Meanwhile, *tabunka kyōsei* seems to represent a mode of integration for foreign residents as denizens or quasi-citizens, but not as citizens. The exclusion of *Zainichi* communities from the narrative of *tabunka kyōsei* seems to reinforce this distinction. Hence, *tabunka kyōsei* seems to represent a first or second order change in Japan’s policy approach towards integration rather than a paradigm shift (Hall 1993). In other

words, there have been changes in the policy instruments used in integration policy-making and changes in the scale at which these policies are made, but no radical shift in Japan's approach to integration at the national scale.

### **8.3 Reconfiguring the governance of integration policies: critical junctures and 'new' actors**

#### **8.3.1 The institutionalisation of NPOs after the Kobe earthquake**

Despite a long history of activity by civil society organisations in Japan, it was only in the mid-late 1990s that these organisations became institutionalised through the 1998 NPO Law (*tokutei hieiri katsudō sokushin hō*). As specified NPOs, these institutions have continued to advocate for the implementation of integration policies at the national scale, while developing closer ties with local governments to deliver services to migrants. However, institutionalisation has come with a tacit acceptance of a degree of government oversight in exchange for tax-related benefits (economic capital) and greater recognition as legitimate service providers (symbolic capital). Hence, we should examine the circumstances that led to this institutionalisation more critically than has been the case in the literature on the subject to date.

Several interview participants confirmed that the Kobe earthquake (known as the Great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in Japan) was a 'critical juncture' in terms of its impact on integration policies in Japan. Here, I argue that this period changed the structure and balance of power between the state and civil society and fundamentally altered the way in which integration policies are made and implemented.

With over 6,400 casualties, hundreds of thousands of buildings destroyed and more than 200,000 people forced to find temporary shelter in other areas, the impact of the Kobe earthquake was catastrophic. The victims included a high number of migrants who were not prepared for the disaster and many 'visa overstayers' who were deemed ineligible for national government assistance (Takezawa 2008). Shaw and Goda (2004) note that the earthquake drew mass media attention to voluntary and non-governmental activities in Japan, as a result of the help provided by NGOs and over a million volunteers during the weeks that followed.

By the time of the earthquake, Japan was experiencing the effects of the 1990 amendment to the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in terms of a

growing number of ethnoculturally diverse migrants entering Japan, resulting in a relatively rapid rise in the foreign resident population stock from just under 1 million people in 1989 to 1.36 million by 1995 (see Figure 1.1). The vast majority of these new migrants were not proficient in Japanese, which was painfully evident in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake when many foreign residents struggled to access information that was only available in Japanese (Takezawa 2008).

Scholars such as Takao (2001) have noted that the Kobe earthquake encouraged a spate of volunteerism that allowed civil society organisations to renew calls for the legal recognition of civil society activities. The ‘policy window’ (Kingdon 1995) opened up by the disaster led to discussions, disagreements and negotiations between non-governmental actors, politicians and bureaucrats which eventually led to the enactment of the NPO Law in 1998 (for a fuller discussion of the process, see Takao 2001). As mentioned previously, the NPO Law liberalised the process for volunteer organisations to acquire legal status as ‘specified NPOs’ and hence benefit from tax breaks and access to public and private funding.

However, this was not the only outcome. Central government bureaucrats viewed the institutionalisation process as a way of delegating certain government functions to the soon-to-be non-profit sector. Despite efforts by some politicians to curb these bureaucratic impulses, Takao points out that civil society organisations still lost a certain level of autonomy in choosing to become specified NPOs.

The individuals and groups already participating in organized activities stand ready to exploit opportunities to take local initiative and voluntary action outside state control. However, even though they may operate independently and be transparently accountable in their activities, the projects such organizations undertake nonetheless must correspond with and satisfy the specific interests and concerns of those institutions and others who provide them with funds. Thus, it seems certain that the increasing availability of official funding will have a significant impact on the roles played by third-sector organizations. (Takao 2001, 292–93)

Seventy years prior to the Kobe earthquake, tens of thousands of lives were lost in the Great Kantō earthquake of 1923, but thousands more people were killed in the days that followed owing to a proliferation of pernicious rumours about Koreans in the Kantō region. Newspaper reports suggested that Koreans were taking advantage of the destruction through various nefarious activities which had little basis in fact (Yoshimura 2004).



This turn of events contrasts sharply with the events of the mid–late 1990s. While the earlier earthquake created an opportunity for state-sanctioned violence, the media attention given to volunteerism during the Kobe earthquake paved the way for civil society organisations to gain formal recognition as NPOs. As the power of civil society actors grew after 1995, associations which had been set up to support migrants and other foreign residents in Japan were now able to become specified NPOs. With the symbolic capital conferred on these organisations by the NPO Law, migrant-supporting NPOs seem to have gained a stronger foothold within integration policy-making processes than civil society groups which lack this symbolic capital.

Although many groups have chosen to remain ‘outside the system’, hundreds of NPOs now exist to advocate on behalf of migrants and to provide services and support to foreign residents, often with some level of local government coordination or cooperation. Although their political capital is still relatively weak in comparison to local governments, and other actors such as *Keidanren*, these NPOs have been able to use their institutional legitimacy to increase the range of social policy provision available to foreign residents in Japan and to challenge central government on integration policies (as discussed in the next section).

The findings of this study reinforce the suggestion that *tabunka kyōsei* was able to gain traction quite quickly during the window of opportunity created by the disaster, first as an ideal, then as a policy approach (Takezawa 2008). The term was quickly adopted by newly formed NPOs and an increasing number of local governments in the late 1990s, and was later incorporated into central government discourse with the publication of the TKS report (Aiden 2011).

As Pierson (2003) suggests, however, it is important that we analyse earthquakes and other ecological events using appropriate time horizons, rather than shoehorning them into ‘temporal structures’ that are based on our own assumptions about event sequences and the links between events. That is to say, when we consider the outcomes of the Kobe earthquake, we should not discount the importance of all the incremental changes that gradually led to the institutionalisation of NPOs in Japan.

### 8.3.2 Engaging central government, rescaling integration policies

Looking at the development of Japan's integration policies from the early 2000s to the present day, it is clear that local governments have been able to use their social capital (in terms of their ability to mobilise central government actors) and their political capital (in terms of being able to recommend 'credible' policy solutions) to bring about incremental changes that have led to the emergence of integration policies at the national scale. Unlike previous scholars who have argued that local governments have more or less developed integration policies in a vacuum left by the lack of central government involvement (Nagy 2008), I suggest that this is an outdated view of integration policy development in Japan.

Through the course of the nineties and into the new millennium, local governments gradually reached a point where they felt that much greater change was needed at the national scale and it seems that they were able to contribute towards such policy changes. For example, by the time of the Hamamatsu Declaration it had become clear that the registration system for foreign residents was no longer fit for purpose (see chapter two). Local governments seemed keen to press their ministerial counterparts for central government support to deal with these issues.

However, what is also clear from the findings is that local governments lacked the political capital on their own to call for changes. This is evident in the development of the *tabunka kyōsei* promotion plan by the TKSK, which was itself the result of combined lobbying from the GSTK and other government and non-governmental actors (though it is impossible to say which actors were most influential). However, it was not until the *Keizai Zaisei Shimon Kaigi* ('Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy', hereafter the CEFPP) took the plan on board that it was able to gain traction. At the time, the CEFPP was an influential 'supra-ministerial' agency directly accountable to the Prime Minister (Yamawaki 2007). Its adoption of the ideas developed by the TKSK generated the political capital needed to create the first cross-ministerial integration policy in 2006—a comprehensive policy concerning foreigners as members of society ('*seikatsusha to shite no gaikokujin*' *ni kansuru sōgōteki taiōsaku*). As Komine notes, 'Japan's integration policy was first established in 2006 and gradually thickened thereafter as new measures were layered on top of old ones' (Komine 2014, 209).

While the institutionalisation of NPOs was an important development for integration policies in Japan, the increasing involvement of central government actors through the 2000s has, I would argue, fundamentally reconfigured the field of integration policy-making. Although the events of the 2000s have been documented by several scholars (Komine 2014; Milly 2014), this section reconsiders that period in terms of its impact on the configuration of governance over integration policy-making.

Milly (2014, 72–73) notes that several actors lobbied the national government in the early 2000s, following a decade of increased migration flows into Japan which led to a relatively rapid increase in the number of foreign residents living in Japan compared with previous decades. While the NPO interview participants in this study felt that it has been difficult to effect policy change under Prime Minister Abe, actors at the turn of the millennium saw opportunities to gain traction with the Koizumi administration.

As we have just discussed, civil society organisations were active within the field of integration policy-making even before the NPO Law, but the field still lacked a strong central government presence. This lack of central government involvement has been acknowledged by several scholars (including Tegtmeier Pak 2000), but this situation seems to have changed gradually over the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

As noted in chapter two, a number of organisations developed policy positions in the early years of the Koizumi administration, including the GSTK, *Ijūren* and migration studies scholars based at Japanese institutions. This study has found that the TKSK included NPO representatives such as Tamura Tarō, whose NPO was one of the first (if not the first) to adopt the term *tabunka kyosei*. Three academics were also present in the TKSK—Yamawaki Keizō, Kashiwazaki Chikako and Angelo Ishi—two of whom wrote an influential pro-migrant policy paper before joining the committee (see Yamawaki, Kondō, and Kashiwazaki 2001). The TKSK also included a representative from Yokkaichi City, one of the members of the GSTK, and a representative from Gunma Prefecture, which is home to two member cities of the GSTK.

There are several points to note here. To start with, this array of local government and non-governmental actors—akin to the kind of horizontal associational network that Dingwerth (2004) has spoken of—were able to use their collective capital to

formally draw the MIC into a more active integration policy-making role, which fundamentally altered the governance of integration policy-making in Japan. Arguably, it would have been difficult for local governments and other actors to consistently call for national policy changes without firm central government commitment to the integration agenda. Although the formation of an agency with formal responsibility for developing integration policies has still not been fully realised (as urged by the GSTK and others) the acceptance of responsibility for those policies by the MIC, however partial, has rescaled the nature of integration policy-making in Japan. While the *raison d'être* for the first report of the TKS was to urge local governments to formulate or continue to develop local policies, it also paved the way for a more comprehensive national approach to integration (Aiden 2011).

Numerous scholars have commented on the involvement of the MIC in integration policies from the 2000s onward, but it is also worth noting that some of the actors who helped secure the Ministry's involvement were then able to influence the direction of the TKS report as members of the research committee tasked with producing it. In other words, the political capital that those actors had gained by lobbying central government was rewarded with closer involvement in the policy-making process.

The development of further integration policies seems to have stalled under the incumbent Abe administration, but there are good reasons to believe that this will not remain the case in the long run. With the involvement of central and local government, NPOs, businesses and academics in the development and implementation of integration policies, it is difficult to imagine that these actors would want to dismantle their links and relinquish their authority in the field of integration policy-making. While some actors, such as *Keidanren*, can focus their attention on other policy issues, other actors are dedicated to integration-related issues. It is likely that these actors will continue to push for national integration policies when further windows of opportunity open up.

### **8.3.3 Towards a better understanding of governance reconfigurations**

Most accounts of integration policies and policy-making in Japan begin by pointing out that the lack of national government in this arena left a void that was eventually filled by local governments and civil society organisations—an outcome at least

partly attributable to the campaigning efforts of *Zainichi* Koreans (Chung 2010). As part of this narrative, the Kobe earthquake response is often seen as a prime example of cooperation at the local scale and the unconditional support offered by civil society actors to foreigners affected by the disaster (Shaw and Goda 2004; Takezawa 2008).

More recent accounts acknowledge the role that the national government has played since 2006, following the publication of the TKSK report (Aiden 2011; Komine 2014; Milly 2014). However, what has been lacking is a theoretically-grounded exploration of how and why the configuration of governance has changed.

This study has shown that the key developments of the 1990s and 2000s can be reconsidered from a field analytical perspective. The institutionalisation of NPOs, as precipitated by the Kobe earthquake, allowed certain migrant-supporting organisations, such as *Ijūren*, to exchange symbolic capital for a modicum of political capital. As discussed above, migrant-supporting organisations with the status of specified NPOs, along with local governments, organisations representing business interests and influential academics, were able to use their capital to catalyse central government involvement in integration policy-making.

While scholars such as Milly have described the governance of integration policy-making as multilevel governance—which she depicts as ‘the trend of dispersing power away from central states and the increasing role of collaborative networks in governance, regardless of the role of supranational organizations’ (Milly 2014, 4)—I would argue that this is problematic. Aside from the conceptual problems with multilevel governance that are discussed in earlier chapters, the decentralisation of power is not an accurate description for the nascent governance of integration policy-making in Japan. Instead, this governance evolved from a predominantly local-scale phenomenon into a multi-scalar configuration.

Speaking to the broader literature on governance, this study reinforces the findings of other studies (Scholten et al. 2018), which highlight the relevance of the agency of local governments in the development of a multi-scalar configuration of governance. Unlike previous studies, however, this study demonstrates the value of using a field-based approach to examine how and why governance configurations change. While the social and political capital of local governments alone was insufficient to garner

central government interest in integration policy-making, the collective efforts of multiple actors in this field amounted to greater capital leverage. The additional leverage was sufficiently high as to lead to a governance reconfiguration.

The next section discusses the strategies employed by governmental and non-governmental actors to achieve policy preferences at a local scale, through efforts to influence governance processes at other scales, particularly the national scale. However, the findings of this study also point to the strategies used by central government to resist these influencing activities.

## **8.4 Integration policy-making at the national scale: policy influencing strategies**

### **8.4.1 Influencing strategies used by local governments and NPOs**

As discussed in chapter four, in many of Bourdieu's own studies the field he constructed was often characterised by a bipolar economic/cultural structure, which was used to differentiate between actors who were rich in economic capital but lacked cultural capital, and vice versa. Depending on the forms of capital that were valued by the dominant actors, which forms they were able to accumulate, and based on those actors' dominance in relation to one another, Bourdieu was able to construct the field in question.

Within this study, the findings do not suggest that constructing the field along economic–cultural lines would help us better understand the motivations of actors within the field of integration policy-making. While both cultural capital and economic capital appear to be relevant to the field, they do not seem to be the principal forms of capital within the field.

Instead, the findings suggest that two forms of capital are particularly important for the struggle to influence integration policies in Japan: political capital and informational capital. Whereas political capital allows its holders to define the politics of integration policy-making and, ultimately, to define integration policies at some scale, informational capital endows its holders with a seemingly 'authentic' understanding of the integration issues affecting 'foreigners' in Japan. While other forms of capital are also important (including economic capital and social capital) a discussion of the role of political and informational capital may help us better

understand the relationships between, and behaviours of, the key actors involved in the development of integration policies.

The importance of political capital is clear in the case of network organisations like the GSTK and *Ijūren*. By channelling their political capital through the GSTK, several local governments have been able to gain more influence than they otherwise would have, as pointed out by one of its representatives.

The GSTK has had various successes, but one of particular interest is its contribution towards the reform of the Alien Registration Act. In 2005 and 2006, the GSTK submitted formal requests for regulatory change to the Council for Regulatory Reform (CRR). Founded in 2001, again under the Koizumi administration, the CRR recommended the GSTK's requests in its reports to the Cabinet. The recommendations were approved, leading to the rescindment of the Alien Registration Act in 2009. From 2012, the foreigner registration system was subsumed into the national registration system (*jūmin kihon daichō* or 'basic resident registry'), thereby eliminating the differences in terms of registration for Japanese and non-Japanese nationals. Administratively speaking, at least, this was another step forward in terms of integration (Komine 2014).

While local governments appear to be positioned somewhere in-between the political and informational 'poles' of the integration policy-making field, the findings suggest that NPOs possess lower levels of political capital than other actors in the field and are more geared towards accumulating informational capital. Perhaps a greater level of political capital would enable NPOs and other migrant-supporting organisations to challenge central government more effectively in the long run. In the short-term, however, it appears as if NPOs have tacitly accepted the configuration of governance in the integration policy-making field as it currently appears.

Although NPOs have engaged in direct lobbying with central government actors, the interview findings suggest that others have tried to use alternative 'strategies of succession' to gain influence. In particular, it was found that *Ijūren* is lobbying not only institutions based in Japan, but also transnational institutions. For example, *Ijūren* has been lobbying the United Nations (via the Migrant Forum in Asia) to urge the Japanese government to reform the working visa system. This example highlights a clear difference between NPOs and local governments in their advocacy strategies.

While local governments have greater political capital than NPOs, they also seem to be constrained in the ways that they can lobby government. NPOs, on the other hand, are more willing to use innovative channels to try and leverage more political capital, as *Ijūren* has demonstrated. Of course, this may just be a case of necessity being the mother of invention. With ‘conventional’ lobbying channels not yielding the results that NPOs desire, NPOs might have been compelled to try less conventional routes.

Organisations such as *Ijūren* have forged their own transnational links and networks in order to influence policies at the national scale. This includes lobbying the United Nations (via the Migrant Forum in Asia or MFA) to urge the Japanese Government to reform the working visa system. The organisation has also developed links with the Asian Migrant Centre: a regional NGO based in Hong Kong, which engages in action-oriented research, capacity-building activities and advocacy in relation to the rights of migrants in Asia. Since 2002, the AMC has enjoyed a Special Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations. In addition, *Ijūren* also has ties with its Korean counterpart, the Joint Committee for Migrant Workers in Korea (JCMK).

Despite these links, *Ijūren* has only had limited success in effecting change at the national scale. While one of the interview participants suggested that this was due to the absence of a transnational institution such as the EU, the transnational actors that are in situ have limited political capital within the field of integration policy-making. Even the focus group participants felt that foreign national governments, as represented by embassies and consulates general within Japan, lacked the economic capital to be effective in supporting their expatriate citizens.

By developing social capital at a transnational scale, as well as at a national and subnational scale, NPOs seem to be trying to leverage their multi-scalar relationships to gain political traction on integration issues. Although it is difficult to evaluate this strategy in comparison to other possible strategies, it seems fair to argue that NPOs are trying to make the most of the capital available to them. There are also precedents for this kind of activity within the EU (Borkert and Penninx 2011). However, as the interviewees in this study were keen to point out, the one thing that (East) Asia very much lacks is a transnational institution like the EU.



Although the findings from this study cannot be generalised to other policy areas, they tie in with those of Tsujinaka and Pekkanen (2007), who suggest that NPOs in Japan are generally more focused on service provision than policy-formation activities. However, while the evidence on advocacy activities by civil society organisations presented here is only a small part of the overall picture, there are reasons to believe that these activities are not as niche as older studies have suggested (cf. Tsujinaka and Pekkanen 2007), nor confined to the boundaries of the Japanese nation-state (cf. Vogt and Lersch 2007). More recent studies suggest that migrant-supporting NPOs are increasingly engaging in advocacy activities, including activities involving transnational actors (Kremers 2014), and the findings from this study support that view.

Furthermore, while Vogt and Lersch (2007) argue that policy advocacy among Japanese migrant-supporting organisations is passive, this may be largely due to the limited resources (particularly economic capital) that these organisations possess. As noted previously, the majority of Japanese NPOs are small organisations with fewer than six members of staff, who generally receive lower salaries than their private sector counterparts. By channelling their advocacy activities through umbrella organisations such as *Ijūren*, these NPOs are able to amplify their collective capital (informational or otherwise) to lobby central government actors more effectively.

#### **8.4.2 Advisory committees: where informational capital meets political capital**

Although ‘advisory committees’ are frequently mentioned in the integration policy literature in Japan, few if any studies explore the roles these committees play in the policy-making process, despite a long history of research on the topic (Harari 1997; Schwartz 2001). However, it is clear from other policy areas that committees play an important role in policy change (on policies towards older people, for instance, see Campbell 2014).

One way in which actors seem to be converting their informational capital into gains in political capital is through advisory committees. As noted in the findings, representatives of certain organisations have been able to gain a seat at the discussion table by dint of their possession of informational capital. This has been particularly evident in the TKSK, to which ‘experts’ were invited to help formulate the first plan

to promote *tabunka kyōsei* in local regions (see Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006).

We could therefore conceive of these committees as spaces where one form of capital is converted to another; more specifically, spaces where informational capital allows committee members to engage in discussions with governmental actors whose political capital is relatively greater. The apparent success of the TSKS, in terms of the roll-out of their policy proposals, suggests that the capital transactions in this particular case were relatively successful for the actors involved.

Alternatively, we could also view these spaces as boundary spaces. Such a conceptualisation would be in keeping with Scholten's (2011) discussion on the policy–research nexus, where he investigates the boundary between the integration policy-making field and the academic field. Scholten's discussion of the establishment of the government-associated Advisory Committee on Minorities Research (ACOM) in the Netherlands, as well as parliamentary committees, is particularly pertinent in this regard.

As the findings have indicated, the TSKS has played an important role in the development of integration policies, but advisory committees and 'expert advisors' have seldom been the subject of scrutiny within migration studies. As Harari (1997) points out, the rationale for this institution is that they provide impartial advice and provide a space for deliberation between government and non-government experts in a given policy area, including academics but also those with some form of professional experience. Yet, one question remains: are they 'sufficiently free of government control to achieve their formal goals' (Harari 1997, 18)?

Against this backdrop, we may wish to consider what 'government control' looks like: whether advisors feel they can act and speak freely on the issues in question. I would argue that some level of government control is inevitable. In contrast to the influencing strategies described previously, the members of these committees are carefully selected by central government officials. Among other things, government officials seem to have free reign in choosing committee members and it is anyone's guess what discussions may accompany their deliberations behind the scenes. One would also expect government departments or working groups to set parameters for advisory committees, but that would not necessarily constitute the kind of control

that Harari is talking about. These committees are formally recognised by the departments or ministries which create them, which instantly endows them with the legitimacy (symbolic capital) that other policy influencing groups may lack. In essence this is a ‘conservation strategy’—the ministry is bringing in expertise (informational capital) but in a controlled way.

Within the field of integration policy-making, actors within the field may be affected by a similar habitus: tendencies to perceive and to react to issues within the field in a similar way. That is, constraints on the behaviour of advisory experts may not just be structural, they may also be cognitive. Depending on the strength of the habitus, committee members may manifest similar attitudes or behaviours even without explicit government control over the advisory committee. For example, if immigrants are persistently constructed as anything but ‘immigrants’ (see above), all subsequent discussions will follow suit unless that construction is challenged. As Dubois suggests, ‘ad hoc committees set up to address a particular problem or domain can be analysed as the objectivation of the “hard core” of the field in question’ (Dubois 2014b, 207).

Within social policy, there is a long history of discussions on the dual role that many social policy scholars play: scrutinising policy on the one hand, while seeking to engage with policymakers on the other. As Bourdieu constantly reminds us, however, academics are no less prone to the socialising effects of habitus than other people unless they engage in reflexive practices (see, for instance, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Committees composed of academic and non-academic ‘experts’ alike should not be considered beyond the purview of scholarly inquiry. Rather, they should be scrutinised with the same critical gaze that academics ought to apply to all objects of study.

#### **8.4.3 The dynamics of policy-influencing strategies**

For some scholars, governance involves cooperation and coordination through formal and informal networks of actors (Rhodes 1996; Rhodes 1997). However, the network concept of governance, and how best it should be analysed, remains somewhat problematic and unclear. As Marsh and Smith (2000) argue in terms of policy outcomes, it is unclear how much explanation is down to the existence of a particular network, and what it is about that network that delivers certain outcomes.

The findings of this study suggest that local governments and NPOs have used their networks to influence integration policies at the national scale. Some, albeit limited, success has been observed where local governments (acting through the GSTK) have been the instigators of policy-influencing strategies, but the strategies of NPO networks (especially *Ijūren*) seem to have been less successful.

In previous studies, such strategies have been viewed through the lens of ‘venue shopping’, which refers to the tendency for policymakers to seek new venues for policy-making that are more amenable to their goals and preferences if they encounter obstacles in their conventional policy venue (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). This study contributes to the literature on lobbying and policy influencing by suggesting that the political capital, as well as the social capital, of policymakers can help explain why certain strategies are more likely to succeed.

Local governments generally possess more political capital than (specified) NPOs in the field of integration policy-making. While the interests of local governments may align with those of NPOs, local governments are more likely to seek relationships with actors rich in political capital. Hence, local governments would be expected to use their social capital to forge alliances with other local governments or government agencies that are relatively well endowed with political capital.

While other scholars have focused on the activities of national or local government actors (Guiraudon 2000; Scholten et al. 2018), this study has also shone a light on the activities of NPOs. NPOs have less political capital at their disposal than local government actors, for instance, which means that even NPO networks such as *Ijūren* may lack the leverage they need to influence policies at the national scale. This may help explain why actors such as *Ijūren* have developed transnational links in a bid to enhance their leverage. It is quite likely that developing and maintaining transnational networks is a resource-intensive process, which suggests that the political capital gained from these ventures would have to be used in a targeted way.

The activities of central government actors have also been scrutinised in this study, particularly through the use of advisory committees. These ‘venues’ allow central government actors to draw on the informational capital of ‘experts’ in exchange for greater political input. However, central government control over advisory committees means that any policy proposals put forward by committees can be

rejected, whereas the knowledge and expertise that central government actors gain from these transactions is a commodity that helps maintain their authority over integration policies at the national scale.

## **8.5 Integration policy-making at the local scale**

### **8.5.1 NPOs and local governments: policy implementation and informational capital**

For much of the second half of the twentieth century, cities such as Osaka (and indeed smaller cities within Osaka Prefecture such as Yao and Toyonaka) seem to have pushed the boundaries of what they could do under existing national policies that were not specifically aimed at foreign residents. In fact, scholars such as Chung (2010) have shown that many of these changes were achieved through the efforts of *Zainichi* activists and migrant-supporting organisations in the postwar period, calling for greater equality in areas such as education. Since the 1980s, local governments have developed their own local policies and initiatives to address some of the issues affecting migrants and other foreign residents in Japan and continue to do so (albeit with problematic constructions of non-Japanese ethnonationals).

Across the interviews it became apparent that local governments are working more closely with NPOs in terms of implementing and delivering policies that are directed towards foreign residents at the local scale. This increasing coordination between the two sets of actors was apparent in both Osaka and Yokohama and their corresponding prefectures.

Yet, as Milly (2014) notes, local governments and NPOs are also able to expand and flex the scope and coverage of particular policies through their interpretation and implementation of those policies. For example, local governments may try to expand the scope or coverage of a particular policy or they could work with NPOs to ensure that more migrants access the services or support provided under a given policy or initiative. This is clearly the case in relation to social security and healthcare, where local governments and NPOs have taken steps to support migrants to make claims or to access medical services (with the support of interpreters) which they otherwise may forgo.

The research findings also suggest that NPOs and local governments have also been engaged in accumulating and leveraging knowledge and expertise on issues affecting foreign residents (informational capital), particularly less established migrants. For example, the interviews revealed that local governments have employed questionnaire surveys for understanding the problems facing migrants living under their jurisdiction, while NPOs seem to have relied on insights from service users or clients to gauge policy issues.

Both Osaka and Yokohama City and their corresponding prefectures have undertaken surveys to investigate the ‘needs’ of foreign residents. In carrying out these surveys, local governments have essentially been building up their stock of informational capital. The rational explanation for these activities is that local governments need this information to better understand the issues affecting migrants and hence provide more tailored services. However, the design and delivery of the surveys reviewed for this study (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2015; Yokohama-shi Seisaku-kyoku 2014) seemed to be very one-sided. Although the surveys were translated into multiple languages, the questions betrayed a sense of knowing what the problems were a priori. In other words, these surveys seem to have been used to *confirm* rather than to *explore* needs.

In addition, the surveys also betrayed a sense of the negative attitudes that are pervasive in Japanese society. For example, an issue raised by several interview participants was that foreigners do not know how to dispose of rubbish properly, implying that they need to be taught how to do so. This issue has been consistently used by Japanese ethnonationals as an example of the ‘trouble’ or community tensions precipitated by the presence of ‘foreigners’ in Japan (Tsuda 2006b). The survey questions were used to confirm the existence of the problem, rather than to find out if or why the problem exists.

Much of the informational capital gathered by local governments and NPOs seems to have been circulated between these actors, through networks, conferences and other kinds of meetings. Tegtmeier Pak (2006) refers to these as examples of ‘horizontal policy diffusion’. By way of comparison, even within the EU the most important policy instruments for the development of integration policies are regarded as being

the collection and exchange of information and good practice and the mobilisation of civil society actors (Süssmuth and Weidenfeld 2005).

Critically, local governments, NPOs and other migrant-supporting organisations seem to be gaining as much from this process as migrants are, if not more so. In providing advice to migrants and in carrying out surveys and other forms of data collection, these actors are gaining informational capital which they can use to advocate for policy change. Ostensibly, this is to call for changes that may improve the lives of migrants. Yet, this extraction of knowledge and expertise from migrants only serves to exclude foreign residents from the policy-making processes in which they too have a genuine stake.

### **8.5.2 Local executive influence on integration policies**

Previous studies exploring the role of local government or local governance in relation to policies affecting migrants and other foreign residents in Japan have seldom explored the role of governors or mayors. The findings from this study indicate that local executives in the prefectures of Kanagawa and Osaka have had an appreciable input into the direction and development of policies aimed at local residents. As one of the interview participants noted, without support for *tabunka kyōsei* from key actors within local governments, including the local executive, policies designed to support foreign residents are unlikely to be implemented.

In the case of Yokohama City, the Governor of Kanagawa from the 1970s through to the 1990s appears to have had a considerable bearing on the framing of local policies under the banner of *minsai gaikō* ('people-to-people diplomacy'). Arguably, Governor Nagasu set the tone for Yokohama to develop a range of policies aimed at turning the city into a 'global city' (Minsai Gaikō 10-nenshi Kikaku Henshū Iinkai 1990). While this policy agenda seems to have started life as a way of effecting greater international cooperation at a subnational level, it does not seem to have been as strongly associated with the economic imperative that has defined other internationalisation policies (Hook and Weiner 1992). Kashiwazaki (2003) believes that *minsai gaikō* gave cities within Kanagawa prefecture a framework with which to respond more quickly to rising immigration in the 1990s and this suggestion seems to have been endorsed by one of the interview participants from Yokohama City (see chapter six).

By contrast, the recent mayors of Osaka City seem to have expressed little interest in the issues affecting foreign residents in the city, as suggested by the Osaka-based interview participants. Instead, Mayor Hashimoto and his successor appear to have been more preoccupied with Osaka's economic development and with plans to turn Osaka Prefecture into a metropolis organised along the same lines as the Tokyo Metropolitan Area.

Jou (2015) suggests that support for Hashimoto's regional political party—*Ōsaka Ishin no Kai*, known as the 'Osaka Restoration Association' or 'One Osaka' in English—has been motivated primarily by support for his charismatic leadership than for the policies that the party espouses. Unlike Nagasu, Hashimoto's stance has been one of opposition towards special interest groups and the local bureaucracy, while promoting the interests of taxpayers (Sunahara 2012). This libertarian narrative was echoed by one of the interview participants, who felt that foreign residents who pay their taxes deserve to receive the same services as Japanese nationals—but the interviewee gave no thought to the additional disadvantages that migrants may face as non-Japanese nationals.

The economic development narrative supported by Hashimoto was also apparent in the internal structures of Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City (see Table 6.1). Within Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, responsibility for integration policies lay with departments that were also in charge of wider economic or 'urban appeal' strategies. In Kanagawa Prefecture, by contrast, integration policies were located in a department that focused on the lives of prefectural residents as a whole. Yokohama City had a specific department for 'international' issues, possibly reflecting the influence of *minsai gaikō* on government administration in the city. These differences highlight divergent practices in terms of where formal responsibility lies for *tabunka kyōsei* or internationalisation-related policies.

Overall, the findings on the power of the local executive chime with those of older studies, which have suggested that local government chief executives in Japan have greater discretion over policy coordination than may be expected from such a centralised system (Reed 1982). Other studies have documented the interest shown by local government chief executives in the implementation of certain policy areas, such as the field of social care (Eto 2001). However, more work could be done to



explore the symbolic and political capital of mayors and governors and how they use that capital (or not, as the case may be) to promote or tackle policy issues such as integration.

### **8.5.3 The implementation of *tabunka kyōsei* at the local scale**

Yokohama and Osaka are among two of the 400 prefectures and municipalities that have developed their own ‘*tabunka kyōsei* promotion plans’ as urged by the TKSK report (Tabunka Kyōsei no Suishin ni kansuru Kenkyūkai 2006). The prevalence of the plans notwithstanding, what is particularly relevant is how *tabunka kyōsei* is applied in those plans.

The findings of this study suggest that there are clear signs of convergence in the implementation of education policies and Japanese language learning policies as part of *tabunka kyōsei* plans, but there is also some divergence. The 2007 Yokohama City plan acknowledges the language of *tabunka kyōsei* but is framed in terms of ‘building a community rich in internationality’ (*kokusaisei yutakana machizukuri*). This seems to cohere with the rhetoric of *minsai gaikō*, as discussed above, which seems to have given a cosmopolitan air to *tabunka-kyōsei*-based activities in Yokohama.

In Osaka City, the 2009 integration plan points towards the realisation of a ‘society of coexistence’ (*kyōsei shakai*), involving ‘respect for the human rights of foreign nationals’, the ‘realisation of a society of multicultural coexistence’ and ‘community participation’ (Osaka-shi Shimin-kyoku 2009). However, all eleven items that appear under the theme of *tabunka kyōsei* are related to education policies (including learning the Japanese language), while other social policy areas appear under the theme of ‘respect for human rights’. Put simply, Osaka City views *tabunka kyōsei* as a way of framing education policies towards migrant children.

The reasons for this may be historic. There is a rich history of *Zainichi* activism in Osaka, with *Zainichi* Koreans demanding the right to a Korean education within the public school system (Okano 2008). Despite local government resistance, the Korean community worked with educators to organise special classes outside the ordinary school curriculum to foster Korean children’s awareness of their ethnic identity. As a

result, Osaka has, since 1992, appropriated a budget for these classes, which have been steadily increasing in number (Kashiwazaki 2003).

Osaka and Yokohama illustrate that the policies associated with *tabunka kyōsei* at a national scale have not been adopted in an identical fashion at a local scale. While educational activities have been promoted under the banner of *tabunka kyōsei* in both cities, the wider scope of activities in each city seems to be contingent on local contexts. This is particularly clear in the case of Yokohama, where *tabunka kyōsei* seems to have been framed in terms of *minsai gaikō*.

#### **8.5.4 Participatory governance at the local scale**

There are notable differences between Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Kanagawa Prefecture in terms of their approaches to participatory governance, namely the ways in which they engage foreign residents in integration policy-making processes as discussed in chapter two.

There is a strong difference between the approach taken by Osaka City and that taken by Kanagawa Prefecture. While the latter provides a council where foreign residents can raise issues and try to influence the policy-making process, albeit without statutory backing, Osaka City seemed to have no comparable forum in which foreign residents can participate.

Kanagawa has been among the leaders in implementing foreign resident-related policies. In 1998, the prefecture launched the Kanagawa Foreign Residents' Council as an advisory body to the governor, with the stipulation that its policy recommendations be incorporated in the formulation of internationalisation policies (Kashiwazaki 2003; Shipper 2008, 150–54). On the whole, conditions in the prefecture seem to have been conducive to the development of policies towards foreign residents, especially under the auspices of *minsai gaikō*.

Osaka Prefecture seems to have developed an approach combining aspects of both of the aforementioned approaches, incorporating a selection of experts with a mix of Japanese and non-Japanese ethnonational backgrounds.

### 8.5.5 Modes of integration at the local scale

Much of the literature on integration in the Japanese context has focused on integration at the national scale, but a growing number of studies have used case studies to better understand how integration policies are made and implemented in cities and prefectures across Japan (Tegtmeyer Pak 2000; Kashiwazaki 2003; Nagy 2012; Milly 2014). These studies suggest that prefectures and cities have promoted foreign residents' integration through services relating to welfare, language support, advice, education, outreach and cultural exchange, in addition to municipal antidiscrimination ordinances and limited political participation through foreign resident councils or similar forums.

Tsuda rightly recognises that the rights afforded under local citizenship are likely to vary from locality to locality (Tsuda 2006c). For example, the residents of Yokohama cannot be expected to receive exactly the same services as those of Osaka. In addition, this study has found that the policies associated with *tabunka kyōsei* at a national scale have not been adopted in an identical fashion in Osaka and Yokohama. There are clear signs of convergence in the implementation of education policies and Japanese language learning policies as part of *tabunka kyōsei* plans, but there is also some divergence, which is likely to originate from the specific circumstances of each city. For example, *Zainichi* activism seems to have had a strong impact on local services in Osaka.

There are also marked differences between Osaka Prefecture, Osaka City and Kanagawa Prefecture in terms of their approaches to participatory governance. Policy-making structures in Kanagawa Prefecture seem to be more conducive to the involvement of foreign residents in policy-making compared with comparable structures in Osaka City. The findings indicate that this may be due to the impact of local leadership.

Previous studies exploring the role of local government or local governance, in the development of policies affecting migrants and other foreign residents, have seldom explored the role of executive leadership at the local scale, as effected by governors or mayors. The findings from this study indicate that local executives in the prefectures of Kanagawa and Osaka might have influenced the direction and development of policies aimed at local residents.

As noted in the findings, these differences are also discernible in the internal structures of the local governments in the study sites. With the notable exception of Kashiwazaki (2003), few scholars have explored local government structures in detail, despite the clues these administrative arrangements can give us about the nature of politics and policy-making at a local scale.

Another issue that seems to have received scant attention in the literature is the issue of delegation. As mentioned in chapter four, increasing reliance on delegates (such as ‘community leaders’) poses a risk to migrants in the form of dispossession of political influence. This study suggests that local governments and NPOs have been able to capitalise on the knowledge and expertise (informational capital) that they have gained at the frontline, but the gains to migrants are not immediately clear. While integration policies at the national scale may well improve as a result of local government and NPO advocacy efforts, a greater number of migrants may become increasingly removed from policy-making processes as a result of delegation. This lack of representation warrants further attention.

## **8.6 Migrant capital: negotiating structure and agency at the local scale**

### **8.6.1 Migrants and the policy-making process**

The field of integration policy-making in Japan is characterised by competing narratives. While one set of narratives objectifies migrants as passive policy targets or subjects, an alternative narrative has developed which views migrants as key stakeholders or players—or, to paraphrase Takao (2003), going from ‘beneficiaries’ to ‘participants’. Under the latter, migrants are portrayed as wanting to play a greater role in decisions that affect their settlement and integration in Japanese communities.

This is partly evident in the role that migrants are playing in service delivery, both as staff and as volunteers. As one interview participant pointed out, a higher proportion of interpreters are now migrants as opposed to Japanese ethnonationals. It is likely that this was borne out of necessity (due to the growing presence of immigrants in Japan) rather than an active policy of recruitment. Nevertheless, it opens up the possibility that migrants may play a more active role in other spheres of life and

potentially gain a little more influence in terms of the future delivery of integration policies.

Other changes make this seem increasingly likely, at least within some cities. One is the policy pursued by certain local governments since the 1980s or 1990s which has allowed foreign residents, particularly special permanent residents, to hold senior positions within some local governments, such as those of Osaka, Kobe and Kawasaki (Chung 2010, 42). Moreover, despite central government reluctance to allow foreign residents to vote in local elections, many local governments have passed ordinances to allow foreign residents to vote in local referendums on issues such as ‘municipal mergers’ or *shichōson gappei* (Mie 2014). Even though the results are not legally binding, some policymakers and academics have questioned the constitutionality of these inclusive referendums. This may be due to concern that local governments are acting *ultra vires*, or because it undermines political opposition to local suffrage for foreign residents.

While voting is one way to influence local politics and policies, participatory governance provide another seemingly democratic route to involve migrants in policy-making processes at the local scale. The creation of councils for foreign residents in cities such as Kawasaki, and prefectures such as Osaka and Kanagawa, has ostensibly given foreign residents a greater voice in the policy-making process. For example, one of the focus group participants was found to have submitted a proposal to Kanagawa Foreign Resident Assembly to provide more medical interpreters. Her positive experience of being an assembly member, combined with her wait-and-see attitude, was in keeping with previous scholarship which has highlighted the possibilities and limitations of these assemblies (S.-M. Han 2004). However, as noted in the previous section, not all cities have these structures in place and there is no statutory requirement to keep these forums going.

Despite the fact that migrants possess intimate knowledge of the issues and challenges they face, they seem unable to convert this knowledge into informational capital. First and foremost, informational capital must have a veneer of credibility: any evidence on which informational capital is based must be derived from the experiences of several hundred migrants, it seems. How this informational capital is gathered, and by whom, is another matter. Clearly, local governments are more likely

to have the resources needed to gather large amounts of data than individuals. However, civil society organisations may also be able to gather these kinds of data, particularly if they are relatively well-resourced.

Of course, we should also consider the possibility that NGOs or NPOs may be led or managed by people with a migrant background. While the fieldwork carried out for this study gave the impression that smaller NPOs and civil society organisations may indeed be led by non-Japanese ethnonationals—including some of the participants in this study—the fact remains that influential organisations such as *Ijūren* are, by and large, managed by Japanese ethnonationals. This situation could change in the future, but for now it seems that migrants' positions in the field of integration policy-making are not conducive to accumulating either informational capital or political capital.

Alongside the 'active stakeholder' narrative, there also seems to be a normative narrative of responsabilisation. This narrative suggests that migrants should take more responsibility for the issues that they face and should play a more active part in tackling these issues—the underlying assumption being that migrants have actively chosen not to participate. This was evident in one of the interview participant's assertions that migrants are not doing their fair share in terms of community disaster response training, such as preparedness drills, despite the fact that local government survey data suggests that this is one of the areas in which migrants are most keen to be involved.

### **8.6.2 Social and economic capital at the frontline interface**

Although migrants generally seem to lack the political and informational capital that would allow them to influence the formulation of integration policies at the local scale, they appear to have been able to leverage other forms of capital at their disposal—mainly social and economic capital—to help them benefit from settlement and integration services.

Generally, the focus group participants fell into one of two camps. Either they were likely to develop their social capital with civil society groups, or to focus on their employment-based relationships. Rarely did they seem to promote both. This may simply be due to expediency, but it seems likely to be linked to other constraining factors, such as the types of paid employment migrants were able to secure. Within

this study, the link between paid employment and ethnonationality was quite stark. Filipino focus group participants were generally found to be more likely to have insecure forms of employment and were more likely to draw on the support of civil society associations (although there were exceptions). By contrast, European and American focus group participants were offered work-based support as a matter of course or were able to access it quite easily.

Many of the migrants spoken to as part of this study were supported by civil society groups. For some, these were friendship groups, providing migrants with links to coethnic migrants or leisure opportunities (particularly spouses/partners of foreign residents who were not in full-time employment). For others, links with migrant-supporting organisations proved more instrumental (particularly in the case of Filipino migrants). This included support to execute social security claims, support in finding paid employment and help to access certain services (e.g. medical services). The instrumental support that some focus group participants were able to garner seemed to be a function of their social capital—the apparent ability to capitalise on one's links with the 'right people'.

In the examples given above, the 'right people' were often coethnic migrants working for civil society organisations with varying degrees of informational capital. For example, one of the focus group participants had some knowledge of Japanese and Philippine labour laws and was able to exploit this knowledge to assist Filipino labour migrants. In other cases the right people were employers, who were able to use the resources (especially economic capital) available to their companies to support their employees in a number of areas. The focus group findings suggest that this support may include assistance to find suitable accommodation and health insurance coverage.

Migrants were also able to use their income to carry out other activities: activities to support their own settlement or integration (e.g. attending Japanese language classes), activities to promote the integration of other migrants (e.g. paying for a child's education-related fees) and other activities (e.g. financial remittances). While migrants in relatively well-paid employment are able to engage in all three activities, migrants in less well-paid jobs have to make difficult choices about which activities they can afford to forgo.

### **8.6.3 Migrants as lacking the ‘right’ linguistic capital**

One of the key findings from this research was the consensus by the interview participants that an inability to speak Japanese language was one of the main issues, if not the primary issue, facing migrants in Japan today. It was also considered to be inextricably linked to other issues affecting migrants, such as an inability to access medical services. This chimes with countless other studies of migrants in Japan and other countries.

Yet, the evidence provided by stakeholders from local governments and international exchange associations in support of this belief was not as robust as it was purported to be. Moreover, while many of the focus group participants identified communication barriers as being a problem, they did not necessarily consider it to be their main concern. Even among those who appreciated that learning Japanese would make their lives easier in some ways, there was not always a desire to learn Japanese.

One way to consider this apparent paradox is through the heuristic of linguistic capital. As noted in chapter four, although different forms of capital, such as linguistic capital, may be valued in multiple fields, they are not accorded equal value in every field. Learning Japanese is integral to primary socialisation in Japan and proficiency in the Japanese language is likely to be a prerequisite for participating in several spheres of activity. However, this does not necessarily mean that learning Japanese should be looked upon as a benign activity.

Migrants are presented as having a choice to learn Japanese or not, but choosing not to learn Japanese is presented as self-detrimental. Under this logic, migrants who lack the ‘right’ kind of linguistic capital (i.e. Japanese) are considered to be more likely to experience integration issues than those who have this capital. These individuals are also presented as having personal responsibility for the challenges they face with respect to integration.

At the same time, lack of Japanese-based linguistic capital is understood to be a legitimate excuse for excluding migrants from the very policy discussions that may affect them the most. For example, foreign residents’ assemblies in Osaka and Kanagawa require assembly members to be proficient in Japanese. This seems to be based on pragmatism, but making interpreters/translators available would not seem



unjustifiable. As some of the focus group participants pointed out, at least some communication issues can be overcome through language support from individuals within one's family, for example, or through greater availability of translation and interpreting services. The implication is that this issue is structural rather than, or in addition to, being individual in nature.

Although the focus group participants understood the value of being able to speak Japanese, they also recognised that many of their compatriots have 'no interest' in speaking Japanese. (It was clear that some of the focus group participants also shared this view). While there are many reasons why migrants may not want to learn Japanese (such as the lack of utility of learning Japanese if you are not planning to stay in the country permanently) those who make an active choice not to learn the Japanese language are implicitly engaged in a field struggle. (The same could be said of those who argue that local governments should provide more interpreting services, or that English should become more commonplace in Japan.) Hence, non-learning of Japanese could be viewed as a strategy of resistance that migrants may engage in.

The Japanese language is a form of cultural capital accorded value by Japanese ethnonationals. Greater competency in Japanese allows individuals to compete for more privileged positions in society, such as more prestigious jobs. Hence, a lack of willingness to learn Japanese is, to some degree, a form of nonconformity. By challenging the need to possess linguistic capital based on the Japanese language or by challenging the unquestioned primacy of this capital, these individuals are also challenging integration policies (especially assimilationist policies) based on the normative assumption that migrants *should* learn Japanese.

None of this is to deny the utility of Japanese as a form of linguistic capital—merely to recognise that the acquisition of linguistic capital, like any other form of capital, often comes at the expense of other forms of capital. This could be a material cost in the form of giving up time that could be used for paid employment or other activities; a social cost through the weakening one's ties with coethnic migrants; or a symbolic cost in the form of cultural distancing from one's homeland. For some migrants, it seems that these costs are too dear.

#### **8.6.4 Migrant capital and social citizenship at the local scale**

The concept of ‘local citizenship’, as formulated by Andrew and Goldsmith (1998), has been influential in studies on migrant integration in Japan since it was first applied to the Japanese context by Tegtmeier Pak (2000) and subsequently developed by Tsuda (2006a). While numerous works have incorporated the concept into their own analyses (including NIRA Shithizunshippu Kenkyūkai 2001; Sharpe 2010; Gottlieb 2012; Nagy 2012; Kashiwazaki 2013), the arguments propounded in Tsuda’s volume have received little critical attention to date beyond the original critique offered within the volume itself (in particular, Tsuda 2006c).

The findings of this study suggest that the concept of local citizenship, as formulated by Tsuda and others (Tsuda 2006a), is problematic. In particular, local citizenship seems to be preoccupied with the structural dimensions of citizenship at the expense of the agency of migrants as ‘local citizens’.

As mentioned in chapter two, Tsuda (2006c, 278–83) believes that migrants lack substantive (local) citizenship owing to their under-participation in integration programmes and services at the local scale. He attributes this lack of active civic participation to the instrumental economic motives of migrants, a sojourner mentality and ethnic segregation. This study demonstrates that a focus on migrant capital provides a useful way of reconsidering these issues and provides a critical corrective to previous work.

To begin with, Tsuda’s assertion that migrants’ work-centred lives make them ‘uninterested’ in using the immigrants services and programmes offered by municipal governments and civil society organisations (with the exception of basic necessities such as health insurance or emergency medical care) is only partially supported by the findings of this study. While the European and American focus group participants reported little or no reliance on local government support or migrant-supporting organisations, this did not seem to be due to a lack of interest in non-economic issues. Instead, those participants were able to execute their claims to certain social rights through employment-based opportunities. On the other hand, Filipino focus group participants (especially women in less secure forms of employment) were found to receive comparatively more support from civil society

organisations—especially ones identified through their own coethnic networks—to access or make better use of central and local government services and programmes.

Tsuda also identifies linguistic and cultural barriers as a key reason for the lack of cultural assimilation among foreign workers in Japan. As discussed in chapter four, migrants may be unable to speak Japanese fluently, especially the more formal Japanese required in administrative environments (linguistic capital), or they project embodied images or institutionalised symbols of non-belonging which limit their access to employment, education or other opportunities. This may be particularly true of less established migrants and non-*Nikkeijin* migrants.

While it is undoubtedly true that such barriers exist, the findings of this study suggest that more attention needs to be paid to the agency of migrants. In particular, some of the Filipino migrants in this study were found to have made an active choice not to learn Japanese (or, put another way, to acquire Japanese-based linguistic capital) as a countermeasure against cultural integration (or assimilation). This is not to suggest that ‘ethnic segregation’, as Tsuda describes it, is or is not a desirable state, but that such a phenomenon could also be studied as a form of cultural/linguistic resistance.

Moreover, there seems to have been a tendency in the literature to view migrants simply as service ‘consumers’ or ‘clients’ and to ignore the possibility of migrants as service providers in their own right. While many scholars recognise that some civil society organisations are run by migrants (for example, Yamanaka 2006), less attention has been paid to the work that migrants undertake as local government and civil society organisation employees.

More broadly, these findings suggest how Bourdieu’s ideas on capital can be used to reconsider citizenship as a key mechanism of distinction between migrants and Japanese ethnonationals (Bauder 2008). Both the formal and informal aspects of citizenship can render migrants more vulnerable than Japanese ethnonationals and this has been well-documented in the literature to date. However, a focus on migrants’ capital would also allow researchers to understand how migrants use their resources to make claims based on political, economic and social rights, or to resist encroachments on their rights.

## 9 Conclusion

### 9.1 Summary of key points

This study has endeavoured to develop a relational approach for understanding integration policies and policy-making in Japan, using Osaka and Yokohama as case studies. In doing so, this study has drawn on the relational dimensions of the concept of governance in order to illuminate the configuration of actors involved in producing integration policies; and it has employed a relational understanding of citizenship to explore the relationships between migrants and the key governmental and non-governmental actors involved. By viewing these integration policies and policy-making activities through a field-analytical lens, I have sought to further emphasise the relational nature of the policy-making process.

Through the findings presented here, it can be seen that the contribution of field theory to the analysis of integration policies goes beyond identifying and characterising ‘decision-makers’. In other words, it is not enough to say that central government, local government and civil society actors are involved in the production of integration policies. Rather, this study has aimed to show what the properties of these actors are (primarily through their use of capital) and what the logic of their relationships induce in terms of symbolic productions (including the institutionalisation of NPOs) and, inseparably, practices of intervention (especially integration policies and integration-related services).

To begin with, this study has cast a critical light on *tabunka kyōsei*. Far from being a fully-fledged policy paradigm in its own right, *tabunka kyōsei* seems to have been encumbered with ideological baggage from previous paradigms, especially internationalisation (*kokusaika*) and *nihonjinron*. The continuing impact of the latter is particularly evident in the persistent taboo surrounding the use of the term *imin* (‘immigrant’) outside of academic circles. Indeed, it is not clear whether *tabunka kyōsei* has replaced previous ideas around assimilation or sits alongside this policy approach. In any case, the more optimistic narratives based on *tabunka kyōsei* seem to have fallen short of their goal of including migrants as ‘key players’ in the integration drive. Migrants continue to be excluded from policy discussions, either

outright through ‘delegation’ or through restrictive criteria such as Japanese language proficiency.

The most significant change in the field of integration policy-making, however, has been the incorporation of central government actors. While previous studies have commented on the reluctance of the Japanese government to develop integration policies at the national scale, this study has shown that this is no longer the case. In particular, it uses field analysis to help explain how the reconfiguration of the field of integration policy-making was precipitated. The combined social and political capital of government agencies, local governments and non-governmental actors during the Koizumi administration seems to have disrupted the status quo, leading to greater involvement of central government actors in integration policy-making at the national scale.

At the same time, this study has shown how local government actors and NPOs have used strategies to make best use of their capital assets to influence policies at the national scale. A number of scholars have noted that international covenants and rights-based instruments have had an impact on Japanese policy-making (in particular, Gurowitz 1999), but the transnational lobbying activities of organisations such as *Ijūren* also deserve further attention.

Developments at the national scale seem to have stalled under the incumbent Abe administration due to political reluctance to relax Japan’s immigration laws (Roberts 2018). However, given the economic and demographic arguments in favour of increased immigration, and given that formal institutions have developed to formulate and implement integration policies at the national scale (e.g. the OPMFR) and the local scale (e.g. the GSTK), there is reason to believe that integration policies will continue to be formulated in a multi-scalar fashion.

The findings of this study also suggest that local executives may have an appreciable bearing on the direction of policy development locally. This has certainly been the case in Osaka Prefecture and Osaka City, and Kanagawa Prefecture and Yokohama City. While governors and mayors in these places have not led calls to implement specific policies, they seem to have been influential in setting the general direction for policy-making in those areas. In the case of Kanagawa and Yokohama, this has taken the form of the *minsai gaikō* (‘people-to-people diplomacy’) approach, which

seems to have created the conditions for a proactive response to migrant integration since the 1990s. By contrast, the political climate in Osaka has shifted towards more populist and economically-oriented policies in recent years, which seems to have pushed integration issues further down the political agenda.

Civil society organisations have long been at the forefront of integration, supporting migrants in Japan to settle and to access services, particularly in urban contexts. As noted in this study, the institutionalisation of civil society organisations in the mid-late 1990s led to the formation of specified NPOs. On the one hand, these NPOs have used this legal recognition (or symbolic capital) to build more formal partnerships with local governments and to engage in policy-making discussions as legally-recognised entities. At the same time, NPOs are now subject to a slightly greater degree of government oversight (albeit less than that desired by central government bureaucrats). As the ties that bind actors in the field of integration policy-making have become increasingly formalised, there are signs that this field is developing its own habitus—a shared terminology and ways of viewing problems that are distinct from those of other fields.

One of the benefits of field analysis is that it allows researchers to study structure and agency simultaneously. Much attention has been paid to the structures that affect migrants' integration in Japan, particularly through the lens of 'local citizenship', but this study has also investigated how migrants from different backgrounds have used their capital resources to negotiate social citizenship at the local scale.

## **9.2 Developing relational approaches in social policy**

In developing a relational approach for the exploration of integration policies and policy-making, this study has introduced new ways of conceptualising and analysing these issues within migration studies, with broader applications and implications for other areas of social policy.

While this study has sought to apply a relational approach to a specific set of policies, other social policy areas could also benefit from adopting such an approach. While Bourdieu did not discuss many policy areas explicitly, sociologists have applied Bourdieu's work to a number of policy areas, particularly education (Lingard, Rawolle, and Taylor 2005). By contrast, a perusal of key social policy journals

reveals very few examples of field analysis in action. Peillon's (1998) proposal for a 'welfare field' designed to provide a robust sociological analysis of welfare is one of the few exceptions, but other examples are hard to find in the subsequent two decades.

While Bourdieu-inspired field analysis has been used in a variety of research applications and disciplines, there seems to be very little use of this analytical approach to understand policies and policy-making processes. This study has sought to build on the work of scholars such as Dubois (2014a; 2014b) in developing a field analytical approach designed to explore policy-making in relation to public policy, and more specifically the production of integration policies (cf. Scholten 2011; Uitermark 2012).

This study is also novel in its treatment of governance and citizenship. Although the concept of governance is now widely used within social policy and administration, this study has sought to focus on the relational aspects of governance; more specifically, the relations between the key actors involved in the production of integration policies in Japan. Although Bourdieu was not a governance theorist, and avoided the language of governance because of its normative associations, this study has sought to demonstrate that his analytical toolkit can be used to illuminate governance relationships.

To begin with, it has recast the configuration of actors involved in the governance of integration policy-making within a field setting, which allows the dynamics within governance systems to be scrutinised more critically. This approach also has the potential to challenge the behavioural assumptions of governance theories that view actors' decisions as grounded in rational choice.

While Osaka and Yokohama are, administratively speaking, cities with fixed boundaries under the jurisdiction of distinct local governments operating within a three-tier system of government, adopting such a functional perspective does little to improve our understanding of the way integration policies are developed in Japan. Rather, the findings demonstrate how the interactions and ties between similar actors in different 'regional settings' may be leading to different outcomes within those settings. In other words, the 'regional assemblages' (Allen and Cochrane 2007) of actors which interact to produce integration policies affecting Osaka and

Yokohama—either partially or entirely, concurrently or otherwise—are negotiating and implementing policies differently, despite the similarities of the actors and institutions involved.

### **9.3 Implications for future research**

Qualitative research was carried out with a wide variety of stakeholders for this study, including local government representatives, NPO representatives and foreign residents, particularly those based in Osaka and Yokohama. However, a focus for future studies could be more research with actors at the national and transnational scales. While policy documents were collected and analysed to provide information about the role and intention of central government within the field of integration policy-making, interviews with central government policymakers might have provided information not available from these sources. In addition, future studies could aim to investigate the influence of transnational actors based in the East Asian region or beyond.

This study has sought to analyse the integration policy-making process in a very specific fashion, namely through the construction of an analytic device labelled the field of integration policy-making. In this study, the actors involved in the production of integration policies were viewed as members of a single field, but there are other ways to investigate the same phenomenon using field theory.

For example, another approach would be to consider the actors that help make integration policies as members of multiple fields, or to look at each group of actors as forming their own field (Medvetz 2015). Using the latter perspective, local government networks such as the GSTK could be viewed as members of a field in its own right. This could help researchers focus on the relations between the GSTK members in more detail, and the outputs and outcomes arising from those relations. However, by focusing on a few relations rather than the relations between the wider array of actors involved in the integration policy-making process, there is a risk of misunderstanding the influence of organisations such as the GSTK, so such an approach should be treated with care.

Yet another approach, favoured by Eyal (2006), is to look at the spaces between fields, and organisations' roles in creating and maintaining institutional divisions.



Viewed as ‘boundary organisations’, organisations involved in integration policy-making processes could be considered to derive their power from their ability to mobilise or reinvest their capital to convert one form of capital to another.

For example, organisations which lie at the boundary between the immigration policy-making field and the integration policy-making field may have an important role to play in determining where immigration policy ends and where integration policy begins, or vice versa. This brings us back to the point made in the introduction, namely that immigration policies and integration policies should be viewed as part of a continuum of migration policies.

This study employed qualitative research methods to explore integration policies and policy-making processes, but quantitative research methods can also be used to explore these phenomena relationally. Future studies could adopt methods such as social network analysis or correspondence analysis to yield further insights regarding migration policy-making processes, either in the Japanese context or beyond.

## **9.4 Final remarks**

While the field of immigration policy-making in Japan seems to be a ‘mature field’, in terms of the stability of the configuration of actors involved, the field of integration policy-making could be described as an ‘emergent field’ or ‘field in flux’ (Stringfellow and Maclean 2014). As discussed earlier, central government has long been regarded as sitting on the sidelines and it has only been through the efforts of a range of governmental and non-governmental actors that central government actors now seem to be taking a more active role in developing integration policies. At the same time, non-governmental actors gained greater legitimacy after the mid-1990s in the form of specified NPOs, which has changed their relationship with central government. These two developments have combined to create a new dynamic between central government, local government and non-governmental actors.

What will this mean for the future of integration policies and processes in Japan? To begin with, as these relationships mature, and the demographic balance in Japan continues to change, it seems reasonable to assume that we are likely to see more integration policies in the future.

What will the nature of these policies be? This is less clear, but the findings from this study suggest that the integration policy paradigm in Japan is gradually changing. One possibility is that there will be a full shift to *tabunka kyōsei*. However, it is not clear what this could look like. There has certainly not been a clean break between previous policy paradigms, favouring assimilation, and *tabunka kyōsei*. Moreover, there has been growing criticism of *tabunka kyōsei* by migrants, particularly *Zainichi* communities. Whether this will lead to a new policy paradigm or incremental changes in the *tabunka kyōsei/kokusaika* paradigm is difficult to tell.

What is clear, however, is that researchers should continue to investigate these issues in Japan, and other Asian contexts, in order to challenge the Eurocentric scholarship that has characterised ‘Western’ literature on migration studies for far too long. This study offers a new contribution to these debates in the form of a multi-scalar study of integration policy-making processes as found within specific Japanese contexts. It has found that there is value in scrutinising integration policy-making processes at local scales as well as at the national scale. In doing so it has sought to challenge the idea of the ‘nation-state’ as having a single integration regime. In the case of Japan, I would argue that there are multiple integration regimes at the local scale. Even if we consider just two major Japanese cities, namely Osaka and Yokohama, there are many similarities, but also idiosyncrasies including local politics, the priorities of the local executive, and sites of democratic engagement by foreign residents, all of which may be socially, politically or historically contingent variables.

But we can go further. Greater cross-national research involving Asian and non-Asian contexts, comparing subnational regions or cities as well as countries, could help enrich migration studies and allow it to evolve in new directions.



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## **Appendices**

### **Appendix A: Interview and focus group materials**

1. Information sheet for interview participants (English)
2. Information sheet for interview participants (Japanese)
3. Information sheet for focus group participants (Japanese/furigana)
4. Topic guide for semi-structured interviews (bilingual)
5. Topic guide for focus groups (English)
6. Consent sheet for research participants (English)
7. Consent sheet for research participants (Japanese)

## Information sheet for interview participants

You will be given a copy of this information sheet

**Project title: Governance, citizenship and migration policies in Japan**

We would like to invite you to participate in this postgraduate research project. You should only participate if you want to. Choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.

### **What is the purpose of the study?**

The aim of this study is to understand how foreign residents in Japan are being integrated into Japanese society. We're trying to find out how foreign residents engage with the national government, local government and NGOs in decisions which affect their lives.

### **Why have I been chosen?**

You have been chosen because, as a representative of an NGO that supports foreign residents, you have first-hand experience of the issues that affect the integration of migrants in Japan.

### **What will happen if I take part?**

It is up to you to decide whether to take part or not. If you decide to take part you will be invited to take part in an interview with the researcher. The details of the interview will be confirmed shortly. Please allow up to 1.5 hours for the interview, but it is likely to be shorter. An audio recording of the interview will be made.

If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and you will be asked to sign a consent form.

Regardless of whether you agree to take part or not, you are still free to withdraw from the study at any point before 31 December 2015 and without giving a reason.

### **What will my information be used for?**

Your information will be used in the researcher's Ph.D. thesis and may be used in other research outputs such as presentations at conferences and journal articles. You will be given an opportunity to see any outputs from the research before they are published.

Your personal information will be held stored securely on a University computer for up to ten years after the interview, but only the researcher will be able to access this information.

**Will my information be treated confidentially?**

Any information you give us will be treated confidentially. This means that no one will be able to identify you from the information that you give us. If you are quoted in the researcher's Ph.D. thesis or any other research output, your quote will be anonymised and pseudonyms will be used.

There are some limits to confidentiality: if the researcher sees or hears something in the interview that makes him think that you, or someone else, is at significant risk of harm, he may have to break confidentiality and speak to a member of staff about this. If possible, the researcher will tell you if he has to do this.

**Further contact details**

If you have any questions or require more information about this study, please contact the researcher using the following contact details:

[Personal information removed]

In the event that any issues arise from the actions of the researcher, you can seek further advice from the University of Bristol using the details below:

[Personal information removed]

N.B. Please contact the University of Bristol only if you feel that these issues cannot be addressed by the researcher.



## プロジェクト名：日本におけるガバナンス、シチズンシップと移民政策～大阪と横浜のケーススタディ

### 調査対象の方への本研究の説明

この調査研究にご協力いただけますようお願いいたします。ご興味がおありでしたら、ぜひご参加いただきたいと思います。参加していただかなくても差支えございませんので、ご自由にお選びください。参加を決定される前に、本研究の目的や調査対象者の役割について説明したいと思いますので、以下の文章をよくお読みください。ご質問があればお気軽にご連絡ください。ほかの人とご相談いただいても結構です。

### 本調査研究の目的は？

この調査研究の目的は、日本における外国人住民が日本社会にいかにして統合されるかを理解することです。具体的には、海外的な視点から見れば、外国人住民に対して政策といえば、「トップダウン」すなわち政府が政策を立て、地方自治体または国民に伝えることが一般的です。一方、日本の場合、政府は日本は移民のいない国であるとしているので、移民政策が立てられていません。しかし、現状は地方によって外国人住民が相対的に多いところがあります。かくして、本研究の目的は相対的に高い外国人住民比率を示す地域における地方自治体や NGO・NPO などが外国人住民に対してどのように対応しているかを検討することです。

### なぜ、あなたが選ばれたのでしょうか？

外国人住民支援組織の代表である貴方は、外国人住民の社会統合に対する課題に直接関わった経験があるので、選ばれました。

### 本調査研究に参加すると何をすることになるのでしょうか？

参加するかどうか自由に決めてください。参加していただく場合、研究者とのインタビューをお願いするつもりです。インタビューの詳細は、参加が決まってからメールでお知らせいたします。インタビューは 1 時間以内に終わらせたいと思いますが、余裕をもって 1 時間半を予定していただけるとありがたいです。許可が得られればインタビューの録音もしたいと思います。

参加いただけるようでしたら、この調査の説明につづき、参加・協力の同意書にご署名をお願いします。同意いただいた場合でも、2015 年 12 月 31 日まで、ご自身の都合でいつでも、本調査研究から脱退することができます。

### **インタビューの内容は何に使用されるのでしょうか？**

本調査研究対象者のインタビュー内容は、研究者である私の博士論文に使用しますが、研究会の発表や専門誌の論文などにも掲載することもあるかもしれません。ただ掲載する場合には、事前にお見せする機会を作りたいと思います。

インタビューの後、研究対象者のインタビューに関する録音は 10 年間ブリストル大学のコンピューターに保管されますが、研究者である私以外に誰もアクセスができませんので、ご安心ください。

### **調査対象者であるあなたの個人情報を守られますか？**

調査対象者のプライバシーおよび個人情報の秘密を守るため、あらゆる予防策が講じられます。そのため対象者の身元は誰も判明できないようにしておきます。調査対象者から匿名の希望があれば、調査内容は博士論文や他研究での報告にも匿名で引用されるようにします。

しかしながら、秘密保持には限界があります。研究者である私は、調査対象者や関係者が生命の危機など危険な状況にあると判断した場合に限り、守秘義務を破り、大学教員に相談する場合があります。その場合でも、まず当該調査対象者と相談してからにしたいと考えております。

### **より詳細な情報が欲しい場合には以下にご連絡ください。**

本調査研究およびインタビューの詳細に関するお問い合わせや、ご不明な点、ご質問などございましたら、どうぞ直接お電話いただくか、下記メールアドレスまでご連絡ください。

[Personal information removed]

もし研究者である私にご不満がおありの場合は、ブリストル大学と直接連絡が取れます。そのときには下記あてにご連絡ください。

[Personal information removed]

※ お願い：ブリストル大学と直接コンタクトする前に、研究者である私に直接言っていただきたいと思います。ご検討ください。

## プロジェクト名：日本における、市民権、行政と移民政策～大阪と横浜 のケーススタディ

### 調査対象の方へのこの研究の説明

この調査研究にご協力いただけますようお願いいたします。ご興味がおありでしたら、ぜひご参加  
いただきたいと思います。参加していただかなくても差支えございませんので、ご自由にお選びくださ  
い。参加を決定される前に、この研究の目的や調査対象者の役割について説明したいと思いま  
すので、以下の文章をよくお読みください。ご質問があればお気軽にご連絡ください。ほかの人とご  
相談いただいても結構です。

### この調査研究の目的は？

この調査研究の目的は、日本における外国人住民が日本社会にいかにして統合されるかを  
理解することです。具体的には、外国人住民の生活に大きく影響する政府、地方自治体や  
NGO・NPO などと外国人住民が関わるかを検討することです。

### なぜ、あなたが選ばれたのでしょうか？

外国籍住民として貴方は、外国人住民の社会統合に対する課題に直接関わった経験があるの  
で、選ばれました。

### この調査研究に参加すると何をすることになるのでしょうか？

参加するかどうか自由に決めてください。参加して下さる場合、研究者とのインタビューをお願いす  
るつもりです。インタビューの詳細は、参加が決まってからメールでお知らせいたします。インタビュー  
は1時間以内に終わらせたいと思いますが、余裕をもって1時間半を予定していただけるとありが  
たいです。許可が得られればインタビューの録音もしたいと思います。

さんか ちょうさ せつめい さんか きょうりょく どういしょ しょめい ねが  
参加いただけるようでしたら、この調査の説明につづき、参加・協力の同意書にご署名をお願いします。  
どうい ばあい  
ます。同意いただいた場合でも、2015 年 12 月 31 日まで、ご自身の都合でいつでも、  
ほんちようさけんきゅう だったい  
本調査研究から脱退することができます。

### いん た び ゅ ないよう なに しょう インタビューの内容は何に使用されるのでしょうか？

ほんちようさけんきゅうたいしやうしや いん た び ゅ ないよう けんきゅうしや わたし はくしろんぶん しょう  
本調査研究対象者のインタビュー内容は、研究者である私の博士論文に使用しますが、  
けんきゅうかい はつびよう せんもんし ろんぶん けいさい けいさい ばあい  
研究会の発表や専門誌の論文などにも掲載することもあるかもしれません。ただ掲載する場合に  
じぜん み きかい つく おも  
は、事前にお見せする機会を作りたいと思います。

いん た び ゅ ご けんきゅうたいしやうしや いん た び ゅ かん ろくおん 10ねんかんぶりす とるだいがく こんび ゅ た  
インタビューの後、研究対象者のインタビューに関する録音は10年間ブリストル大学のコンピューター  
ほ かん けんきゅうしや わたしいがい だれ あんしん  
ーに保管されますが、研究者である私以外に誰もアクセスができませんので、ご安心ください。

### ちようさたいしやうしや こじんじようほう まも 調査対象者であるあなたの個人情報を守られますか？

ちようさたいしやうしや ぶら い ばし こじんじようほう ひみつ まも よほうさく こう  
調査対象者のプライバシーおよび個人情報の秘密を守るため、あらゆる予防策が講じられます。  
たいしやうしや みもと だれ はんめい ちようさたいしやうしや とくめい きほう  
そのため対象者の身元は誰も判明できないようにしておきます。調査対象者から匿名の希望があ  
ちようさないよう はくしろんぶん たけんきゅう ほうこく とくめい いんよう  
れば、調査内容は博士論文や他研究での報告にも匿名で引用されるようにします。

ひ み つ ほ じ げんかい けんきゅうしや わたし ちようさたいしやうしや かんけいしや せいめい  
しかしながら、秘密保持には限界があります。研究者である私は、調査対象者や関係者が生命  
き き きけん じようきよう はんたん ばあい かぎ し ゅ ひ ぎ む やぶ だいがくきょういん そうだん  
の危機など危険な状況にあると判断した場合に限り、守秘義務を破り、大学教員に相談する  
ばあい ばあい とうがいちようさたいしやうしや そうだん かんが  
場合があります。その場合でも、まず当該調査対象者と相談してからにしたいと考えております。

### しょうさい じようほう ほ ばあい い か れんらく より詳細な情報が欲しい場合には以下にご連絡ください。

ほんちようさけんきゅう いん た び ゅ しょうさい かん と あ ふめい しつもん  
本調査研究およびインタビューの詳細に関するお問い合わせや、ご不明な点、ご質問などござい  
ましたら、どうぞ直接お電話いただくか、下記メールアドレスまでご連絡ください。  
[Personal information removed]

けんきゅうしや わたし ふまん ばあい ぶりす とるだいがく ちよくせつれんらく と  
もし研究者である私にご不満がおありの場合は、ブリストル大学と直接連絡が取れます。そのとき  
か き れんらく  
には下記あてにご連絡ください。  
[Personal information removed]

ねが だいがく ちよくせつ こん たくと まえ けんきゅうしや わたし ちよくせつ  
※ お願い：ブリストル大学と直接コンタクトする前に、研究者である私に直接言っていたきた  
おも けんとう  
いと思います。ご検討ください。

## Interview topic guide

<b>予備</b>	<b>Preliminaries</b>
挨拶を交わすこと	Exchange formalities
対象者の個人情報の確認：氏名や役職など	Confirm the participant's details: name and position in organisation
説明シートの頂戴の確認	Check that participant has read information sheet and whether they have any questions
同意書の紹介と説明	Introduce the consent form with a verbal explanation
対象者が録音に同意の確認	Check that the participant is happy for the interview to be recorded
<b>外国人住民のイメージ</b>	<b>Perceptions of foreign residents</b>
外国人住民の問題と「ネイティブ」の住民の問題は異なるように見られていますか。	Are the problems faced by foreign residents regarded as different to those faced by 'native' residents?
その問題は在留外国人のグループによって違いますか。	Do these vary across different groups of residents?
外国人住民は一般大衆にいかに見られていますか。メディアにいかに表示されていますか。	How does the public perceive foreign residents? How are they portrayed in the media? → link this to integration policies
<b>多文化共生や社会統合政策</b>	<b>Integration policies</b>
外国人住民が直面している課題は最大の課題は何ですか。	What do you view as the major challenges with regards to immigration / integration?
その課題と取り組むため、どのような政策や方針が導入されていますか。	What policies and programmes have been introduced to tackle cohesion / promote coexistence? → prompt to ascertain differences between local and national initiatives
そうした政策や方針は外国人住民に関するニーズいかに対応していますか。	How are these policies addressing the needs of foreign residents?
大阪市における外国人住民に対して政策や方針などはいかに展開してきましたか。	How have these policies been developed, i.e. who is involved (formally or informally) in the development of integration policies? → has the interviewee's organisation played any role in the development of these policies?

NGO のバックグラウンド／活躍	Background / current activities
NGO の設けた状況は何でしたか。	What were the circumstances that led to the organisation being set up?
現在の目的は何ですか。NGO はどのような役割を果たしていますか。(支援、擁護など)	What is the purpose of your organisation? What role does your organisation play? (Support, advocacy, etc.)
NGO はいかに運営をしているのでしょうか？例えば、支配構造。 財源などはどこから得ていますか。	How is your organisation run (e.g. governance structures)? How is the organisation funded? → relationship with government
外国人住民はコリアNGOセンターの活動を影響できますか。例えば、フィードバックができる外国人住民フォーラムなどがありますか。	Do foreign residents get a say in the activities run by the organisation? E.g. through forums?
NGO は何人／どの地域から来られた外国人住民に対して支援していますか。	How many / what kind of foreign residents does the organisation support? → come back to this point in the <i>Close</i> regarding focus groups
外国人住民は NGO の活躍についていかに知ることになりますか。	How do they find out about the organisation? → What is the organisation's scope? Ikuno-ku, Osaka or wider?
90 年代より、NGO はいかに変わっていますか。何か変更（社会的、文化的、政治的、経済的など）又は主要なイベントなどに影響されていますか。	What changes (socio-cultural, political, economic, etc.) or major events has the organisation seen / been affected by since its inception? → link back to immigration / integration <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Prompt around Immigration Control Act, Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, "Lehmann Shock, hate speeches, etc.</li> <li>• Probe around other "critical moments" during the rest of the interview</li> </ul>
他の組織・機関	Other institutions
日本における外国人住民を支援している機関はどのような感じですか。	What is your impression of the institutions designed to support / integrate foreign residents? → prompt around changes among these

	organisations if appropriate
地域の組織（外国人住民を支援している NGO・NPO や企業など）との関係はどのような関係ですか。	What is the relationship between this organisation and other local organisations? → prompt around other organisations nationally or internationally if appropriate
NGO の取り組みは他組織に伝播していますか。結果はどのような感じですか。	Do you share your experiences with other organisations?
<b>将来</b>	<b>Future</b>
将来は、外国人住民又は NGO を含めて外国人住民を支援している組織にとって、最大の課題は何でしょうか。	What are the major challenges for foreign residents and organisations supporting them (such as yours) going forward?
<b>終わり</b>	<b>Close</b>
次のステップ	Explain what will happen next and how the interview data will be used → mention focus groups if appropriate
同意を収めること	Obtain written consent from the participant to use their information
感謝と終わり	Thank you and close
挨拶を交わすこと	Exchange formalities

## Focus group topic guide

### Introduction (5-10 mins)

- Introduce the research project (what it's about, why I'm doing it)
- Explain what the focus group will involve and check that everyone's happy to be there
- Check that participants are happy for the focus group to be recorded
- Ask participants to do a quick jiko-shokai (N.B. this will help with the transcription)
- Ask participants to fill in a short questionnaire about themselves during the focus group or at the end (N.B. this will help with the analysis)
- Briefly explain about the consent form and ask them to sign it before they leave

### Exercise (5-10 mins)

Ask participants to think about different sources of support that may be important to them:

- Government: national government, prefectural government, city government, local ward
- Civil society: migrant-supporting NGOs/NPOs, other NGOs/NPOs
- Employment-based: trade unions, employers, professional groups
- Social networks: family, friends, clubs, hobby groups
- Media: internet, newspapers, social media
- International: embassy, home country government, etc.
- Other

Ask participants to rate their importance on a Likert scale OR rank them in order of most to least important.

Briefly ask participants to give feedback to the group.

### Discussion (40-60 mins)

Starting with the most important source of support, get participants to discuss the following:

#### Who and what?

- Who have been the key sources of support?
- What kind of support have they provided?

#### Relationships and influence

- How would you describe your relationship with these sources? E.g. provider-user
- How involved do you feel?



- Have you been able to feedback to different orgs about the services or support they provide? Did it make a difference?

### **Outcomes and impact**

- Have your experiences encouraged you to get more involved in supporting migrants?
- In what ways? E.g. volunteering with an NGO/NPO
- In what ways has it helped? What else could they have done? Or what didn't they do?

Repeat the discussion for the second most important source, the third, etc.

N.B. Allow participants to flow on to other sources but bring the discussion back if it begins to drift OR if there are outstanding questions

### **Prompts**

Look for opportunities to encourage participants to discuss the following (if appropriate):

#### **Time**

Think about key events—pre-arrival, post-arrival, getting a job—what were the biggest challenges you faced as you entered Japan?

#### **Space / scale**

Do you feel part of your local community? Or part of Japanese society more generally? What scale is the most important for people?

#### **Collaboration**

Do you think the different orgs work with each other? Do you have examples of this? If they don't, do you think they should?

### **Close (5-10 mins)**

- Thank participants for taking part and explain next steps
- Make sure all participants receive their gift cards
- Make sure all participants sign the informed consent sheets

## Consent sheet for participants


Complete this form after you have read the information sheet and/or listened to an explanation about the research.

**Project title: Governance, citizenship and migration policies in Japan**


Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organising the research must explain the project to you before you agree to take part. If you have any questions arising from the information sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this consent form to keep and refer to at any time.

	Yes	No
I have read and understood the information about the project, as provided in the information sheet dated _____.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions about the project and my participation.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I voluntarily agree to participate in the project.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
I understand I can withdraw at any time without giving reasons and that I will not be penalised for withdrawing nor will I be questioned on why I have withdrawn.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Furthermore, I understand that I will be able to withdraw my data at any point before 31 December 2015.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The procedures regarding confidentiality have been clearly explained (e.g. use of names, pseudonyms, anonymisation of data, etc.) to me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
The limits regarding confidentiality have been explained to me.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>


The use of my anonymised data in research and publications has been explained to me.



I understand that at the end of the project my data will be anonymised and stored securely at the University of Bristol for up to ten years.



I, along with the researcher, agree to sign and date this informed consent form.



**Participant's statement:**

I \_\_\_\_\_

agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above and the information sheet about the project and I understand what the research study involves.

Signed

Date

**Investigator's statement:**

I \_\_\_\_\_

confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the proposed research to the participant.

Signed

Date

## プロジェクト名：日本におけるガバナンス、シチズンシップと移民政策～大阪と横浜のケーススタディ

### 究への参加・協力の同意書

本研究の説明を読んだ後又は研究者の方から説明をもらった後、下記の同意書に必要な情報を入力してください。

本研究に参加しようと検討していただきありがとうございます。参加について決定する前に研究者はプロジェクトを説明しなければなりません。ご質問がある場合は、参加するかどうかを決定する前に、研究者にお問い合わせください。いつでも参照するために、研究者は対象者にこの同意書のコピーをお渡しします。

1 つにチェックを入れてください → はい いいえ

- 私は\_\_年\_\_月\_\_日付けの説明シートを読んで、プロジェクトに関する情報を理解しています。
- 私はプロジェクトの参加についてやインタビューに関しては質問をする機会があることを理解しています。
- 私は自主的にプロジェクトに参加することに同意します。
- 私は理由に関係なく、いつでも撤回することができます。プロジェクトを撤回することになったら、罰せられることやその理由については質問されないことを理解しています。
- さらに2015年12月31日までにいつでもプロジェクトを撤回することができることも理解しています。
- 私は機密性に関する手続きは完全に説明されています。  
(名前やデータの匿名化など)

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

- 私は秘密保持の限界について説明されています。
- 私は研究や出版物の匿名データの使用について説明されています。
- 研究のプロジェクトが終わったら、データの秘密が確保されて、最大10年間ブリストル大学で厳重に保存されていることを理解しています。
- 私は研究者と一緒に、この同意書に署名します。

<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

### 対象者の声明

私は上記のプロジェクトが完全に説明されていることを理解して、研究に参加することに同意します。上記に書かれた説明文やプロジェクトに関する説明シートは全て読んで研究調査についても完全に理解しています。

氏名： ※ 仮名・ローマ字

署名： 日付： 年 月 日

### 研究者の声明

私は対象者に研究のプロジェクトについてや、予想できるリスクについて丁寧に説明しました。

氏名： ※ 仮名・ローマ字

署名： 日付： 年 月 日



## Appendix B: Social security systems in Japan

Scheme	Category
Public pensions ( <i>kōteki nenkin</i> )	National basic pension
	Income-related pension:
	For employees of private firms
	For mainly public sector employees
Health services and health insurance ( <i>kenkō hoken</i> )	For the self-employed (non-mandatory)
	Employees and their families' health insurance
	National health insurance for the self-employed and their families
Personal social services	Health services for the elderly (aged 70 and over)
Unemployment insurance ( <i>koyō hoken</i> ) and related policies	Unemployment allowances
	Employment promotion projects
Work-related accident insurance ( <i>rōsai hoken</i> )	
Family benefits	Child allowances ( <i>kodomo teate</i> )
	Maternity leave allowances
	Day-care services for children
Public assistance ( <i>seikatsu hogo</i> )	

Source: [http://www.mofa.go.jp/j\\_info/japan/socsec/maruo/table1.html#2](http://www.mofa.go.jp/j_info/japan/socsec/maruo/table1.html#2)

Scheme	Finance	Benefit		Main function (ILO classification)
		In-kind	In-cash	
Public pensions	Social insurance		X	Old age, survivors, invalidity benefits
Health services and health insurance	Social insurance	X		Sickness and health
Personal social services	Tax*	X		Old age, invalidity benefits
Unemployment insurance and related policies	Social insurance		X	Unemployment, family benefits
Work-related accident insurance	Social insurance	X	X	Employment injury
Family benefits	Tax	X	X	Family benefits
Public assistance ( <i>seikatsu hogo</i> )	Tax	X	X	Social assistance and others

\*except for long-term care insurance

Source: <http://www.ipss.go.jp/s-info/e/ssj2014/PDF/ssj2014.pdf>

## Appendix C: Artwork from a government leaflet about the points system

# Points-Based Preferential Immigration Treatment for Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals

Under the points-based system, foreign nationals recognized as “highly-skilled foreign professionals” will be given preferential immigration treatment!



### The Three Categories of Activities of Highly-Skilled Foreign Professionals

#### ✓ Advanced academic research activities [Highly Skilled Professional(i)(a)]

Activities of engaging in research, research guidance or education based on a contract entered into with a public or private organization in Japan.



#### ✓ Advanced specialized/ technical activities [Highly Skilled Professional(i)(b)]

Activities of engaging in work requiring specialized knowledge or skills in the field of natural sciences or humanities based on a contract entered into with a public or private organization in Japan.



#### ✓ Advanced business management activities [Highly Skilled Professional(i)(c)]

Activities of engaging in the operation or management of a public or private organization in Japan.



For further details, please turn to the Points Calculation Table overleaf

Foreign nationals, who have been permitted entry and residence as a highly-skilled professional, are entitled to the follow types of preferential treatment.

#### Highly Skilled Professional(i)

- (1) Permission for multiple purposes of activities
- (2) Grant of the “five years” period of stay
- (3) Easing of requirements for permanent residence
- (4) Permission for the spouse of the highly-skilled foreign professional to work
- (5) Permission for the parent(s) to accompany the highly-skilled foreign professional to Japan under certain conditions
- (6) Permission for a domestic worker to accompany the highly-skilled foreign professional to Japan under certain conditions
- (7) Preferential processing of entry and residence procedures

#### Highly Skilled Professional(ii)

- a. In conjunction with the activities of “Highly Skilled Professional (i)”, permitted to engage in almost all of the activities of statuses of residence based on employment
  - b. Granted an indefinite period of stay
  - c. Eligible for the preferential treatment of the abovementioned (3) to (6)
- ※ “Highly Skilled Professional (ii)” is for foreign nationals who have engaged in activities of “Highly Skilled Professional (i)” for three years or more.

Source: Immigration Bureau of Japan, Ministry of Justice, revised on 26 April 2017, [http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact\\_3/en/index.html](http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/newimmiact_3/en/index.html)



